

JPRS-NEA-84-021

6 February 1984

Near East/South Asia Report

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PRESS CONFERENCE IN ATHENS ON TRIAL OF ARMENIANS IN BELGRADE

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 27 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] The Defense Council for the two Armenian young men detained in Belgrade held a press conference yesterday noon in a hotel in Athens.

Attending the press conference were a large number of journalists from morning and afternoon papers published in Athens, representatives of AFP and the Athense News Agency as well as the Athens correspondent of a number of Yugoslav papers.

During the press conference, the Defense Council explained to the audience the goals of the conference which primarily concerned the following four points:

- a) The fact that the trial of the two Armenians is kept closed to the public.
- b) H. K. Levonian's state of health and the inadequacy of health care.
- c) The fact that the Yugoslav student was not killed by the Armenian fighters.
- d) The demand of the Armenian people for the release of the two brave Armenian fighters.

Representatives of the Defense Council gave elaborate responses to the questions asked by those attending the conference. Later, more intimate conversations and an exchange of views took place between the journalists and representatives of the Defense Council.

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CSO: 4605/34

TURKISH AMBASSADOR ACCUSED OF ANTI-ARMENIAN ACTIVITIES

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 27 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] The Armenian Cause Committee of the Eastern United States has prepared a pamphlet demanding the expulsion of Sukru Elekdag, the Turkish ambassador to the United States, as an undesirable person.

On the last page of the pamphlet the stance and the viewpoint of the Armenian Cause Committee are explained.

The pamphlet emphasizes that Elekdag has misused his diplomatic privileges by disseminating false information personally and through offices collaborating with him to distort, with premeditated malice, the facts about the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians by Turkey .

Elekdag employed letters, announcements and articles in large-circulation papers to realize his dark political motives and to disseminate unfounded and distorted information. He also slandered Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey in 1915, and distorted his published works about the Armenians. In addition, Elekdag termed the Armenian massacres of 1915 a "myth", which hurt the feelings and sensibilities of numerous Americans (survivors of the massacres and their children and grandchildren who are now settled in the United States). Those who experienced the calamity of 1915 and witnessed the massacres feel scorned and ridiculed by these denials and distortions.

Unsatisfied with all this, Elekdag also pressured U.S. congressmen, administrators, journalists and schools by condemning them as "fomentors of terrorism" whenever these individuals and organizations mentioned the Armenian genocide in their public statements.

He also tried by other means to threaten and to prevent Americans from commemorating Armenians who perished during the massacres and from expressing the reality of the genocide.

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CSO: 4605/34

FOREIGN AID POLICIES CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 21 Dec 83 p 5

[Article by Dr Ibrahim al-'Isawi: "Foreign Aid and the Humiliation of Subordination"]

[Text] The concept that major capitalist countries are trying to promote about the assistance or aid they offer to Third World countries is that the impetus for offering these funds is moral or humanitarian and that it is above any selfish design or interest. Many people in Third World countries, yielding to pressure from foreign propaganda and in the absence of honest national information, may believe that this assistance consists of contributions or grants that are not to be paid back. In fact, a few people may believe the allegations made by these countries that offer this aid: they allege that the assistance they offer is a charitable gift and that it entails no favors and no harm.

It is true that these concepts are as far as anything can be from the truth and from reality. This is because the largest part of this assistance consists of nothing but loans which are offered by governments or international organizations whose management is controlled by the major capitalist countries. Foremost among these countries, of course, is the United States of America.

Conditional Loans

The greater part of foreign assistance--80 percent of it--comes in the form of loans that have to be paid back in a set period of time with an agreed upon interest rate. These loans are not of the kind that is called easy-term loans, as the term assistance might suggest they are. In other words, these loans, or most of them, are not always distinguished by the fact that they have terms that are more favorable than those that come with loans from commercial establishments. In fact, in the limited cases where [terms for] these government loans may be deemed easy compared with terms for commercial loans, these loans are linked with a number of [other] conditions such as those that have to do with utilization of the loan; management of the project that will benefit from the loan; future expansion possibilities in the branch of the activity with which the project is affiliated; the sale prices for the project's products; the importation of a product similar to that produced by the project; special conditions regarding proportional contributions to the project's capital by the government, the public sector and the private sector; the kind of treatment that the foreign or local private sector should get from the government that is getting the loan; or all these conditions together.

A Custodial Arrangement

In fact, these conditions many times are such that a lender--the U.S. government, other governments of major industrial countries, international financing and lending organizations such as the IBRD and the IMF which are under the influence of major industrial countries in the capitalist world--will set up a custodial arrangement to watch over the economic and financial policy, and even the foreign policy, of the country that is receiving these loans.

It is no secret that the U.S. government--represented by the Agency for International Development (U.S. AID)--the IBRD and the IMF have specific demands with regard to Egypt's policies in the area of prices, price subsidies, the rate of exchange for the pound, the import policy, and so on. In addition, the U.S. government has political and military demands from Egypt. It is expecting Egypt to play a certain role in the context of the U.S. strategy whose aim is to forestall the liberation of Third World countries from the clutches of the international capitalist system. It is also the aim of the U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States is trying to impose a U.S. solution (an American-style peace) on Arab countries. The United States is trying to ensure a distinguished and a superior position for Israel in comparison with all these countries.

Grants That Are not Grants

As we mentioned earlier, a small part of the assistance that is offered--about 20 percent of it--comes in the form of a non-returnable grant or gift. It is a fact that this description gives one the impression that we are getting foreign resources that we are not paying for. This is absolutely not true. The term, "a non-returnable grant" says only half the truth and maybe even less than half. The funds referred to may not always be returned directly in comparable goods or in cash, but in actual fact they are returned indirectly in one way or another. This is because there is nothing in relations between countries and between big and small governments that would create between members of the same family that [sense of] joint responsibility or solidarity that is free from selfish design. Anyone who gives something expects to get something in return.

That something which is given in return may take the form of [a pledge to] overlook shameful conduct by the state that offered the grant, such as the intervention perpetrated by the U.S. forces, which are part of the peace-keeping force in Lebanon, and the strike they carried out against the Druze in support of the position of Israel's allies, the Phalangists. Payment for a non-returnable grant may take the form of [a willingness] to yield to some of the economic demands made by the country that is offering the grant, as, for example, giving it preference over other countries in supplying certain commodities to the country receiving the grant, or being forced to accept some unfair conditions in the loan agreements. Such payment may come in the form of [a willingness] to be "flexible" in relations with the enemies of the country "making the grant." What is intended here is that the country receiving the grant adopt the same position that the United States has adopted toward the Soviet Union, for example. That country would not speed up the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Such payment may also come in the form of [a willingness] to "overlook" some "non-traditional" conduct by the friends of the country that made the "grant" as

was the case when Israel invaded Lebanon, occupied Lebanese territory and slaughtered Arabs in Sabra and Shatila, or when Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Payment for a "non-returnable grant" may be [a willingness] to offer certain facilities to the country that made the grant, such as allowing it to have so-called military facilities in the country or giving its intelligence agency permission to open an office in the capital of the country that receives the grant. These are merely examples of what we know. What we don't know about is greater.

To put it briefly, the so-called non-returnable grants are nothing more than rewards for conduct carried out by the country that is a grant recipient or for conduct the country that is a grant recipient is expected to pursue in the interests of the country that is making the grant.

Grants That Are Returned Immediately

But it is not at all unusual for these non-returnable grants to be paid back immediately and in cash. An example of this is when the U.S. government offers a grant for carrying out economic or social research in Egypt. [When that happens], one notices that a large percentage of the grant is spent on wages for U.S. experts, travel allowances and travel fares on U.S. airlines for those American experts who come to Cairo and for the Egyptian experts or trainees who go to the United States to attend "meetings" or "conferences" or to complete research and so on. Another example is when the United States offers academic scholarships or training scholarships to Egyptians. In these cases the training takes place in the United States where the entire grant is spent. Universities as well as research and training centers receive tuition and training costs from that "aid." This is not to mention that the greater part of the so-called training programs are in many cases no more than tourist trips to the United States during which Egyptians are dazzled by the greatness of the United States, and young Egyptians are brainwashed into believing in the humanitarian objectives of this superpower. All in all a rather sizable percentage of our young people become intellectually contaminated since they come back to Egypt with their tenacity undermined. They despise themselves and their country when they come back; their feelings of impotence and inferiority are magnified; and they lose any hope of achieving progress in the country in a short period of time. This is a national disaster that we cannot go into now even though it is closely related to our subject.

Merely Conventional Conditions

In general, more than 90 percent of grants and foreign loans are usually spent directly in the country that is offering these grants and loans. These funds are used to pay for machines or raw materials that are imported from that country; these funds are used to pay the wages of experts, to pay fees for consulting offices, to pay transportation and shipping fees and to pay insurance costs and travel allowances. I hope some people will not think that the country receiving these grants and loans is spending those funds in that manner out of a sense of propriety or moral obligation. The fact that this is not the case is confirmed by the fact that purchasing goods originating from the United States, shipping them on U.S. vessels and airplanes, hiring the consulting firms that the United States approves of--and these are mostly American--are matters that are clearly stipulated in American loan and grant agreements. These have become "conventional" conditions that are included in these agreements.

U.S. Wheat as Aid

Speaking of aid, some Egyptians may believe that the wheat we get from the United States is a grant that is not to be paid back or a loan that is to be paid back in Egyptian pounds and not in dollars, as was the case in the sixties. But the fact of the matter is that according to the terms of U.S. Public Law No 480 regarding the disposal of surplus agricultural products, the wheat we get from the United States is not a grant but a loan that must be paid back in dollars. This is in accordance with agreements that are in effect at the present time. This is a loan that is to be paid back over a period of up to 20 years. (See AL-AHRAM, 5 October 1983).

It is most curious that the new agreements for the grain we are getting according to the terms of the law on surplus agricultural products dropped the condition of paying back for the wheat in Egyptian pounds but retained for the U.S. government the power to control the proceeds received by the Egyptian government from the sale of goods financed by that loan. What is even more curious is the fact that these agreements restrict the right of the Egyptian government to import agricultural goods at a suitable price from the countries of its choice. According to these agreements the Egyptian government "has to take the necessary steps to ascertain that the exporting country, the United States, is receiving a fair share of any increase in commercial purchases of agricultural goods in the importing country, Egypt." This means that the agreement for the grain which we are getting with a loan that is being paid back in dollars--and that grain is basically surplus grain and of no value to the United States--stipulates that Egypt's reliance on the United States be increased in the procurement of agricultural goods and not just wheat.

The Bank and the Fund

In the foregoing [remarks] we restricted ourselves to [comments on] foreign assistance in general and on U.S. assistance in particular. We did not deal with the assistance we receive from two international organizations that are of great consequence in the world of finance and credit and in operating the world capitalist system. These organizations are the IBRD and the IMF. The truth is that most of what we've already said applies, usually more vigorously, to this assistance that is offered by these two organizations.

This is because these two organizations are nothing more than tools that are used to carry out the objective that major capitalist countries have in wanting to keep the developing countries within the framework of the world capitalist system; major capitalist countries want to keep developing countries in a position of subordination to that system. They impose on these subordinate countries a capitalist development model that serves the interests of the dominant countries and preserves their superior position in relation to the subordinate countries. One of the most important weapons used in this regard is that of assistance. In other words, Third World countries are inundated with debts and with the financial burdens that those debts entail. Their wills are shackled by "the favor" that is being bestowed upon them as recipients of "non-returnable grants."

Actually, the real source of power for the IBRD or the IMF in relation to a Third World country depends not only on the size of the loan the two organizations may

extend to that country or on the fact that major capitalist countries dominate the management of these organizations--the voting system within each of the two organizations allows that--but it also depends on the fact that the two organizations have become authorities that are relied upon and trusted by the remaining lending institutions in the capitalist world. These institutions trust the accuracy of these two organizations' evaluation of economic conditions in a certain country and their assessment of that country's earnestness in reforming its economic conditions--or how committed that country is to carrying out the recommendations of the IBRD and the IMF. The smallest example of that can be found in the development funds that were established in the Third World, including Arab funds, which follow the lead of the IBRD in dealing with Third World countries. Arab development funds adhere to IBRD's directions regarding dealing with backward countries. In fact, it is not unusual for these funds and for other banks to [join forces] and offer loans to impoverished countries under the supervision and direction of their "godfather," the IBRD.

The Four Reservations

And now we would like to state for the record four observations to ward off suspicion and to avoid misinterpretation of what we said.

First, I know that leaders of Third World countries disapprove of having their countries described as subordinate countries. They may swear emphatically under oath that they do not take orders from this or that major country and that although they do consult with some "friendly" countries and international organizations, such as the IBRD and the IMF, the final decision is theirs and no one dictates that to them. But the truth is that the major industrial countries are not so naive as to appear in front of this or another developing country as the one giving orders and interdictions. Quite the opposite, as a matter of fact, these countries try to have everything done through discussions, talks and negotiations with the approval of both parties. But what agreements can be reached between a party that is powerful and one that is weak, that is, between two unequal powers? If the advanced country is determined to have certain conditions in these agreements, it will soon clear itself from suspicion of dictating terms or being obstinate about those terms by making a statement such as these terms are only general, "conventional" conditions that are included in our agreements with all Third World countries. But what is more important than that is what happens to the developing countries. They are "tamed," "conditioned" and "compromised" by being made to assume a heavy debt, by having the western mode of consumption firmly entrenched, and by the creation of groups of people who have an interest in maintaining ties with the capitalist countries and so on.

These operations put the developing country in a submissive position in which it can accept numerous conditions and restrictions on its freedom to act.

Second, I also know that attempts made by governments and organizations that offer us loans and grants to shackle our will and restrict our freedom of action are not always met with passivity on the part of the Egyptian negotiator. In fact an Egyptian negotiator may resist these attempts with various degrees of vigor according to the general climate in which he is operating. He may succeed in evading a commitment to abide by some of the unfair conditions. It is known that a delay in signing a new agreement between Egypt and the IMF is due to the

resistance Egyptian negotiators put up to the demands made by the fund with regard to economic reform policies.

But there is not that much resistance between unequal parties as some people may think. A developing country may be hurt considerably if loans from the fund are withheld for several months. The fund is not affected much when a certain country is denied access to its loans for several years. On the one hand, the fund can afford to be patient until that country yields to the fund's basic demands. On the other hand, it is being observed that negotiations on all "essential" conditions that are included in loan and grant agreements are basically irrelevant. Examples of such conditions are those that have to do with obtaining information, with linking withdrawals made in accordance with the agreement to the progress made by the country in carrying out the fund's recommendations, or with the terms for supervision, arbitration, etc. But negotiations on matters of detail or on matters of secondary importance are conducted. Although the success of the Egyptian negotiator in getting better secondary conditions is to be considered a gain, its worth must not be overstated. Because of the unequal relationship in this case, that gain can be no more than a secondary one.

Third, every developing country, whether or not it is dealing with advanced countries, has to bear in mind the warnings and dangers that we mentioned in the area of foreign assistance. Major industrial countries, regardless of their social system, will not hesitate to use assistance as a weapons to serve their own objectives. Although a scientific study of our experience in dealing with the Soviet Union and countries of the eastern bloc in the sixties did prove that the economic terms for this assistance were quite "rewarding" and more favorable than what we got from countries of the capitalist world, it is a matter of duty to exercise care. It is legitimate to be cautious about consenting to non-economic terms that do not serve our interests. Also too much reliance on one foreign party is objectionable in principle, regardless of the ideology of that foreign party.

Fourth, if the key to solving the question of development lies in breaking out of the shackles of subordination, it is our opinion that a boycott of international trade, turning down assistance and total isolation from the world are not required. The essential question [here] or the crucial point in the success or failure of development lies in the reliance on foreign countries and on one foreign party, in particular. What is important is that a development strategy be drawn up on the basis of society's actual needs and not on the basis of a foreign party's needs. This development strategy should depend primarily on mobilizing local resources and not on foreign assistance.

Although a measure of voluntary isolation may be desirable at first from the standpoint of reducing reliance on foreign countries, since such voluntary isolation would provide a better climate for changing the modes of consumption and production and reformulating them in a manner that is consistent with the actual capabilities and the basic needs of society, we still have to remember that re-establishing contact with the outside world is inevitable. But that has to be done from a position of strength, and it has to be based on compatibility and equality; it must not be done from a position of weakness and humiliation that goes hand in hand with subordination.

ELECTION SYSTEM SEEN AS UNDEMOCRATIC

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 21 Dec 83 p 5

[Article by Dr 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah: "The Art of Falsifying Voters' Wishes"]

[Text] Article 63 of the constitution stipulates that "A citizen has the right to vote, to run for office and to express an opinion in a referendum in accordance with the provisions of the law. It is the national duty of a citizen to participate in public life." The law defines the stages one goes through and the measures one takes in exercising this constitutional right, from the time one registers to vote till the result of an election is announced. The purpose of all these stages and measures is [to ensure] that the declared results [of an election] correspond to voters' wishes or to the wishes of a majority of those voters. The authenticity of the elections process is measured by the extent to which the results of an election correspond to voters' wishes. The constitution states that the election process entails grave consequences. Those who are elected are empowered to enact laws and to watch over the activities of the executive authority (Article 86 of the constitution). Articles 98 and 99 of the constitution postulates that those individuals, their ideas and their opinions shall be immune from civil and criminal liability and from measures [that may be taken] in such cases. In other words, they are authorized to commit what is basically considered a crime [and to do so with impunity] for the purpose of liberating them from the fear of expressing what is assumed to be voters' wishes.

Briefly stated, a group of individuals achieve positions of power, and that power, which is almost absolute, has to do with the future of the country and of every citizen. It is assumed that the election of these individuals to such positions corresponds with voters' wishes. The precise meaning of that statement is this: falsifying voters' wishes destroys the state's legitimate existence; it does not destroy the legitimacy of parliamentary representation, but it does destroy the legitimacy of the government and of the rulers.

We still remember that the former president liquidated his political opponents in May 1971 soon after disbanding the Arab Socialist Union, which had selected him its presidential candidate, and after dissolving the People's Assembly which did actually nominate him. This was done under the pretext that the elections for the Arab Socialist Union and for the People's Assembly had been falsified—even though he was one of those supervising those elections. Al-Sadat did not realize that in [that action] alone he had invalidated his own selection, his own

nomination, his own referendum and his taking office. Although there are many reasons for complaining about the course of growing tyranny which Anwar al-Sadat was impetuously pursuing, one cannot ignore one of the sources of the confidence he had in his ability to act with highhandedness. He was able to continue as president after he [himself] acknowledged that the wishes of those who had selected him and nominated him had not corresponded with voters' wishes from the beginning.

This bitter experience which ended in an alarming tragedy makes the freedom and integrity of elections even more valuable. It teaches us that even though elections are held periodically, at distant intervals and in a manner that may encourage lax measures for safeguarding them, elections are nevertheless the small key that is not always used to unlock the door of legitimacy. Anyone who employs less than strict measures in seeing to it that the key is in honest hands is doing no less than tempting thieves of power to break into the structure of power and steal positions of power.

Among the final phases of the elections process, is one wherein a voter would indicate on his ballot [the name] of the candidate he had chosen. The ballots are then counted; invalid ballots are removed; the ballots [as cast] are allocated to the contending candidates; and the name of the person who received a majority of the vote as set by law is announced. All that is supposed to take place under the supervision of members of a judicial board who are entrusted with that task. It is at this stage that voters' wishes are physically and directly falsified in a variety of ways. One of those ways is almost inevitable albeit its effect is weak. For example, the names of those who voted do not correspond with the names on the register of voters who have a right to vote because the names of people who reached the voting age were not added to the voters' rolls during the period of time between the time when the voters' rolls were transcribed and the time when the election was held or because the names of those who were deceased had not been removed from the rolls. [Another reason is due to the fact that] there are people who cannot vote because they have emigrated for example. Some of these falsifications are always deliberate; sometimes they are drastic. For example, ballots are forged in proportion to the number of voters who are deceased and who are absent. Verification reports and victory reports are forged, and voters are prohibited from voting. There are other falsification measures that people with experience in the elections and in falsifying those elections in Egypt have known about since 1923.

Because this method of falsification is obvious, deliberate and occasionally drastic, it attracts attention and condemnation; it is condemned in newspapers and in the courts. [The reaction to this method] is such that it almost suggests that it is the only way to falsify voters' wishes even though it most definitely is not the only method. This method is characterized by the fact that it is base, backward and crude. It is a stupid method.

A method that is more effective than the [previous] one is that which may be called "the art" of falsifying elections. In that method free elections are held, and each voter votes without coercion and chooses the representative he wants. The result of such an election actually corresponds to the voters' ballots. Nevertheless, it is a result that was prepared in advance. In other words elections are held so that those whom the government wants to have in parliament get there.

This art triumphs when an election is conducted so that a strong majority can be selected and limited [parliamentary] opportunities are left for the minority. This minority is they used to argue that the election was sound and that the democracy that is being claimed and bragged about throughout the world [does exist].

How [is that done]?

This is done in a variety of ways. For example, the wishes of intermediaries are made to come between voters' wishes and the members of elected bodies. This is a two-step election process in which voters do not vote directly for members of a parliamentary assembly. Voters' right to vote is restricted to voting for an "intermediate group" which afterwards assumes the responsibility for electing assembly members. Thus, the relationship between voters' wishes and assembly members is broken, and a human barrier is set up between the two. [In this case] when the names of those who had won seats in the assembly are announced, the result may correspond to the wishes of the intermediate group. But it is impossible for those names to correspond to voters' wishes. Thus, the precept that the outcome of an election correspond to voters' wishes is disregarded, and the election becomes spurious. This is the system that was in use before 1923 to elect the Legislative Shura Council. It was abolished by parliament in 1924; it was restored by Isma'il Sidqi in 1930; and it was then scuttled by the people in 1935. It is forbidden in most constitutions; in Egypt's constitution, which adopts the direct voting method, this system is forbidden in Article 87.

Another way or another example is to have voters' choices restricted to a small and selected group of candidates. Voters would be free to choose anyone they wanted from a previously prepared list of the best individuals. This is the oldest method for falsifying elections. That select group was set up by imposing exorbitant financial conditions on anyone who wanted to become a candidate. Also the right to become a candidate was restricted to certain groups. That method was in effect throughout the period during which the 1923 Constitution was in effect. It was stipulated that anyone who would be declared a candidate for a seat in the Senate had to have been a minister; a political representative; a member of the House of Representatives; an undersecretary of a ministry; a chief judge or a judge on the Court of Appeals or any other court of the same or higher grade; an attorney general; a president of the Bar Association; a past or present government employee with a grade level of general manager or higher; a major scientist or spiritual leader; a retired officer at the rank of major general or higher; a prosecutor who served at least two terms in the prosecutor's office; a landlord who pays no less than 150 Egyptian pounds a year in taxes; or anyone whose annual income is not less than 1,500 pounds and who is engaged in financial, trade or industrial activities or is a practicing professional.

Anyone who wanted to declare his candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives had to pay 150 pounds to the treasury of the governorate [he wanted to represent]. These funds would be designated for use in local charitable activities if he were to withdraw from the election or if he were not to receive one tenths of the votes. That condition was set to restrict the right to run for a seat in the House of Representatives to a group of people who could pay the set sum of money, which in today's currency prices equals 1,500 pounds. Free elections would be held, if they were held at all, on [the understanding] that previously

determined individuals--at least determined by their characteristics--would be the only ones who would become members of elected bodies.

Free elections may be conducted to authenticate the membership of individuals identified by name who were previously selected by an intermediary group. This is one of the most skillful arts of falsification for which there is an ideal precedent in Egypt's history. This occurred in the 1926 election where the falsification was done so skillfully that no trace of it could be found, and the 1926 election [thus] became an example of free elections. The 1926 election was actually free and exemplary in the sense that the names of those who won in that election corresponded with the names of those who were chosen by the voters. Nevertheless, that election had been falsified wholly and separately. This is because this election combined the two-step election system with restricting the choice to a certain appointed candidate. On 3 April 1926 party leaders met and agreed to distribute the seats in the House of Representatives for which an election had been scheduled on 22 May 1926. They agreed they would not compete with each other: 160 precincts were allotted to the Wafd Party; 45 precincts were allotted to the Constitutional Liberal Party; and 9 precincts were allotted to the National Party. Each party then chose a number of candidates from among its members; the number chosen corresponded to the [number of] precincts that were allotted to it. This is a two-step method of election in reverse. It means that a group of people would come between the voters' wishes and the representatives. In the traditional method the intermediate group becomes a barrier that stands between the voters' wishes and the representatives who win [in an election]. In this reverse method it is the party that becomes the intermediate group and the barrier between voters' wishes and the candidates. Then elections are held and voters vote for previously selected candidates, or they authenticate the decisions that were made by the parties to appoint those candidates.

In all these cases the election has a perfect form but a spurious content. This means that the result of an election corresponds to voters' ballots, but has nothing to do with their wishes, since those candidates the voters wanted or may have wanted were skillfully precluded in the first place from becoming candidates.

It seems that Egypt's government finally wants to give up this stupid method of falsifying elections or it wants to add to that method [another] skillfull one. A law to that effect, Law No 114 for 1983, has been enacted. That law added three restrictions to the previous restrictions that are imposed on voters' wishes. The first restriction is that voting shall be by means of a list; the second restriction is that voting shall be by means of a proportional list; and the third restriction is that voting shall be by means of a party's proportional list. Although all these restrictions are parts of the same chain [of restrictions], each one of them has its own effect in falsifying an election.

The basis for voting by means of a list lies essentially in the list that is chosen by a voter, that is, the list of candidates that a voter makes from a host of candidates. All commentators on constitutional law, including Dr Kamil Laylah, say, "This means that a voter would make up a list of the names of that number of candidates he wants to vote for to represent the electoral district. This is the reason why this method of voting is called voting by means of a list." (From "Al-Mabadi' al-Dusturiyah al-'Ammah" [General Constitutional Principles] by Dr Kamil Laylah, 1st Edition, p 785). In making this statement Dr Kamil Laylah cites

French professors of constitutional law (Eisman, "Constitutional Law" Vol II p 327; Bartley, "The Principles of Constitutional Law" p 337; and (Laferrier), "Constitutional Law," p 550). This system is very close to that which has been in effect in Egypt since 1964. Each voter selects two candidates: one of them is either a worker or a peasant. This system is in effect in trade unions and professional associations: each member chooses from a host of candidates a number of candidates equal to the number of positions that are to be filled in the association. But this system differs from the [previous] two systems in that the boundaries of an electoral precinct are fixed when voting for workers or peasants or when voting in unions and professional associations. But when voting in an election for legislative assemblies by means of a list, this method was improvised to undermine the personal relationship between candidates and voters by expanding the electoral precincts--joining four or five precincts together, for example. Each voter was charged to choose from a host of candidates a number of candidates in proportion to the number of expanded precincts, a list of which would be prepared.

People who did not vote because they did not know any of the candidates are [reminded] that those who won the election are representing them in parliament. People whose votes were invalidated because they did not falsify their wishes by mentioning names of people they do not know are [reminded] that they are represented in parliament by those who won the election, the people they do not know. And people whose votes were valid are [reminded] of the fact that they chose one or two specific candidates. It is also self-evident that [a voter] can only designate a candidate who is known to him. Voting by means of a list means, according to what is actually intended by that method, that voters will tend to vote for individuals who are unknown to them even though they are known to those who nominated them. Thus, the assumption that there is a correlation between winners in an election and voters' wishes is unfounded. This is a highly "professional" method of falsification.

It's been observed that the system of voting by means of a list has nothing to do with a list of candidates. As we stated, the reason for that system is to have every voter vote for a number of individuals from a host of candidates. Instead, it has led to what is called voting for a proportional list, and that [principle] has been accepted by the law. [A voter's] right to vote for numerous candidates has encouraged candidates to cooperate with each other. Anyone of them would draw up a list of the candidates' names, and they would run in an election campaign with that list. They would help each other with finances and publicity, except for those candidates who would want to launch their own election campaigns without partners. Those candidates by themselves constitute their own lists. That method corrected an old flaw in [the system of] voting for individuals. When one votes for individuals, a candidate who gets 51 percent of the valid votes wins the election, and a minority of voters, who may be 49 percent of all voters, have no representation. In other words, their votes are lost.

The solution provided by the proportional list system was more representative of voters' votes. After the number of votes required to win an election is determined by law, the votes given to each list are counted, and the number of lists that is proportionate to the number of votes wins the election. This is regardless of the votes that are cast separately for each candidate on a list. There is a complicated system for depicting "the fractions" of votes in each list and how

those "fractions" are to be depicted. But there is no need to go into the complexities of that system [here].

Voting for a proportional list then is one of the better known methods of voting.

But there is one basic condition to that: a citizen's right to choose is not to be infringed upon. In other words, a citizen must be able to choose the candidates of his choice and to make up a list of his own chosen candidates from the candidates' lists without being restricted to one list in particular. If a voter is required to choose from the lists as they are, then there is no doubt that those who advised the ruling party that this method was useful, did read in the books they studied when they were students and also in the books they taught their students what the French expert in jurisprudence, Eisman, said about that method which represents the most serious threat to democracy: it is partisan repression and tyranny (Op. cit. p 364). Those advisers undoubtedly know that the constitutional stipulation which reserved for citizens the right to run for office and the right to vote did also choose a method of voting for an individual and nominating an individual for office.

What matters is that under the new law all the candidates whose names are on a list that won in an election will be declared winners even if some of the names on those lists did not get a single vote. This will correspond with the result of the vote count for the lists, but it will have nothing to do with voters' wishes. Voters may choose one list simply because they want one candidate on that list. A list in its entirety may lose simply because one and only one person on that list may be disliked and may [somehow] have been able to have his name placed on that list. Thus, the failure of good people to win in an election does not indicate that they have been rejected by voters. In both cases the presumption that winning an election corresponds with voters' wishes would be groundless and would be obvious falsification of voters' wishes. But if we were to accept what the law has accepted, and that is that the party which has the winning list would add [to the votes it has] the votes [that were cast] for the lists that did not win and thereby increase the number of its members commensurately, the result of that will be that [certain] people will get seats in parliament on the basis of a declaration that they got votes that were clearly given to others. And that would be blatant falsification of the wishes of those who cast those votes.

[Let's consider] the third restriction. Voting for a party's proportional list is the latest [contrivance] in the technology of falsifying voters' wishes. In that system voters are asked to make a selection from lists that are issued and prepared only by parties. Leaders of each party prepare each party's list of candidates. Thus, all citizens who are not members of political parties are denied the constitutional right to run in an election. Thus, those who wish to run for office would either have to join an existing party in whose principles they do not believe, or they would have to form their own parties in accordance with the conditions set by those in power. This is what they would have to do if they wanted to exercise their constitutional right to run for office. Thus, when we announce the names of those who won in an election and their victory is attributed to voters' wishes, those wishes would have undergone numerous stages of falsification.

A. The election of people who had been previously selected by party leaders was ascribed to party members among the voting public.

B. The choice that was made by parties was ascribed to the collective wishes of voters.

C. The fact that voters chose the nominees of each party was ascribed to the fact that they chose those who believed in the principles of that party, even though membership in that party was an opportunistic requirement for exercising the right to run for office.

D. The fact that voters chose their representatives from among the parties' nominees only was ascribed to the fact that they did not wish to be represented by any independents even though those wishes were not tested. Such wishes can only be tested when an independent becomes a candidate for elective office, and that is something from which independents are precluded.

The upshot of this falsification is this: many of those whose victory in the election will be announced will be people who have accepted [the principle of] thwarting with impunity the constitutional stipulation that every citizen have a right to run for office. Many of those will be people who accepted the restrictions imposed on people's right to organize parties within the boundaries of constitutional principles. They may be people who agreed to join parties in whose principles they do not believe, or they may be people who agreed to organize parties in accordance with the conditions imposed on them and not in accordance with their beliefs. They may be people who agreed to have the leaders of their parties choose the candidates on the party's lists in accordance with where those people stood personally with the leaders. Or they may be people who agreed to take part in the conspiracy of existing parties to divide the precincts among themselves and to keep out their independent competitors who would not for any price agree to subject themselves to the conditions that would be imposed on them by the law of parties, etc.

It is this [elite] who will one day allege that they represent the people because they reached [their positions in] the legislative authority as a result of the free wishes of voters. Their rationale--and they know from the course they took to reach that power that voters' wishes had nothing to do with that allegation--is that they will exercise their legislative authority, enact laws and assume positions that will be satisfactory to those who chose them. [They assert] they will prove to the voters that they made no mistake when they placed them on the parties' lists and protected them from competition. They say that in the hope that they may be included on the lists once again. It will not be curious for them to join forces with each other "to further democracy" by coming up with new methods in this fine art of falsifying voters' wishes by enacting laws.

I wonder why is it that they don't make things easy for themselves and for people by counting the members of each party and determining a number of seats in the People's Assembly for each party proportionate to the number of each party's members? Why don't they let each party appoint its representatives [to the People's Assembly]? Why don't they relieve us of [this burden]? Wouldn't this be the result of an election that is conducted by means of a party's proportional list?

CENTRAL BANK'S FIRST QUARTER ECONOMIC REPORT

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Dec 83 p 9

[Article: "Central Bank's Report on Monetary Policy in First Quarter of Present Year [Reveals That] Egyptians' Monthly Monetary Remittances Rose to 144 Million Pounds and Goods of Material Value Brought into the Country Rose to 116 Million Pounds; Loans to Financial Companies and One-Person Operations Improve and Increase; 1.216 Billion Pounds in Revenues Collected in 3 Months"]

[Text] The Central Bank has prepared a report on the principal indicators of the results of monetary and credit policies during the first quarter of the second year of the plan: July through September 1983. The report indicated that conditions at the outset of fiscal year 1983-1984 were more favorable than those at the beginning of the previous year. Means of payment dropped, and foreign currency deposits rose.

Average monetary bank remittances from Egyptians working abroad amounted to 113.7 million pounds a month, compared with 51.6 million pounds in the same period last year. Remittances in the form of merchandise, goods and raw materials amounted to 116.4 million pounds, compared with 99 million pounds.

The report also indicated that deposits in savings accounts improved noticeably during last July, compared with the same month last year. The increase in those accounts amounted to 138.9 million pounds compared with only 6.2 million pounds [last year]. At the same time net foreign assets have been rising. Last July these assets rose by about 79.8 million pounds, compared with 2.8 million pounds in the corresponding month [last year].

With regard to credit, there was improvement in the government sector's net liabilities, which dropped by about 5.5 million pounds in 1983, compared with an increase of 15.4 million pounds for the corresponding month last year. In 1982-1983 the average monthly increase for net government liabilities was about 130 million pounds. Last year that figure was 190.7 million pounds.

On the other hand the liabilities of economic organizations rose 57.4 million pounds in the month of July compared with [an increase of] 10 million pounds in the comparable month [last year].

There is a phenomenon worth mentioning, which is that private sector liabilities rose by about 53.1 million pounds last July, compared with 400,000 pounds in the

comparable month last year. In 1982-1983 the average monthly increase in liabilities was about 71.9 million pounds. In 1981-1982 that average was about 146.3 million pounds. Last July's increase was reflected in a growth in credit to private financial companies of about 3.4 million pounds, compared with a shortage of 24.4 million pounds during the comparison month. Credit directed to one-person operations rose by about 14.8 million pounds compared with a shortage of 6.2 million pounds.

Last July's increase was reflected in the growth of credit to private financial companies. Credit to these companies rose by about 3.4 million pounds compared with a shortage of 24.4 million pounds during the comparison month. The increase was also reflected in the growth of credit to one-person business operations by about 14.5 million pounds compared with a shortage of 6.2 million pounds.

This is what the report said about financial aspects during the first 3 months of 1983-1984: "Current operating funds amounted to 1,408,900,000 pounds--that is 14.2 percent of the target for the year--compared with 1,482,400,000 pounds for the same period last year--that is 16.9 percent of allocations for that year.

Wages in these operating funds for 1983-1984 amounted to about 453.3 million pounds from an annual allocation of 2.935 billion pounds--this is an implementation rate of 15.4 percent--compared with 437.9 million pounds for the comparison period, at an implementation rate of 17.9 percent.

8592

CSO: 4504/120

RELATIONS WITH EEC, ASPIRATIONS EXAMINED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 34, 3 Dec 83 p 37

[Text] The Moroccans have followed with great interest the activities of the European Economic Community (EEC) countries' ministerial council that took place in Brussels recently. The Moroccans were pinning a great deal of hope on initiatives in the offing that might result in agreement by the EEC to give the green light for the implementation of Chapter 19 of the cooperation agreement concluded between Morocco and the EEC. The section pertains to the "exemption of canned sardines from import duties while preserving minimum prices."

Morocco is linked to the EEC by relations of cooperation that were first negotiated in 1963. After lengthy discussions lasting years, the negotiations resulted in the signing of an agreement in February 1969. Amendments were introduced to this agreement to accommodate the new reality of the EEC in March 1973, after England, Ireland and Denmark joined the EEC. In addition, Moroccan officials realized the opportunities that the agreement could present with Europe for the country's development. Therefore, they sought to have the amendments include the area of agricultural production, which was not included in the first agreement.

There were three pivotal areas that the Moroccans focused on at that time so that cooperation with the EEC would be most beneficial. These areas were the establishment of a comprehensive trade system, financial cooperation, and technical aid, including provisions related to expatriate Moroccan labor in the EEC countries. After difficult negotiations, a cooperation agreement was signed between Morocco and the EEC on 17 April 1976. The agreement was implemented on 1 November 1978. It included the free entry of all industrial products into the EEC and an 80 percent discount for Moroccan agricultural products. It also included financial and technical cooperation in a variety of developmental fields in Morocco, such as energy, fishing, investment and economic stimulation. There were also measures in the area of social security for Moroccan laborers working in the EEC countries. In view of the increased Moroccan immigration to Europe and its importance, Morocco, at that time, was unhappy with what the 1976 agreement had produced in this area. Nonetheless, they considered the agreement's provisions to be a step forward as long as it aimed basically at providing expatriate Moroccans with a system of social security that was equal to

that received by the citizens of the EEC countries. At the head of Morocco's aspirations in this area was the integration of social security qualification periods to the advantage of Moroccan expatriates in the various countries of the EEC affected by the agreement. However, due to a lack of understanding and commitment by some of the EEC countries, this remained nothing more than ink on paper. Even suggestions put forward on this matter by some of the EEC countries did not move the issue any closer to application, because some of the EEC countries would not fulfill their obligations. Procrastination was the hallmark of the EEC countries' position vis-a-vis the application of the principle of equal treatment of Moroccan expatriates and the citizens of these countries. Moroccan economic circles noted that this was a result of reservations by some of the member countries, particularly France, England and West Germany, due to fears of the expected financial impact of these measures.

In July 1980, as a result of Moroccan efforts in difficult and complicated discussions, the issue moved a step forward when the EEC agreed to a number of measures offered to Morocco after amending the original plan. Although these latter measures did not completely fulfill Moroccan desires, Moroccan economists disregarded the negative aspects of the measures in hopes that they would be overcome by the technical and financial cooperation, whose horizons continued to expand day after day. Perhaps it is appropriate to point out in this regard that Morocco is the only country in the Middle East and North Africa that has acquired comprehensive loans from the EEC in the context of a financial protocol for the years 1978-1981. These loans have amounted to about 130 million European accounting units (1 unit is equal to about 1 dollar).

The projects financed by the EEC encompass a variety of economic fields. The protocol that was executed within its scheduled time frame, that is, before 31 October 1981, included the following areas: basic equipment (buildings, facilities, and the means to operate them)--54 percent; industrial cooperation--17.5 percent; agriculture and animal husbandry--14 percent; vocational training and grants--12 percent; scientific cooperation--2 percent; trade 0.5 percent.

The second protocol signed between Morocco and the EEC on 10 June 1982 amounted to about 199 million European accounting units. Ninety million units were from the European Investment Bank, 43 million units were in the form of private loans, and 67 million units were in the form of grants. This represents a 53 percent increase over the previous protocol, something which the Moroccans believe represents the greatest increase granted by the EEC to any country in the Mediterranean basin. The belief is increasing here that these loans will be used to finance projects in areas of top economic priority, such as agriculture, fishing, energy, mining and basic equipment. In addition they will help to create or strengthen centers of vocational skills.

Moroccans would like their relations with the EEC strengthened to the extent called for by Chapter 48 of the cooperation agreement. This chapter stipulates that contacts be held between the Moroccan Chamber of Deputies and

the European Parliament. Actually, the first meeting was held on 11 and 12 March 1981 in Strasbourg between delegations of each of the parliaments. It was a coincidence that the European parliament was at that time discussing a report by its political committee known as the "Lalore Report," which dealt with the conflict in the Western Sahara.

Based on the above, the Moroccan position toward the EEC continues to be characterized by flexibility and moderation. Despite the above-mentioned deficiencies in the field of economic cooperation, the Moroccans have a ready answer to any question on this matter. A well-informed source told AL-TADAMUN, "Morocco is betting on the future of its relations with this international economic community. All of the complications can be overcome by Morocco by looking to its future aspirations."

12608

CSO: 4504/105

STATUS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN NEW GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED

Casablanca LE MESSAGE in French No 16, 9 Dec 83 pp 11-13

[Article by Abdelhai Aboulkhatib]

[Text] The long-awaited government was appointed by His Majesty the King last Wednesday. We find therein six leaders of the most representative political parties in the country, and changes in ministerial assignments.

Above and beyond the presentation of the new government before the television cameras, in an atmosphere profoundly influenced by the solemnity and majesty of the throne room, and above and beyond the mention of the two main missions of the new ministerial team, the ceremony over which His Majesty King Hassan II presided at 3 pm on Wednesday was basically designed, to judge from the form it took, to demonstrate a typically Moroccan constant. As the sovereign said, "The continuity which characterizes the great nations with a glorious history and true values is illustrated in Morocco today, and creates the picture of a country which fears neither domestic difficulties nor foreign tests, a country which is forging its path, confident of its future." The sovereign set forth the historic fact that "this ceremony reminds us of 1956, when the first government of independent Morocco was established. All factions met together in this same hall, rallying around our late lamented father, His Majesty King Mohammed V, whom God in his mercy took from us," and then he went on to note proudly that "all Moroccans inherited faith in the future at birth, because it comes down to them from their fate and their mothers who lived among our forefathers in an atmosphere imbued with the true historic patrimony from which we derive both boldness and calm."

In this spirit and in another, auguring the more intensive development of Moroccan democracy, the new government headed by Mr Mohamed Karim Lamrani, as His Majesty the King said in his own words, "is entrusted first of all with seeing to the honesty and the legality of the coming elections and then the mobilization with a view to the test for which we are preparing, that of the referendum in the Sahara." On these two basic and determining points, unity of the Moroccan people, their parties and the leaders of all political factions has been a fact since the very day of the royal speech on 5 November. The sovereign made a point of emphasizing forcefully and reassuringly that "we want to express our satisfaction and our pride, not just to the Moroccan people, who know their political leaders very well, but to the entire world. This pride is because of the fact that since 5 November and to this day, we, the faithful servant of our country, have encountered neither difficulties nor hesitation on the part of any political organization to which we have appealed to work beside us in the service of this people and this fatherland.

Better still, we have seen in them absolute, sincere and loyal commitment and a great readiness to rise above what is temporary and to take into account only what is constant and enduring, that is to say Morocco, its liberty, its identity, its sovereignty, its democracy and the constitutional monarchy, which is the system it has freely chosen."

On this basis, and also taking into account the specificity and the situation of the missions to be carried out in time, it was relatively easy to form a new government.

Respect for the Rules of the Game

On the political level, a single concern was dominant: to confirm, consecrate and crystallize national unity with a view to the referendum and the legislative elections. Put in another way, to face up to the test of the former with unity in the strengthened ranks, while preparing to carry out the latter in a calm spirit, free of any vindictiveness or idea of bitterness or settlement of accounts. In other words, to play the game by making respect for the rules and its proprieties a principle for all.

In a difficult international situation, the economic and financial aspect could not be neglected. In this realm, the sovereign was specific. "We also have before us the files making it necessary that we rally around us the most competent and devoted individuals, those most dedicated to their country and the best informed about the affairs of state, so as to avoid any lapse into demagoguery or intrigue, or again into a harshness which would be likely in the long run to deprive Morocco and its workers class of oxygen and to slow down the development and the industrial and agricultural advance of the country." His Majesty the King also established some time periods. "We ask you to make preparations, in a full understanding of the subject, for the draft finance law, which will be submitted to the Parliament during the spring session which will begin on Friday, 2 April. We must prepare for tomorrow's electors the various options pertaining to the economic, farm and urban development policies in order to allow the majority established by the legislative elections and the one-third of the representatives elected to the trade chambers and by indirect balloting to make their decisions based on clear foundations and data leaving no room for ambiguity."

Is the new cabinet revealed to the public in a special news program carried on the RTM [Moroccan Radio and Television] at 2:30 pm on Wednesday really new? If one excludes its political components and the specific assignments it must carry out within a given period of time, it would be difficult to answer in the affirmative. Some of the key posts have not changed hands.

Among the neutrals, for example, are Mustapha Belarbi Alaoui (Justice) and Driss Basri (Interior). The also unlabeled technocrats are still there in force: Abdellatif Jouahri (Finance), Azzedine Guessous (Commerce, Industry and Tourism), Bensalem Smili (Ocean Fisheries and Merchant Marine), Abbas el Kaissi (secretary general of the government), M'Faddel Lahlou (Housing and Land Management), Mohamed Kabbaï (Equipment), Othman Demnati (Agriculture and Agrarian Reform), and Abdellatif Hajjaji (secretary of state for Housing and

Land Management). Even if they do not belong to any political organization, the sovereign sees in them "dedicated, competent individuals devoted to their country and familiar with the affairs of state." In the drafting of the Finance Law, they will probably be called upon to play an important role alongside Mohamed Karim Lamrani.

Party Distribution

The Istiqlal Party, which partially lost the foreign affairs portfolio, won back a ministry of state from the political party leaders and retained seven posts: Hachemi Filali (Religious Endowment and Islamic Affairs), M'Hamed Douiri (Planning, Cadre Training and Vocational Training), Azzedine Laraki (National Education), Abbas el Fassi (Traditional Industry and Social Affairs), Said Belbachir (Cultural Affairs), Abdelkarim Ghallab (minister delegate in the prime minister's office), and Abdelhaq Tazi (secretary of state for foreign affairs).

The Popular Movement (MP) yielded the Ministry of State for Cooperation (Mahjoubi Aherdane), but also lost the Ministry of Transportation, since Mansouri Ben Ali has for several months preferred a neutral label. This choice was, moreover, confirmed by a statement circulated by the MP just prior to the announcement of the new cabinet. The Movement still has three posts: Public Health (Rahhali Rahal), Posts and Telecommunications (Mohamed el Ansar), and Administrative Affairs (Mohamed Toughani).

The PND [National Democratic Party] won a state ministry (Arsalane el Jadidi), but lost the Labor and National Training post. It retains Energy and Mines (Moussa Saadi), Relations With Parliament (Ahmed Belhaj) and Saharan Affairs (Khali Hanna Ould Rachid).

A Novelty

The RNI [National Rally of Independents] won a post, with the return of Ahmed Osman as minister of state, and retained two ministerial posts it had had earlier: Ministry of State Without Portfolio (Moulay Ahmed Alaoui) and Economic Affairs (Taieb Bencheikh).

The UC, the most recent addition to the political parties, saw its leader, Mr Maati Bouabid, appointed to a state ministry, along with the leaders of the other political parties. Mr Abdellatif Semlali was made minister of Youth and Sports. This decision removes this department from the jurisdiction of the Information Ministry.

Where the political and arithmetic aspects of the change are concerned, the great novelty is without a doubt the entry of the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] into the government with a minister of state (Abderrahim Bouabid) and the appointment to the Cooperation post of Abdelwahad Radi, whose basic task will be to coordinate our economic and trade relations with our foreign partners.

The Information Problem

Thus for Mr Radi it will be an assignment generally based on our contacts with the foreign world, such as the meetings of the mixed commissions.

Resignations and changes led to three other appointments. Abdelouahid Belkeziz was appointed to head the diplomatic corps, which will continue to be the private preserve of the guarantor of our territorial integrity and our sovereignty, His Majesty the King. The sensitive Information post was entrusted to a relatively new man, Abdellatif Filali, who apart from a short assignment to the royal cabinet and the royal academy, has pursued a diplomatic career exclusively. Having suffered from the shortage of propaganda and information materials on Morocco while abroad, he will have much to do in this sector to correct the course pursued.

There is an entirely new minister--Moulay Zine Zahidi. He is taking over the Labor and National Training post.

Messrs Belkeziz, Filali and Zahidi are all neutrals.

A final word on Hadj M'Hamed Bahnini. A minister of state whose advice is always enlightened, he has been a nationalist from the first and a member of the government since 1956--an unequaled record.

5157

CSO: 4519/69

TRAUMA OF RETURNING EMIGRANTS DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Nov 83 p 20

[Article by Gideon Alon: "Pains of Reabsorption for Emigres"]

[Excerpts] "I returned to Israel because I was sure that this is my home. I was born here, I went to school here, and I served in the IDF; but if I am forced to pack up my things and go back to the U.S., I will not come back again to Israel". This is candidly confessed by H.L., a pretty sabra, blond haired and blue eyed. H.L. is single, 26 years old, the daughter of a senior government official who is on an official mission in the U.S.

There is in her voice a mixture of bitter disappointment, anger, and impotence: "The ministers and members of Knesset are always loudly declaring that emigres should be encouraged to return to Israel. They promise them that they will be received with open arms, but in my short experience these are empty words. Everywhere I have gone I have encountered apathy, closed eyes, and a shocking lack of caring".

It should be emphasized: H.L. never really left Israel. She bristles at being defined as an emigre. In fact, she joined her parents, who had left two years ago on an official mission on behalf of the government, to the U.S. There she finished her baccalaureate degree at a Jewish college in New York, and she was trained as a senior medical surgical assistant. She underwent special training at New York hospitals, and she has warm letters of recommendation. H.L. says: "I could find work at any hospital in the U.S. without difficulty, and could earn 35 thousand dollars per year. But I decided to make a try at returning to Israel, to see if I could find work in my field here. The academic consul in New York promised to find out whether hospitals in Israel were willing to hire me. In fact, several hospitals in the center of the country were ready to hire me as a licensed nurse, but they wanted me to produce certification from the Ministry of Health. When I came back to Israel in April, they told me at the Ministry of Health that my profession did not exist in Israel. They told me that I was a special case, because my work as a senior surgical assistant was generally performed in Israel by doctors".

H.L. met with the woman responsible for foreign nurses at the Ministry of Health, who promised to consider her request. On 19 September she sent her an official letter, in which it was said that she would have to attend a training course for licensed nurses at the School of Nursing in Holon, for five months. H.L. was happy.

She returned to the U.S., packed all of her belongings, left her parents who were to remain in the U.S. until the end of their mission, and returned to Israel on the famous "emigre" plane hired by Abie Nathan, confident that at the end of the five month course she would easily find work at a hospital as a licensed nurse. But when she came, reality slapped her in the face. To her shock, it was made clear to her that official government promises in writing had no value. She was officially told that the training course would last 18 months, and not five as promised.

H.L. was at a total loss. She did not know to whom to turn. She tried to explain and persuade that she had completed her first degree in New York, she produced documents, she showed pictures of the degree awarding ceremony at the college, she cried bitterly. And she said that it was not possible that she would be forced to participate in a course in elementary subjects in which she was already expert, with students who had no prior knowledge of medicine. But her explanations fell on deaf ears. At the Ministry of Health she was told with finality: there is nothing that can be done. If you want to be a licensed nurse, you will have to take the course for licensed nurses starting in October and lasting a year and a half.

In the mean time, H.L. had problems supporting herself. She had no sources of income, and she had no savings. She did not bring dollars with her, and she did not want to be a burden on her parents in the U.S. At the academic department of the Ministry of Labor she was told that she was entitled to unemployment benefits of 5,900 shekels per month, because she was not recognized as an academic (since the proof of her completion of studies at the college in New York had not yet arrived because of administrative delays.) At the Ministry of Absorption she was promised that during the course she would receive maintenance of 9000 shekels per month, and that she was also entitled to ask for a subsidy of 2000 shekels per month from the Ministry of Health, in return for a commitment on her part that she would agree to work in any hospital in Israel to which she was sent after completion of the course.

H.L. was frustrated. She called her father by telephone in the U.S. and asked for his help. She thought of calling him to come home, but he could not abandon the many official duties in the U.S. She met with friends and acquaintances, but ran into a blank wall. In distress, she asked the Ministry of Health for permission to support herself by working at a hospital as a practical nurse. But she encountered absolute opposition. They told her: "It is improper, and not the practice". With no alternative, she registered for the course and began her studies. But in her heart there was a heavy sense of disappointment and despair. "I could not live on 9000 shekels per month, when my apartment costs twice that amount per month. My parents' apartment is rented and I cannot evict the people there. I am not disabled, thank God, needing maintenance and unemployment benefits. I have a profession with a first degree, and I do not want gifts from anyone. I want to live with respect and to earn a living in my profession."

Last week, H.L. met with Asher Friedberg, coordinator for Prevention of Emigration. She filled his ears with her story, and told him in no uncertain terms that if no solution were found for her problem, then she intended to return to the U.S. Friedberg promised to do something. He persuaded her to delay her return to the U.S. for one month. Yesterday, Friedberg told her: "The matter is being dealt with".

The story of H.L. is neither unique or exceptional. Many emigres return to Israel after extended stays abroad, and protest the deafness of the bureaucracy of the bodies in charge of handling "returning residents" (the official definition of Israelis who come home). Another concrete example follows:

G.R. went to complete his studies in the U.S. in 1980. As he completed his studies, he sought to return to Israel and to receive a loan from the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Absorption, for the purpose of financing his plane ticket. But his request forms lay in the offices of the Agency for months without being processed. His father, who is in Israel, filed a new request, but the forms which he filled out were lost. In desperation, G.R. took a loan in dollars from Bank Leumi in New York, paying interest at a rate of 18 percent, and returned to Israel on his own to begin working at one of the universities in Israel.

TEN TO FIFTEEN PERCENT OF RETURNING EMIGRES LEAVE AGAIN

Dr. Aharon Fein, of the School of Social Work at the Hebrew University, is presently completing comprehensive research on behalf of the Ministry of Absorption, regarding the motives for emigration. He estimates that 10 to 15 percent of those emigres who return to Israel are not absorbed and leave again. Dr. Fein notes that the principal reasons for leaving again are the problems in finding a source of suitable employment, difficulties in obtaining appropriate housing (because of prices of apartments) and the absence of a policy of assisting those who return with rented apartments, and complaints about the lack of attention, foot dragging, and unwillingness to give elementary service.

Asher Friedberg, the coordinator for Prevention of Emigration (in the office of Deputy Minister Shilanski) believes that in order to make efficient the cumbersome government system which is today charged with handling returning emigres, there is a need to establish an authority to deal with the return of emigres. In his opinion, only in this way can one avoid the lack of coordination and the fragmentation of so many government factors. Friedberg feels that unsuccessful reabsorption of the returning emigre may not only cause him or her to leave again, but also prevent the return of other emigres, who will hear about all of the troubles encountered. He emphasizes that there is insufficient consciousness among the officials in the various state offices of the importance of properly handling a returning Israeli. As a result, many Israelis who return roll from one office to another, in despair and considering leaving again. He believes that the solution to housing is making available rental apartments, because many returning emigres do not have the means to purchase an apartment on the free market, even after they have received a mortgage from the Ministry of Housing. As for employment problems, the difficulties of reabsorption stem from improper training of the emigre during his or her stay abroad by the emissaries who are handling such matters.

Every Israeli who is planning to return to Israel and wants to obtain government assistance available to a returning resident, creates a connection while still abroad with an emissary of the Jewish Agency (whose role is to update the emigre on his rights as well as the possibilities of reabsorption in Israel) or with the consul for Labor Affairs (today, the journalist Amos Hadad is serving in this role, and he deals exclusively with the requests of those seeking aid in finding academic employment). The Agency has one and only one emissary to handle emigres -- Col (Res) Mashakh Amir. He has attacked the maintenance of representation of the Ministry of

Labor in New York, and noted that "this representation annoys, because it causes confusion among Israelis wanting to return, and it is not constructed to handle returning Israelis". According to him, "there are known cases in which the representatives of the Ministry of Labor did not handle Israelis who turned to them. Even the handling of academics is slow and frustrating, and many Israelis who have contacted the Ministry of Labor have not received a response, or the treatment was inappropriate. Later, they have come to the Immigration Department of the Agency".

But, the duplication and "war of the Jews" abroad is nothing compared to what goes on in Israel in this area. Although, according to the estimate of the director general of the Ministry of Absorption, Eli Artzi, as many as 50 percent of those returning do not seek any help from government factors, those who do seek assistance cannot see the forest for the trees. Apparently, their processing has been assigned to the Committee for Returning Residents in the Ministry of Absorption (headed by Amram Tamir), but this committee has no representation in the Ministry of Housing, which created its own unit for handling the housing problems of returning Israelis, headed by Ms. Mira Makhlev. A returning emigre who is looking for work can go to the Employment Service or the Employment Section of the Ministry of absorption or the Employment Service for Academics in the Ministry of Labor. Anyone who has problems regarding health insurance must turn to the Ministry of Health, and when he has questions regarding the education of his children, he must turn to the Ministry of Education. In short, the lack of coordination exhausts the returning Israeli, and stops him in his first steps upon his return to Israel.

7075

CSO: 4423/21

ISRAEL

ILLEGAL ALIEN WORK FORCE SURVEYED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Dec 83 Supp p 1

[Article by Avraham Dishon: "Foreign Work Force"]

[Text] Despite the air of recession and the fears of dismissal, Israel today employs more than 4,000 foreign workers from all parts of the world without a work permit, and an additional 1,286 with a permit. Most of the foreign employees work at hard unskilled jobs in industry, construction, hotels and the tourist and health sector.

The air of recession and fears of dismissal of tens of thousands of workers have recently turned the spotlight on the thousands of foreign workers employed in Israel illegally and without a work permit. These employees are engaged for the most part in almost underground conditions in all sectors of the economy, especially in hard manual labor which Israelis do not like, starting with the third shift in factories, through construction work at distant sites and taking in hotels which cry out for this kind of workers.

The employment service estimates that more than 4,000 alien workers are employed today in Israel without work permits in addition to about 15,000 workers from the occupied territories who work illegally in Israel (another 60,000 workers from the territories are legally registered in the labor bureau offices). These workers, who are generally very efficient, disciplined and relatively cheap, enjoy the protection of their employers, who maintain a conspiracy of silence and make every effort to cover up for them.

The Interior Ministry, which is authorized to issue work permits for workers from abroad, is not set up to deal with those who do not take out the permits and simply makes do with occasional checks of the employers by the employment bureau.

Until now 1,286 work permits for foreign workers have been taken out in Israel, mainly in those cases in which it was proven that it was impossible to get local workers for the position. The permits, which are renewable, are given for a period of half a year.

In recent years there has been almost no change in the number of foreign workers employed by permit. Of 1,286 workers whose employment was authorized, 606 are employed in industry. This is mainly the aircraft and military industries which require special professional manpower for short periods, and also various private and government plants--like the new power station in Hadera, the Dead Sea plants and others.

Branches of tourism employ 303 foreign workers, including chefs (especially Chinese chefs), waiters, specialists in areas of tourism and flight and even artists and entertainers who arrive in Israel for extended periods of time.

Various hospitals have engaged 168 foreign workers as experts in particular fields; 64 are employed in institutions of higher learning, especially as guest lecturers; 87 foreign workers are employed by various church institutions and 58 aliens are doing humanitarian work in Israel, namely taking care of chronically ill persons who immigrated to Israel and require continuous care and assistance.

But this list is extremely sketchy. For example between 300 and 400 female workers from the Philippines work in Israel as housekeepers. These maids stay in Israel for extremely long periods of time, and only a small portion of them have been "caught" and sent back. Another 3500 to 4000 foreign workers are employed in the construction and hotel industries without the necessary permits. They are employed in simple unskilled jobs that the typical Israeli worker is not willing to do. Most of their employment is, as we noted, in the third shift in factories or at distant construction sites. The employer does not make the required contributions for these workers and pays them a net salary below minimum wage--such workers have no social rights or medical insurance. This phenomenon has even penetrated to the restaurant and hotel sectors, where they are also employed in the most simple jobs.

The employment service is not set up, as we said, to deal with this phenomenon--but the hope is now that the condition of the economy will bring about an improvement. Israeli workers will rise up and report their "new fellows" to the employment service--as has already happened in a number of workplaces and where it was then possible to take action and deport them.

By the way, the first ones to complain about the unfair competition were the artisits, who feared that their sustenance was being taken away from them after dozens of entertainers and artists arrived in Israel. It is now hoped that other sectors will also begin to inform on aliens.

The entire topic of alien workers is disquieting to the heads of the Histadrut, but even Histadrut plants such as "Merkavim" and "Ha'argaz" have taken out work permits for many dozens of foreign workers. The Minister of Industry Gid'on Pat recently called on the general secretary of the Histadrut Yeruham Meshel to stop employing foreign workers, and it is high time that they take the first step and serve as an example to others.

The Histadrut's central committee recently decided that the Histadrut will set up rotation activities for professionals so that they will be able to replace foreign workers. These professionals will be trained in the various professions and be shifted from plant to plant as required in order that they be able to replace foreign workers.

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CSO: 4423/25

BLACK MARKET EXPANSION ANTICIPATED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Nov 83 p 10

[Article by Arye Lavi: "Expansion of Black Market Anticipated"]

[Text] The black market will continue to expand in the near future, according to a study by the Union of Trade Offices of 124 leading companies, and 24 branches of activity in various branches of commerce.

From the results of the study, conducted by the economist Yisrael Porma, of the Economics Department of the Union of Trade Offices, it is apparent that already today there are a growing number of complaints regarding small businesses which require payment in cash -- sometimes in dollars -- without accounts. This harsh atmosphere of payment in dollars in cash in conducting business is causing serious concern for improper competition among large businesses which operate according to law.

Following are the principal findings of the study:

A steep decline in sales during the months of October and November of this year, at rates varying from 20 to 70 percent.

The only branches in which a rise has been recorded are electronic components and office automation.

The attempt to reduce inventory has led to sales at pre-devaluation prices, and this prevented declines in sales in the month of October, especially in home electrical appliances, furniture, liquors, and household utensils.

A drastic reduction bordering on an absolute freeze in orders from abroad in most branches of commerce, ranging from 50 to 100 percent.

In a number of branches, such as liquors, there has been a rise in the price of domestic prices at a rate of between 25 and 30 percent immediately after the devaluation. The study notes that this is an example that prices of domestic products rise immediately and in tandem with the rise in prices of imports, and not always directly related to a true rise in the branch.

Prominent is the trend to reduction or elimination of deals with institutional factors such as governmental ministries, the defense industry, kibbutzim, and marketing networks, because of the inability to withstand the conditions of payment dictated by these factors.

A large number of branches complain of a lack of credit to finance current operations.

In a number of branches there is a possibility of expansion of credit from foreign suppliers, linked to foreign exchange, but because of the sharp decline in sales, the uncertainty regarding the future, and the fear of a recession, businesses are prevented from expanding their activities.

7075

CSO: 4423/21

ISRAEL

ATTEMPTS TO POPULATE DEVELOPMENT TOWNS SEEN AS FAILURE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Dec 83 p 9

[Article by Ari Yafet: "Development Towns Missed the Train"]

[Text] In the population race between the development towns and the towns in Judaea and Samaria, the former have been defeated. Even in years of plenty when government funds were freely distributed, the development towns have remained at a standstill. In many development towns the number of those departing is greater than the number of new people being absorbed.

The last year in which the number of people moving from the center of the country to development towns exceeded the number leaving them was 1979, by a surplus of 3301. From 1980 to 1982 the balance was negative: -405 in 1980, -364 in 1981, -75 in 1982. There is also a decline in the number of immigrants absorbed in the development towns. In the national total 1979 saw the absorption of 5,773 immigrants. In the following year 2,885 were absorbed. In 1981 973 were absorbed, while in 1982 1,412 immigrants were absorbed. (This is an increase with respect to the preceding year but a sharp decrease with respect to years gone by.)

The number of cities which registered a negative migration balance (including immigrants) is increasing: from 4 development towns in 1979 to 9 in 1980 and to 13 in the years 1981 and 1982.

The Major Cities With a Negative Migration Balance

<u>City</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
Qiryat Shemona	-279	- 18	- 18	- 74
Tiberias	- 18	-193	-204	-214
Bet She'an	-147	-105	-246	-204
Dimona	- 44	-338	-731	-660
Eilat	+338	+ 72	-117	-197

How did these negative phenomena develop? Certainly none of the government ministries or office directors intended for the development towns to dwindle. Even those who saw a central national mission in accelerating the

settlement of Judaea and Samaria claimed that the budgets intended for strengthening the development towns would not be affected.

It seems that the major weak point is in settlement policy. Expanded settlement of the development towns is conditioned, among other things, on the number of new apartments and apartments available for monthly rental, in the present employment and social situation, to those who want to move. For many years various government ministries such as Housing, Commerce and Industry, and Labor worked together on a policy of settlement assistance. This was accomplished by means of a committee of ministers for development towns and a committee of development town administrators. This approach continued to operate even after the 1977 change of government.

In the years 1977/78 the ministerial committee even initiated a positive change in the system of incentives for the development towns. It was decided that the special incentives could be gotten not only by required workers who moved to the development towns, but that anyone who moved could get them. It was also decided that teachers, doctors, nurses and social workers who moved to the development towns would receive a monthly increment as an incentive. Previously the total housing loan to which someone who moved to a development town was entitled came to the actual cost of the housing. (At a later stage it was determined that the buyer would have to pay at least 5 percent of the purchase price. All these incentives and more, such as the allocation of new apartments for monthly rental--so that a newly moved family could decide if they really wanted to remain in the new place without burning all their bridges behind them--were the life blood of the development towns.

As noted, this process reached its peak in 1979. From that point on things began to get confused. The construction ministry took over control of what happened in the development towns. Other government ministries were removed from the picture. The ministerial and administrative committees for the development towns ceased to function. The construction ministry quickly became the exclusive agent in determining settlement policy and incentives for new settlers. The size of loans to purchasers of apartments was scaled down, and the development towns were given the same precedence as the new towns that were built in Judaea and Samaria. The temptation to move to a far-off development town weakened, especially given the attractive alternative: for the same loan, and sometimes even for a more generous one, it was possible to purchase an apartment in Judaea and Samaria, in towns only a quarter to a half hour travel time from Gush Dan, which made it possible to continue working at the same job. The arrangement for allocating new apartments at rental for new settlers of development towns was canceled. In fact, it was the old-timers in the development towns who enjoyed this benefit, since they were more easily able to buy new apartments that had been intended for new settlers--when the latter changed their minds because of more attractive alternatives.

In recent years reasonable conditions have been created for the middle and upper classes to move to the development towns, but the way has been clocked for that group which constitutes the majority of settlers--young

couples. The latter want to escape from living with their parents or from renting substandard apartments. To this very day they flood the development town steering centers, but the skyrocketing apartment prices and the lack of convenient loans deter them.

The statistical report of the steering center overlooks an additional serious factor. Several initiatives of the industry and commerce ministry bore fruit. Several extensions of well-known plants such as Raf'al, Elsint, Elbit and Tadiran were established or were planned to be set up in the central and western Galilee. Development towns such as Upper Nazareth, Ma'alot and Karmi'el would receive a large wave of immigration if all of those workers--excellent human material--were to settle in them. But in practice the situation was different: the majority of the workers were transported each day to the plants from the area of Haifa and the cities. Settlement conditions in the vicinity of the plants are far from being convenient or attractive.

Five members of the Knesset from Likud and MA'ARAKH are also development town mayors. Neither they nor the 370,260 residents of the development towns have formed an effective enough pressure group to move the matter forward. The imagined economic abundance has passed the development towns by without their getting to enjoy it. Indeed, in some of the towns, according to the report, there has been some growth in population as compared to the previous year, but that growth is mainly due to natural increase, which is much higher than the national average. It is particularly ironic that construction minister David Levi is a resident of Bet She'an, one of the development towns struck by poverty and stagnation.

Today it does not seem that a body will be found, like the ministerial committee in the past, to make the decisions that are particularly vital at the beginning of a recession. In its time, the ministerial committee had decided that it should remove Ashdod, Ashkelon and Be'er Sheva from the list of development towns. In view of the tighter and tighter budgets, it is proper to ask if the time has not come to remove such towns as Qiryat Gat, Qiryat Malakhi and Yavneh from the list of developments in the center of the country and to direct the monetary resources for the advancement of some of the development towns that are in hard retreat.

Zohar Gindel, the director of the center for development town management, confirms the fact that today's reality requires renewed consideration of the entire topic. In his opinion, if a body can be found that will make courageous, sensible decisions, it will be possible to substantially increase the number of people who will move to the development towns. "The readiness to settle in the development towns exists. The question is only one of coordination between the various ministries and of reasonable moving conditions."

For the time being this is merely a wish. There is no suitable forum today for making and carrying out decisions--and without it the budget spigots are closed. It seems that the development towns have missed the train.

PRODUCE ROTS DUE TO PORT CLOSURE

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 5 Dec 83 p 4

[Text] Enormous quantities of fancy fruits and vegetables destined for export are rotting in the warehouses of the ports of Ashdod and Haifa because of the job actions there. Eight hundred tons of peppers, 300 tons of melons and large quantities of celery and persimmons have been destroyed thus far. Further cargoes are exuding foul odors in the warehouses and it seems that their fate is sealed.

Yesterday before noon dozens of fruit and vegetable warehousemen from backstage operations at the port of Ashdod were busy with the destruction of produce intended for export. On the spot they dug pits, emptied into them crates of peppers, melons, persimmons and avocados and afterwards set them on fire.

At the same time trucks began diverting tons of fruits and vegetables to canning and other industrial plants. Nevertheless the quantities that have been destroyed thus far have caused more than half a million dollars in damage.

The people at "Agrexco" have been emphasizing that the lack of trust in Israel in the markets of Europe will cause untold damage in coming years. In any case, the "Agrexco" people say, store shelves will not remain empty, and produce from Spain, Morocco and Portugal will replace that of Israel. The fruit and vegetable councils yesterday instructed farmers to stop harvesting, even if the crops rot.

The director of the port of Ashdod, Ilan Or, claimed yesterday that since the job actions began at the port last week, unchecked information has been spread to influence the course of events. In his words there is no truth to the report that last week not a single ship left the two ports. In fact last week from Ashdod alone six ships set sail.

Yesterday they were busy there loading fruit on two ships, even if at a slow pace; this, after one ship left the port Friday on its way to Europe. The number of ships at the docks yesterday afternoon in Ashdod was 12, with about 8 waiting outside the breakwater.

It was reported that, unlike previous years, the port workers' councils of Haifa and Ashdod this time reached agreement on full cooperation, and this has meant that ships could not simply move from one port to the other as has happened in the past. The workers' demands include significant wage increases.

JERUSALEM HOSPITAL SERVICES FOR ARABS DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Nov 83 p 9

[Article by Nadav Shragai: "Jerusalem Medicine"]

[Text] There has never been much understanding between the administrators of Hadassah Hospital, Sha'rei-Zedek Hospital, and Bikkur-Holim Hospital, in Jerusalem. The three administrators have appeared several times before Knesset committees, and they have also signed several joint appeals, but in a city where the supply -- a surplus of beds -- is greater than the demand (the number of sick persons), generally each of them is convinced that his institution in particular is entitled to a greater share of the pie of hospitalization.

The cool relations between the three hospitals have recently given way to cooperation against the building of a new Arab hospital in east Jerusalem. A considerable percentage of the clientele in the large hospitals of the capital has been Arabs, who in the best case are not members of Kupat Holim and bring a lot of cash into the impoverished coffers of the hospitals, and in other instances increase the occupancy of beds in the various departments. The extreme case is the pediatrics department of the Hadassah Hospital on Mt Scopus. Forty percent of the children in this department are from east Jerusalem. The direct cause of the common concern recently shown by these hospitals is the plan of Dr Wasar Ubayd of Ramallah to build a new 400 bed hospital for the Arabs of east Jerusalem with Jordanian financing. The many papers of Dr Ubayd have been rolling around the desks of the officials of the Jerusalem city hall and the Health Ministry for several years, and would continue to do so were it not for the decision of Health Minister Eliezer Shostak, in conjunction with Mayor Teddy Kollek, to authorize the construction of the project.

Hadassah, Sha'rei-Zedek, and Bikkur-Holim could not have wished for worse timing for this news. At a time of scarce resources, hospitals in Israel are like small boats staying afloat with great difficulty, and in Jerusalem, the official authorization was another blow to the hospitals. Ubayd, whose title in Jordan is still "in charge of health services on behalf of the Jordanian government in Jerusalem", has established links with the Israeli architect Ze'ev Bern, who has begun to design the hospital in collaboration with the Jerusalem city engineer. At the same time, the Jordanian representative has turned to the holder of the planning portfolio in the Jerusalem city hall, Teddy's deputy Avraham Kakhula, and has asked for a prior letter of commitment that the city authorities will not place difficulties in the

way of the implementation of the project. In exchange, the Jordanians have promised him to finance the building of the hospital and the purchase of the land on which it is to be built. Ubayd himself, who lives in Ramallah, is in direct communication with the Jordanian health minister, and has met several times with the Israeli health minister, Eliezer Shostak. The city for its part has hastened to locate a piece of vacant land north of the Beit Hanina neighborhood, and has signed the letter of commitment, which caused the administrators of the three hospitals to jump.

In the Health Ministry it is difficult to find an expert who will declare that there is a need for more hospital beds in Jerusalem. At Hadassah-Ein Karm and Hadassah-Mt Scopus, and Sha'arei-Zedek, there are more than 1000 beds, and other hospitals in the eastern sector of the city have an average occupancy rate of only 70-80 percent. Even at Bikkur-Holim the occupancy rate has not reached 100 percent, and in addition to all of this, another hospital in Jerusalem -- Misgav Ladakh -- has been expanded without any logic. Both Arabs and Jews have places in which to be hospitalized, and Dr Ubayd's plans, which are supported by the Health Ministry and the Jerusalem city hall, have other causes.

Since 1978, the number of Arabs of east Jerusalem insured by Kupat Holim has gradually been increasing (45,000 today). Naturally, they prefer to go to Jewish hospitals and to receive treatment free of charge. Membership in Kupat Holim is no longer considered a crime of supporting a Zionist cause. Anwar Nuseiba, an ex-Jordanian defense minister, travels to London to ease his pains, but another important political personality, the head of the East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, Fa'iq Barakat, is a proclaimed member of Kupat Holim. The mukhtar of Beit Tsafafa, Muhammad al-Abd-Raba Suleiman had until recently refused to cooperate with the city administration of Jerusalem, but a month ago some Arab money exchangers stabbed him and seriously wounded him. Suleiman was brought to the Al-Maksad Kupat Holim, and from there he was quickly taken to the Hadassah Hospital. His life was saved, and since then Suleiman has not ceased lauding Jewish medical institutions to his villagers. In recent weeks, dozens of villagers from Beit Tsafafa have signed up as members of Kupat Holim in order to receive inexpensive medical treatment when needed. The new medical center of Kupat Holim at Shaykh Jarkh, which was built with the aid of the Jerusalem Fund, also helped to dispel the atmosphere of suspicion regarding the medical insurance of the Jews, which had prevailed on the Arab street until a few years ago.

In the office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs for the Jerusalem City Administration, they quickly draw out news clippings from the Arab press which warn the residents of east Jerusalem from associating with Jewish medical insurance. There is no doubt, that in Jordan as in Israel, medical insurance is viewed as a powerful political tool, and they are afraid of its expanding influence in Jerusalem. Whoever waves a national insurance policy to compel us to come and vote in city elections will, in a few years, be waving a Kupat Holim certificate to bring us to the polls again, I was told by an Arab worker at the Jerusalem city hall. Yasar Ubayd and his plans are the Arab answer to medical insurance as a political tool. In the Jerusalem city hall they had trouble explaining the support for Ubayd's plans, but they point to the Maksid Hospital on Mt Scopus, a hospital with an obviously pro-PLO orientation. They explain Israeli support of Ubayd as a counterbalance to Maksid. (The waqf is building a nursing school next to Al-Maksid.)

At Maksid, there are 250 beds, although the Ministry of Health has authorized only 120 beds. The ministry is responsible for only one hospital in east Jerusalem -- the Hospice, where there are 60 beds. Jews go to carpenters and garages in east Jerusalem. But you will not find one Jew in the Arab hospitals of east Jerusalem. In a letter which was addressed to Arab contributors in the Persian Gulf countries, the directors of the Al-Maksid Association wrote: "So that the picture will be clear to our brothers abroad, we are calling upon them to come to Jerusalem to see the Hadassah Hospital. This large institution which was built with contributions from Jewish communities throughout the world ... We are asking if the Jewish communities are wealthier than the oil countries? We are hoping that our brothers will listen to our appeal, that our strong position here needs your help."

Those who are injured in demonstrations or accidents with the army and the police are assured free medical treatment at Al-Maksid. In September 1981, the administrator of the hospital, Mahmud Khibia, writes: "In accordance with the policy of the Association, it was decided that Alice and Margaret Sham'a, two women who were injured by grenade fragments, would be treated by the Association free."

The sources of financing of east Jerusalem hospitals are varied., Al-Maksid, which is the largest, is financed by the budget of the Al-Maksid Islamic Association and from contributions from governments and people of means in the Arab world. Regular annual contributions come from Palestinians who work in the Persian Gulf, and from the Islamic Solidarity Bank. In particular, the governments of Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia bear the burden. In 1982, the general budget of Al-Maksid was 3,662 million dinars (512 million shekels).

Officially, the Auguste Victoria Hospital on Mt Scopus (107 beds) receives only Palestinians from refugee camps. Its budget comes from grants from UNWRA, the UN Welfare and Relief Agency, and from the Lutheran church. The annual budget of the Hospice is 14 million shekels. The smaller hospitals, St John (82 beds), St Joseph (72 beds), and the Women's Hospital (8 beds) receive financing from foreign sources, from foreign governments to private associations.

The administrators are not the only ones dissatisfied with the results which may arise from Dr Yasar Ubayd's activities here. Several months ago, unidentified people burned the two automobiles owned by Ubayd, and one can only guess from where they came.

Research conducted by Dr Alex Leventhal in 1978 for the Jerusalem Institute for Research of Israel showed that the Arabs are a minority among those who need medical service in the western part of the city. There percentage of the population of Jerusalem stood at 27.7 percent, but only 4.3 percent of those coming to Red Magen David stations were Arabs. The Arab rate of those coming to hospital classification rooms annually was 39 per 1000. When a comparison for a specific month was made between two neighborhoods, Arab and Jewish, each having 15,000 persons, the numbers said everything: 137 came from the Jewish sector as opposed to only 37 from the Arab sector.

Today, five years after the study, Dr Leventhal confirms the new situation in the field, and says that the number of Arabs presenting themselves at Jewish hospitals has increased greatly, especially following the rise in the number insured by Kupat Holim. He rejects the decision of the Minister of Health to grant a license to another 400 bed hospital in east Jerusalem. "There is today a surplus of beds, and the medical basis in them cannot enable them to raise such a project. It is not the hospitals which practice medicine, but the people who work in them", claims Dr Leventhal. Under present circumstances, the east Jerusalem hospitals transfer every complicated case to the Jewish hospitals. Indirectly, it is clear to all of them that another hospital is superfluous. Dr Leventhal anticipates a continued rise in the numbers coming to Jewish hospital classification rooms. "We consider health to be a right. Among the Arabs it is considered a favor. This is how they considered it until 1967. But in recent years there has been a maturing, and a de facto acceptance of Jewish medical services".

The director of the Bikkur Holim Hospital, Dr Shlomo Stern, rejects the very idea of establishing a hospital in Israeli sovereign territory with Jordanian financing. "This is very serious, with no connection to Arab needs." Stern asks: Has anyone examined the needs of the Arab population? Has anyone considered the social and political aspects of this decision? We are talking about the segregation of Jews from Arabs. Is this the official policy of the government and the city administration?" Stern argues that from pure economic considerations, the three hospitals in the future can increase their number of beds, and reminds those who have forgotten that the permission to reactivate the Hadassah Hospital on Mt Scopus was given in response to the needs of the nearby Arab population. "The Jewish population did not need another hospital at the time." Dr Pinkhas of the Hadassah Hospital also believes that the reason for building another Arab hospital in east Jerusalem is not medical.

It is possible to justify the building of another hospital for Arabs in Jerusalem by the argument of the objective difficulty of the Arab patient to communicate with the Jewish doctor -- language, dietary practices, etc. This is the position of one of the well known doctors of east Jerusalem, Dr Amin Khatib. But with all of the understanding for this position, it is impossible to use it alone to justify the building of another hospital in Jerusalem. Dr Yasar Ubayd is presently in Amman, recovering from a serious operation which he underwent in the U.S. When he returns to Israel in the coming weeks, the debate regarding an Arab hospital will be renewed. Political themes will certainly be involved in it, but it must be remembered that the question is essentially a medical one. There is no reason to renew the debate which preceded the building of the Misgav-Ladakh Hospital, for which many argue today that there was no need.

DR MODAN: IT IS A PRIVATE HOSPITAL

Question: Why is there a need for another hospital in Jerusalem?

Answer: The Arab population has been accustomed to high level private medical service. It is denied this today.

Question: What is wrong with Hadassah-Mt Scopus, or Sha'arei Tzedek?

Answer: They are not private hospitals. We have no right to deny the construction of a private hospital which will not ask for our aid.

Question: The hospital administrators of Jerusalem claim that it will adversely affect them.

Answer: I have not yet received any such appeal from them. I do not believe that it will adversely affect them. It is true that in relative terms, the Jerusalem population has more hospital beds than other areas of the country, but in certain departments there is already an occupancy in excess of 100 percent. We believe that a private hospital, when it is built, will serve as a substitute for other private hospitals in east Jerusalem which are of a lower level.

Question: Is not this in fact opposed to the integration of medical services in Jerusalem?

Answer: Look, there is no possibility of refusing this request. They are not asking for our aid, and just as we do not refuse a request by Jews to build a private hospital, so we cannot refuse a request by the Arabs.

7075

CSO: 4423/21

ISRAEL

NEW RABBINIC RULING SEEN AS AGGRESSIVE CLERICALISM

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Dec 83 p 10

[Article by Daviv Ben Isra'el: "Religious Control in Food Plants"]

[Text] Last Friday (2 Dec 83) it was reported in the press that the council of the Chief Rabbinate in Israel, meeting under the leadership of the two chief rabbis, decreed:

Any food plant that requests a certificate of kashrut [certification that the food was prepared to be Kosher in accordance with Orthodox Jewish law] will be required to observe the Sabbath in the entire territory of the plant (underlining mine--D.B.I.).

What does "the entire territory of the plant" mean? The intent is clear: to expand religious control, not by increasing supervision over the kashrut of the products themselves, but by capturing territory (as continues to be done in Jerusalem) because, from now on, the very existence of such a plant, even in moshavim and kibbutzim where such exist, will be dependent on strict observance of the Sabbath. This is the case even in warehouses that do not contain food products, in bathrooms, in parking spaces, in offices and gardens, in the guardhouses and kiosks on the property, in private roads and in workshops. The supervision over "the entire territory of the plant" will require that it be surrounded with an impenetrable fence, with a lockable gate to cut it off from the surroundings. And, of course, it will have to fly the flag of rabbinic supervision.

It should be pointed out that the first glimmerings of the spirit of this rabbinic decision have already been seen. For example, plants that fall into this category were required in the past to maintain kashrut in the buildings that are at the disposal of their workers, buildings which are totally separated from the production buildings and which have no connection with production itself. It is redundant to note that the plants meekly bowed their heads.

A decision parallel to that of "the entire territory of the plant" has been in effect for many years with regard to hotels, which have largely given in to the decrees of the religious establishment out of fear of loss of customers (after all, business is business). The secular public has had

almost no reaction to this clerical pronouncement, which has invented a law on the kashrut of food that has nothing to do with kashrut itself. This large powerful camp is virtually unaware of what has been happening now for many years in Israel, in fact, since its founding. At each step of growing religious compulsion which encroaches on our lives at the national, judicial and police levels, it responds "Enough!"--in a weak-voiced protest that is inconsistent and ineffective.

A proper reaction against this aggressive clericalism requires organization, financing and persistence which can only come from the major parties of the left--from MA'ARAKH and the various liberal circles--but such a reaction is conspicuous by its absence. Electoral considerations, humanistic naivete, longings for times gone by that are no more, the desire to prevent a cultural war, economic interests and weariness of ideological struggles--all of these have combined to silence the secular majority of the country which, through its money, finances the crushing clerical machine.

Tightening the Noose

We are now witnessing a giant leap forward in religious compulsion which portends a stranglehold. Who will prevent the heads of the Israeli Jewish church from deciding, at some tactical point in time that it may choose, that every store that sells kosher food must observe the Sabbath, that its male employees must wear a skullcap and the "four corners" [of a "small Tallit," an undergarment worn by the ultra-observant] and that its female employees must be modestly dressed? Who will prevent the Chief Rabbinate from deciding that the granting of kashrut to agricultural produce--vegetables, fruits, grains, fish, milk, eggs, honey--requires the observance of the Sabbath "in the entire territory" of the economy which produces and/or sorts and packages it? Why not prevent stores from selling kosher products together with those that until now were exempt from kashrut (such as products imported from abroad, for example jellies, sweets and wines)? What a joker that would be for extending religious supervision (control) beyond Israel's borders by requiring anyone who grants kashrut to be exclusively subordinate to the Israeli rabbinate!

The day will come, and it does not seem so far off or so impossible, in which the Jewish Vatican will decree that kashrut not be granted any food--or even toothpaste (didn't you know that that, too, requires a certificate of kashrut?)--if its manufacturers do not observe the commandments, as is the case with "Guarded Matzo" [unleavened bread for Passover prepared under the especially strict conditions required by the ultra-Orthodox].

It is clear that the territorial laws of the Chief Rabbinate are not there for the sake of heaven. There is no connection between them and simple, upright faith wisely maintained. The growth of an army of religious supervisors assures additional votes to the religious parties, since anyone who earns his living from the religious compulsion is going to be interested in maintaining and strengthening it.

The crown jewel in the religious control over this aspect of our lives will certainly come. Don't worry, we shall yet see the day--God willing--when that additional step of the Rabbinat will be taken (perhaps when some Chief Rabbi will want to prove to his competitors that he is more righteous than the pope), that there be an additional step for renewing a license of kashrut for a food manufacturing plant--the dismissal from work "in the entire territory of the plant" of any person who takes part in the struggle against religious compulsion and/or for freedom of conscience. Inasmuch as we understand human nature, we can presume that the plants, even the secular ones in the labor sector, will swallow this pill as well--after all, "the plant is our livelihood, isn't it?"

God in his mercy protect us!

9794

CSO: 4423/25

BRIEFS

REAL DECLINE IN TAXES--The treasury's tax administration has expressed serious concern over the drastic real decline in the collection of taxes. In November the real decline in collection reached 10 percent--about 6 billion shekels--which was expressed by an enormous outflow of currency. Most of the decline comes from the collection of income taxes, both corporate and individual. According to treasury circles this decline will continue and even increase in coming months because, as a result of spiraling inflation, the collection of income taxes in the cities from both employees and the self-employed will suffer. According to treasury estimates, the rate of inflation for the 4 months October 1983-January 1984 will reach about 80 percent. The national income administration reported that in November 60.3 billion shekels were collected in taxes--a real decline of 10 percent. Income from customs rose by about 4 percent, and it was reported that at this stage there is no indication of a tendency toward a general decline in imports. In the month of November the levy on travel abroad and on foreign currency sales brought in about 4 billion shekels, after foreign currency purchases underwent a decline. At the treasury ministry they explain that the decline in tax collections could completely undermine the cash reserve situation. This condition has resulted from the suspension of the Lebanon war loan collections, the drop in the stock exchange levy and the inflationary taxation law which has brought about a decline in income taxes from corporations and individuals. [Text] [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 5 Dec 83 p 2] 9794

MANDATORY TECHNOLOGICAL REFRESHER COURSES--Fifty thousand teachers, both male and female (about 80 percent of the teachers in the primary and secondary schools) will not be able to continue working if they do not take professional technological refresher courses at various levels during the next 10 years. These facts were reported by the institute for technological forecasting at the University of Tel Aviv and were forwarded at the request of "NA'AMAT" to the minister of education. The general secretary of "NA'AMAT," Masha Lubelski, warned the education minister that "the education system is helpless in meeting future demands of the economy." The report shows that there are insufficient technological studies in the schools, and that there is a grave lack of qualified teachers and development resources. In Bar Ilan University, for example, only 150 out of 2,000 applicants were accepted for computer studies. The president of the Technion, Professor Yosef Singer, warned not long ago that a shortfall is projected of 5,000 engineers and a similar number of associate engineers and technicians in the fields of electronics, computers and aeronautics and air traffic control. The general secretary of

"NA'AMAT" urged the minister of education to undertake a wideranging study of the technological education system, especially in the female sector, in light of the findings that were published in the report of the institute for technological forecasting according to which only 1.9 percent of mechanical engineering students and only 4.8 percent of electrical engineering students are women. "These figures prove the failure of the system to meet future needs," "NA'AMAT's" general secretary wrote to the minister of education, Mr Zvulun Hammer. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Dec 83 p 18] 9794

YOUTH FOR ISRAEL MOVEMENT--Irit ben Dov, the organizer of "Tzlil" (Youth for Israel, at the University of Tel Aviv), you all are taking part in arranging the Hanuka activity--what is that activity? Over the holiday the movement will hold candle lighting ceremonies opposite the homes of objectors to service in Lebanon. Lighting the candles is symbolic of the war of Israel and the Maccabees as a war of the few against the many. What do you want from the objectors? That they sing Hanuka songs with you? The lighting of the candles will tell each objector "See this light which symbolizes rebellion and heroism! Stop endangering the existence of Israel as a sovereign democratic country. Joining the young people in our ceremonies will be members of the underground movements who fought for the establishment of Israel, the people of the Irgun and LEHI. We also have some people from the Palmach who support our activity and despise the objectors. Opposition to the objectors is national, not factional. You will only light candles? No. In a vigil at the house of the "spiritual father" of the objectors, Professor Leibowitz, we will light a flaming inscription condemning those who preach disobedience to orders. Leibowitz, after all, is a professional angry prophet, so let him see the inscription on the wall. At the end of the holiday we will hold a gathering with a central figure--we want to bring Arik Sharon--since he was once crowned "Judah Maccabee," wasn't he? [Text] [Tel Aviv YOMAN HASHAVU'A in Hebrew No 84, 1 Dec 83 p 47] 9794

NEW, INDEPENDENT ZIONIST NEWSPAPER--Lou Lanert, one of the first fighter pilots in the Israeli airforce, will be one of the directors of a new Israeli newspaper, in English, which is to be published at the end of May. "World Jewry," Mr Lazer claims, "is yearning to read an independent Zionist Israeli newspaper with a sympathetic patriotic viewpoint." Mentioned for the slot of general manager of the newspaper is businessman Buma Shavitt. At this stage negotiations are on-going with one of the senior officials in the governments of Rabin and Begin, who is a candidate for the position of editor-in-chief. [By Benny Landau, HA'ARETZ correspondent in California] [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Dec 83 p 2] 9794

NEW ELECTRO-OPTICS PLANT--A high-tech electro-optics plant that will produce measurement tools based on infra-red rays was inaugurated yesterday in the Migdal Ha'emeq industrial park. The plant currently employs about 20 workers, mostly engineers and tool operators. Most of its output is destined for the use of highly sophisticated plants such as the aviation industry, the Ta'as and Raf'al concerns and tooling for the development

of the Lavi airplane. Present at the opening ceremony were the dean of the physics faculty at the Technion, Professor Lipson, the chairman of the Migdal Ha'emeq community council and many guests. The plant was set up by two entrepreneurs who had previously worked at the Technion on electro-optics and have now decided, in partnership with investors from abroad, to make industrial use of their knowledge. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Dec 83 p 4] 9794

ASTRONOMICAL TRAFFIC VIOLATION STATISTICS -- According to statistics, every Israeli driver commits 2000 traffic violations per year, and Israel holds first place in the world in terms of the burden of traffic per kilometer. This was revealed yesterday evening by Minister of Transport Haim Korfu, at a ceremony for the award of the safe driver certificate for 1982, which was held at the Hall of Culture. Korfu said that in Israel today, there are about 1,200,000 licensed drivers, who own 700,000 vehicles. The minister revealed that in the last nine months alone, there were an additional 49,000 new drivers. According to him, we have reached the point where traffic safety has become a problem for the quality of life, and if the problem is not dealt with, things may become a nightmare. Korfu also noted that 50 percent of all traffic accidents in the country occur in the area of Tel Aviv, where there are about 100,000 vehicles on the road each day. High Court Judge Dov Levi who serves as the chairman of the Council on Accident Prevention, said at the ceremony that the plague of traffic accidents is not a situation which we must accept, and that we must root it out. Judge Levi maintained that the basic cause of accidents is that the driver is human, and that a supreme effort must be made to improve the situation. He said: "The state of Israel suffers from a plague of traffic accidents which is out of all proportion to its size and population". [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Nov 83 p 1] 7075

GALILEE INDEPENDENT ARAB PARTY -- An independent Arab party is growing in Israel. A protest meeting of the "Progressive Movement - Nazereth" against the intervention of the Syrian regime on behalf of rebels in the PLO attracted delegations from six Arab communities (Shefar'am, Sakhnin, 'Araba, Dayr Hannah, Jatt, Deir al-Asad). Telegrams of support were sent to the meeting by Arab activists in Haifa and Jaffa. Apparently, heavy rains and the loss of telephone communication prevented other delegations from arriving. Uri Avneri was the only Jewish guest at the meeting. The head of the "Movement" faction in the town of Nazereth, Attorney Kamal Dahar, called for the establishment of a national party, or a federation of local groups, which would galvanize the Arab community in Israel for the struggle for equality of civil and national rights, "and free it from party dependence". The HA'ARETZ reporter notes that the collaboration between the Nazereth group and other groups will be further expressed in the near future, with the publication of a common newsletter, in which there will be a summary of the speeches made at the protest meeting. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Nov 83 p 3] 7075

CONDITIONS IN AL-KHARRUB DISTRICT DISCUSSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 32, 19 Nov 83 pp 65-67

[Article: "AL-TADAMUN in District That Has Remained Beyond Cease-fire; al-Kharrub District Lost Between Camille and Kamal, and Israel Has Introduced It Into War Game; Majority in al-Kharrub District Is Sunni; Its Political Role Has Been Stolen by Beirut, and Israelis Have Squeezed It Between Fire of Phalangists and Socialists; No Hospitals, No Health Centers, No Electricity, and Water Has Not Run in al-Shiffah Canals for 8 Years"]

[Excerpts] Al-Kharrub District is a name that has suddenly gained prominence in the list of names of Lebanese areas highlighted by the war after having been forgotten for a period of time or not having been known to many people.

The confrontation in al-Kharrub District between the Socialist Progressive Party and its allies on the one hand and the Lebanese Forces on the other took a turn different from the course of the military operations in the other areas of Mount Lebanon when the Israeli forces intervened in this war for the first time, enabling the Lebanese Forces to regain some of the positions they had lost in the district. One imagines that it is as if this intervention were intended to involve the district in a state of siege similar to the state of the severe siege imposed on Dayr al-Qamar and to use the district as a new political card, keeping in mind that this district had remained for long years one of the forgotten and neglected areas hardly exerting any impact on the Lebanese political decision. Even though most of the Sunnis in the capital, Beirut, come from al-Kharrub District, they have forgotten this district and allowed it to get lost between Camille and Kamal (Camille Sham'un and Kamal Junblatt).

Al-Kharrub District is the gateway to al-Shuf from the coastal side, and it separates Upper al-Shuf from the coastline extending from al-Awwali to al-Sa'diyat. In some parts, the district overlooks al-Awwali River directly. It also faces Jazzin area. Moreover, some of the district's hills are of strategic military importance because they control the entire area of al-Shuf, especially the roads leading to 'Alayh area, considering that these hills overlook the western al-Shahhar area.

This geographic reality gives the area a major military importance, and this importance explains why the Israeli occupation forces established full control over the important points in al-Kharrub District during their invasion

of Lebanon before moving deep into al-Shuf. This also explains the entry, or rather introduction, of the district into a bitter military struggle, keeping in mind that it had kept away from the military battles throughout the years of the civil war. Thus, they involved the district in a state of military siege following the state of political, social and historical siege in this area that is supposed to represent a model of coexistence among numerous sects.

Demographically, the district's population consists of 300,000 people, with a high Islamic proportion from the Sunni Muslim sect. More than two-thirds the district's population are Sunni Muslims. The district also contains a Maronite minority that lives in either joint villages, such as Hasrut, al-Mughiriyah and al-Burjayn, or in purely Christian villages, such as 'Ayn al-Hawr, al-Ma'niyah, al-Jlayliyah, 'Alman and al-Shams, keeping in mind that there are 37 villages in the province. Therefore, this district separates demographically the Druze concentration in the Upper al-Shuf and the Christian concentration in Jazzin. The district also contains a Shi'ite minority centered in al-Wardaniyah located above the coastal line.

Administratively, al-Kharrub District is within the jurisdiction of al-Shuf Province of the Mount Lebanon Province. At the popular level, prominent politicians, especially the late Kamal Junblatt and ex-President Camille Sham'un, tried to gain popularity in this province. This endeavor could be seen during the parliamentary elections. Kamal Junblatt was able, by virtue of his understanding of the popular political game, to build a popular base in the district when he built a residence in the district and lived among its population. Kamal was followed by his son Walid Junblatt who kept the residence and completed building the Sibliin Cement Factory which had been planned by Kamal Junblatt and which had aroused a major political clamor at the time when Kamal was minister of public works and then minister of interior.

Moreover, the district population has been split politically into two main segments: Rightists, such as the 'Uwaydat and Qa'qur families, and radical leftists, such as al-Khatib family, which includes in its membership Deputy Zahir al-Khatib and dissident lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib, commander of the Arab Army of Lebanon, and the Shabbu family, which includes in its membership Murshid Shabbu who has worked in leftist organizations that have resorted to violence as a means to achieve their objectives.

We should keep in mind that many of the district's inhabitants emigrated to Beirut and forgot the district. Those who came to Beirut became rich, and the district inhabitants have remained poor. It is well known that most of Beirut's families are from this district originally. This is what has motivated many of Beirut's Sunni inhabitants and their organizations, such as al-Maqasid Association, to devote special attention to al-Kharrub District on the basis that it is the first line of defense for the capital. Serious thought is being now given by Beirut's Sunni leaders to the demand that the district be annexed to Greater Beirut, thus becoming a natural extension of Beirut's Sunnis and vice versa.

Thus, al-Kharrub District has entered the circle of interest through the gate of polarization, as soon as battles erupted in the district, voices rose in

condemnation. Why not, considering that the district represents this important politico-geographic dimension?

In view of the concentrated Muslim Sunni presence in the district, the Islamic leaders, especially the Sunni leaders, have moved to demand that the hands be kept off the district, that the ghost of war be kept away and that the state of siege be ended. Most prominent among these leaders have been al-Shaykh Hasan Khalid, the mufti of the republic, and ex-Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, along with the Islamic Grouping leaders, in addition to the Druze, Shi'ite and radical leaders and some Christian leaders, such as Camille Sham'un. But these moves have produced no result, the siege has remained unchanged and the battles have continued. Even though nearly 2 months have passed since the siege started, the cease-fire has not included the district's population with its blessing. The battles go on, the sounds of rockets are heard in its various villages and the bullets of snipers cover its roads.

The talk about al-Kharrub District must be coupled with the talk about the historical hardships under which its inhabitants have lived-hardships made evident by the official neglect of the district, especially the neglect of its living conditions and political affairs.

Socially, the district lacks health, guidance, educational, supply and public services. For example, water has not run in al-Shaffah canals for 8 years, especially in the elevated areas. The same goes for electricity, keeping in mind that the thermal electricity plant is located in al-Jiyah area on the district's coastline. There are constant power outages because the networks are corroded and the maintenance rare. Most of the villages lack hospitals and health centers. There are no government clinics in the villages, except for a small clinic in the village of Shuhaym, which is the district's most important village. This clinic is not enough to meet the needs.

Moreover, the civil defense center in Shuhaym lacks manpower, tools and equipment and the area's narrow roads are unfit for use. As the inhabitants put it, "between one pothole and another on the road, there is a third pothole."

As for communications, the area's telephone, which is linked to Beirut by only two lines, is operated in the primitive, semimanual way. As for education and schools, the district's official schools suffer from a thousand and one problems. There is a shortage of teachers, equipment, buildings and desks. For example, "the student needs to take with him into the classroom an umbrella for protection from rain," according to one of the area's inhabitants. Many schools stop teaching during the academic season, namely winter.

In the face of this situation, the inhabitants had no alternative but to "pull out their thorns with their own hands." So they have formed popular committees or small associations that cooperate to solve some problems. But these modest initiatives, which have not been able to drill a small artesian well, surface a short and narrow road or build a popular clinic, are definitely unable to undertake bigger tasks performed by capable central state agencies. According to one of the area's inhabitants, the district has lived for long years with

the state represented in it only by police stations and police, whereas it has been absent in the other spheres.

In addition to the chronic and widespread neglect in the district's villages--the same neglect that is widespread in other Lebanese areas, such as 'Akkar, the south and al-Biqa'--the district suffers from the poor financial capabilities of the citizens, most of whom earn their livelihood from government and private jobs and from enlistment in the army, the internal security forces and the public security because agriculture has lost many of its mainstays and is no longer enough to provide the main part of life's needs.

What makes things worse, according to the inhabitants generally, is that the major part of the productive sector works outside the area in government and private jobs, thus causing the district's economic activity to be more stagnant and monotonous. This activity is confined to agriculture which is centered in the orchards where olive and fig trees, grapevines and the remnants of carob trees--for which the district [kharrub means carob] is named because it is famous for the fruit of the carob trees from which molasses is made--are grown and to scattered shops and businesses in public squares.

It must be noted here that the area enjoyed a negligible degree of prosperity when the 2-year civil war started and when the district's native sons living in Beirut abandoned their homes and returned to their villages, opening some businesses and branch offices of some companies. This activity was growing steadily when the Israeli invasion came and destroyed everything. The distinctive economic feature in the district is the Sibline Cement Factory which supplied a considerable number of jobs and working places for tens of the district's inhabitants (since its construction started). But the security conditions have not permitted the factory to start production. Consequently, this experiment is so far incomplete. Naturally, the hardships intensified with the Israeli invasion, and the inhabitants began a new journey in suffering which started with the coming of the tanks, the RPG's, the mortars, the snipers' bullets, the kidnap roadblocks and the closed roads. A large number of the district inhabitants have been killed or wounded, with the number of those killed and wounded estimated at 500 since the Israeli invasion.

Along with this official neglect of the social and living conditions and under the canopy of this stifling hardship, the district has also suffered from political neglect. Despite its geographic, economic and popular importance, this district has remained far from participation in making Lebanese political decisions.

What is noticeable regarding al-Kharrub District is that it, like any other poor area, has given Lebanon a number of its top-level leaders and officials. But the district has not benefited from these leaders or from their role because their positions took them away from their areas and they moved to Beirut with their families. Beirut has made them forget their roots, and the district has become to them a summer resort to which they go to spend their vacations.

The district has also been premeditatively kept by all administrations far from actual participation in shaping Lebanon's future. For example, the

district, with its Sunni Muslim majority, has never been given an important ministerial portfolio, keeping in mind that the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim. But this area has never gotten its share, and a Sunni leader from Beirut or the north has always spoken in its name. Even a "connection" (which is a very common word in Lebanon if one wants a government position or even a job) needs another "connection" before an inhabitant of the district can explain his circumstances, ask for a job or demand participation in the process of power sharing among "the people of the house."

Add to this the fact that many people from outside the district have tried through the district--by using it in the market of political oneupmanship--to attain important higher positions in the state. For example, Salim al-Khuri, a brother of departed president Bisharah al-Khuri (known as Sultan Salim because he had control of the keys of power), tried in 1947 to run in the parliamentary elections as a candidate for the district. In the 1947 elections, Shaykh Hasan al-Jisr was able to win the parliamentary seat representing al-Kharrub District. In the past 10 years, Michel al-Khuri (the son of the late Bisharah al-Khuri) has tried to get to the parliament through the district. All these people are from outside the district, and they have tried to exploit its situation to achieve their goals and objectives and to attain positions without paying any attention to the area's hardships.

Some believe that the Lebanese sectarian separation has been a reason for excluding the district and denying it participation. The majority of the district's population is Sunni, and the important Sunni positions have been allotted to certain areas, especially Beirut and Tripoli (in the north). Even in these two areas, the allotment has been confined to certain families within the framework of Lebanese political feudalism and of splitting the "cheese loaf" among the cats while the mice stand and watch. It is perhaps for this reason that well-known families have transferred their vital statistics records from the district and registered them in Beirut in order that they may have the opportunity to attain these positions, such as the Mazbudi family which is originally from Mazbud and which includes in its membership deputy and minister Zaki Mazbudi, the Barraji and al-Burjawi families (originally from Burja), the 'Anuti family (originally from 'Anut) and al-Shuhaymi family (originally from Shuhaym)--all of which are villages in al-Kharrub District.

Despite all this, al-Kharrub District has never been absent from Lebanon's political life, and its sons have played a prominent role in the various spheres, even though the channels they have followed are not official channels, have not been recorded in the authorities' agencies and records and have even been forgotten by the historians.

What is being experienced by the district presently is perhaps a historic turning point. Regardless of the consequences of the destructive war sweeping this district, along with the other parts of Lebanon this war has given the district this political momentum and has restored it to this role. Many have come to realize its strategic importance at all levels, and this will enable it to play an important role in changing Lebanon's political map. Whoever thought that this district, whose name had been forgotten by all the Lebanese and which has never been taken into consideration in the talk about the spheres of influence, would be noted, for example, by U.S. President

Reagan who recently mentioned it while talking about the Lebanese situation in al-Karub (meaning al-Kharrub), would be mentioned by the Soviet TASS AGENCY or would be underlined by the high-ranking U.S., French and Italian military leaders as an important point in planning the deployment of the multinational forces and the UN observers. To our misfortune, it is always our enemies and those lurking after us who alert us to the importance of what we possess and draw our attention, unintentionally of course, to the conditions of our strategic areas. Has the war led us to this important juncture called al-Kharrub District and has it drawn to the district the attention of those who have forgotten that this district, with its inhabitants, resources and location, is an important part of this lost homeland?

A final question has to be raised while all are sitting around the dialogue table:

What will the condition of al-Kharrub District, which has been the main source of Beirut's Sunni Muslims, be a month from now and who will win in the game of time? The winter is coming and with the first downpour, the roads will turn into swamps, the need for fuels will intensify and the winter diseases, which accompany the changes in climate, will spread. What will the district's condition be if its joints are severed? We are waiting for the answer.

8494

CSO: 4404/218

HOUSING MINISTER DISCUSSES HOUSING PROBLEMS, ELECTRICITY RATIONING

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 35, 10 Dec 83 pp 31-32

[Article: "Lebanese Minister of Housing to AL-TADAMUN: Crisis Is Chronic and One-half of Lebanese People Are Homeless"]

[Text] One-half of the Lebanese people are homeless today. The Mount Lebanon and al-Shuf war has left behind 30,000 families who have resorted to government schools, churches and mosques for shelter.

"The government, through the three-member committee, has approved a number of steps to secure temporary housing to the homeless until security and stability are restored to the areas from which they have been evicted. We have decided to use the hotels damaged by the war to house these evacuees.

"The economic situation is fearful and very serious as a result of disruption of the economic cycle and of exploitation, and the warmongers are exploiting the citizen "energetically."

"The housing problem in Lebanon is a chronic problem, and we have formulated some immediate and medium-range solutions to deal with it. We hope to begin implementing these solutions as soon as political and security conditions allow us to do so.

"Almost all electric power will be restored shortly to all parts of Lebanon. I would not be surprised if there are merchants of electric generators who are exploiting the circumstances to reap illicit profits. Some Lebanese have turned death into a business, so why wouldn't they exploit generators and the like?"

These statements were made by Engineer Baha'-al-Din al-Bisat, the minister of water and electric resources, housing and cooperatives, when he was interviewed by AL-TADAMUN in his private office on Rue Verdun and questioned on the issues of the hour in Lebanon, namely the problem of the evacuees, the electricity crisis and the housing problem.

"The Mount Lebanon and al-Shuf war alone has resulted in the eviction of 30,000 families, i.e. nearly 180,000 persons. These figures have been confirmed by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and the Lebanese

organizations concerned with the affairs of the homeless. The state has worked to secure temporary housing for these evacuees. A total of 1,602 have resorted to official schools in the various areas, and the rest have taken refuge in churches and mosques and with relatives. With the onset of winter and the start of the new academic year, the government, through the three-member ministerial committee, comprised of himself, the minister of labor and social affairs and the minister of agriculture, has approved a number of solutions to deal with the problem of these evacuees as quickly as possible. The proposed solutions include transferring the evacuees from the official schools to lodge them temporarily in the unused hotels damaged by the events and located on the coastal corniche in central Beirut--namely the Holiday Inn, the Phoenicia, the Hilton Hotel and others--after making the necessary and urgent repairs on these hotels to make them habitable. Generally, the Lebanese war, which started in the middle of 1975, has led to the evacuation of one-half of the Lebanese people. We hope for a quick and final solution to this serious problem through the restoration of security and of the state's authority to all parts of Lebanon so that every evacuee may be able to return to his original home."

Answering a question on the present situation of the housing crisis, Minister al-Bisat said that the housing problem in Lebanon is a chronic and stifling one due to three reasons:

"The first is the shortage of housing built for the working class and for people with low and middle incomes. The second reason stems from the evacuation which started in 1975 and which is still going on, with one-half of the Lebanese people forced to emigrate from one area to another. The third and final reason is the enormous damage that has been inflicted on thousands of housing units in Beirut, the capital and various areas, especially the damage inflicted as a result of the Israeli invasion.

"Just for the sake of information, let us cite the following figures on the amount of the housing damage resulting from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In Beirut, 25,283 units have been damaged, including 15,658 units damaged partially, 8,545 units damaged heavily and 1,080 units that need to be rebuilt completely. Beyond Beirut, the damage has been as follows:

"1. Damage inflicted on housing units in West Beirut: 10,530 units destroyed and 11,630 units damaged.

"2. In the city of Tyre: 469 units destroyed and 2,301 units damaged.

"3. In the city of Sidon: 1,500 units destroyed and 1,700 units damaged.

"Added to this is the damage caused to housing units by the Mount Lebanon and al-Shuf war and the West Beirut events in August and September 1983. Up to now, we don't have accurate statistics on the dimensions of the damage due to the impossibility of going to the combat sites in Mount Lebanon and al-Shuf to conduct a practical on-the-spot inspection of the damage suffered by the housing sector."

Answering a question regarding his opinion of the current Lebanese economic situation, Minister al-Basat said: "It is catastrophic, even though it is not in my nature to be pessimistic. But this is the truth. Production is idle, the economic cycle is disrupted and exploitation is 'rampant.' This is axiomatic in a country overtaken by war 9 years ago--a war that still goes on. We still hope, with our confidence in the dynamic nature of the Lebanese economy and in the private economic sector, that the Lebanese economy will restore its previous condition and strength. It is not impossible for the Lebanese people to achieve this goal. We must achieve this goal when we attain security and political relaxation of the Lebanese crisis."

Finally, asked about the electricity problem in Lebanon and about the date for lifting the rationing system that has been in place for too long, Minister al-Bisat said: "The Lebanon Electricity Establishment is exerting a big and extraordinary effort to repair the damage caused by the recent fighting. The establishment's maintenance teams are working under danger to restore electric power to the Lebanese people. The members of these teams are making invaluable sacrifices."

"The establishment is not responsible for the delay in repairing the remaining damage, which is subsidiary. The sides responsible for this delay are the disputing parties in Lebanon that do not allow the maintenance teams to repair the remaining damage, especially in al-Kharrub District."

Asked about the truth of the rumor linking the continued rationing of electricity to deals to sell electricity generators, Minister al-Bisat said: "I hear every day a new kind of slander against the Lebanon Electricity Establishment. This is shameful because it is groundless. The establishment is, as I have already noted, exerting its utmost efforts to secure electric power to the citizens. As for the presence of 'generator' merchants and other kinds of merchants who exploit this situation, this is not the responsibility of the establishment. However, this exploitation does not seem surprising to me. Some Lebanese 'have turned death into a business' during the war, so is it surprising that they are turning electricity into business?"

8494

CSO: 4404/228

STATISTICS ON WORKERS' SALARIES, BENEFITS PUBLISHED

Cairo AL-'AMAL in Arabic No 237, Nov 83 Supp pp 4-29

[Booklet by Suhayr al-'Uryan: "Manual of Regulations Dealing With Labor in Saudi Arabia"]

[Excerpts] II. Residence Laws

It is necessary to obtain a work visa when entering Saudi Arabia. There are three types of visas for coming to Saudi Arabia, and they are the following:

1. The 'Umrah [Minor Pilgrimage] Visa

A person having this type of visa has the right to reside in Saudi Arabia without having his passport checked. This visa is usually granted for a period of 2 weeks. Persons having this type of visa are permitted by the authorities to visit only the holy places in Mecca and Medina, such persons are not allowed to go to any other city, and they do not have the right to work while in Saudi Arabia, whether they work for pay or work without receiving pay.

2. The Visitor's Visa

This type of visa is given either to individuals to visit their relatives or to businessmen, as specified by the visa. The period of residence granted by this type of visa is from 1 to 3 months. Persons having this type of visa are not permitted to work in Saudi Arabia during their period of residence there.

3. The Entry Visa for the Purpose of Working

This type of visa is granted on the basis of a contractual agreement between the contracting party and the employer and on the basis of prior approval from the Saudi Ministry of Interior. Persons having this type of visa are allowed to legally reside in Saudi Arabia during the entire period that their contractual agreement is in effect. Persons having this type of visa must obtain a residence permit from the Passport Office when 3 months have expired after the date of their entry into Saudi Arabia. This 3-month period "constitutes the probationary period."

III. Laws Dealing With Labor and Workers

Most Important Features of the Saudi Labor Code

1. Work Hours

The work day shall consist of 8 hours. During the month of Ramadan, however, it shall consist of 6 hours. It is permissible to have a worker work overtime. But the total number of hours worked per day shall not exceed 10 hours, and overtime pay shall be paid for hours worked overtime.

2. Leave

A. 15 days of annual leave for persons who have worked a whole year, with wages paid.

B. 21 days [of annual leave] for persons who have worked for an employer for 10 consecutive years, with wages paid.

C. Sick leave which is fully paid for the first 30 days and three-quarters paid for 60 days thereafter.

D. 10 days emergency leave during the first year, with pay.

E. 3 days for the purpose of completing the formalities of marriage, with pay.

F. 1 day if an employee's wife has given birth to a child, with pay.

3. Severance Pay

A worker is entitled to severance pay for the period of time he was employed. This severance pay is computed on the basis of being half of the salary of the last month of each of the first 5 years of employment plus a full month's salary for each year after that.

4. Terms Which Must Be Found in the Work Contract

A. The contract shall stipulate that the employer provide suitable and hygienic housing for the employee. In case such housing is not provided, a worker shall be granted a housing allowance totalling not less than 3 month's salary.

B. The contract shall stipulate that the employer provide air travel tickets to the employee both at the beginning and end of the contractual period as well as when the employee goes on annual leave.

C. The contractual period shall be 1 year, renewable by agreement between the two parties.

D. Salaries shall be set in terms of the local currency, which is the Saudi riyal.

E. The job and its responsibilities shall be determined on the basis of being a single job.

F. The contract shall also include the other benefits--both monetary and material benefits--which are in addition to the pay [such as] commissions and transportation allowances.

5. Pay Scales

The contract shall not include any unfair terms of punishment which workers must be compelled to accept.

Salaries of Contracting Parties in Government Jobs

The contract must be certified by the appropriate authorities in each of the two countries.

Foreign contracting parties are appointed to government jobs in Saudi Arabia on the basis of a contract ratified in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations Dealing With the Hiring of Non-Saudis in Government Jobs. These regulations were issued on the basis of Civil Service Council Degree Number 45 of 1 Sha'ban 1398 A.H. The decree stipulates that the provisions of the regulations are valid with respect to all non-Saudis working in the field of education, starting 1 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1398 A.H.

The regulations also provide for other rights for contracting parties, the most important of which are the following:

1. Travel tickets for the contracting party and his family ([totalling up to] 4 persons) both at the beginning and end of his contract period and during his annual leave.

2. A housing allowance equal to 3 months' salary and totalling at least 8,000 Saudi riyals.

3. A furniture allowance equal to 50 percent of the employee's monthly salary at the beginning of his contractual period.

4. Monthly transportation allowances in accordance with the following salary categories:

<u>Salary</u>	<u>Transportation Allowance</u>
Less than 2,000 riyals	300 riyals
From 2,000 to 3,500 riyals	350 riyals
More than 3,500 riyals	400 riyals

5. An employee may be given an annual bonus of no more than 5 percent, and it is determined in accordance with his efficiency rating.

6. Regular leave time amounting to 45 days each year.

7. An award amounting to half a month's [salary] for each complete year employed, provided that the employee has worked at least 3 consecutive years, [and the award] shall be no more than 5,000 riyals.

Salaries for Members of Teaching Staffs of Universities

This section deals with the salaries of faculty members, lecturers, language instructors, researchers, and research assistants. The salaries of contracting parties engaged in this type of employment have been set in accordance with the following tables:

Table 1. Salaries and Allowances of Researchers and Research Assistants (in riyals)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Initial Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Annual Bonus</u>	<u>Maximum Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Monthly Transportation Allowance</u>	<u>Annual Housing Allowance</u>		<u>Furniture Allowance (disbursed as lump sum)</u>
I.	4,855	350	7,305	500	19,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					23,000	married	
II.	3,955	300	6,955	500	18,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					22,000	married	
III.	2,700	250	6,450	500	17,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					20,000	married	

Table 2. Qualification Requirements for Members of University Teaching Staffs

	<u>Faculty professors</u>
I.	Doctor's degree or the equivalent, or an academic title from a university recognized by the university [hiring the professor].
	<u>Lecturers</u>
II.	Master's degree or any other academic degree recognized by the university as being equivalent to a master's degree.
	<u>Language instructors</u>
	1. Master's degree.
III.	2. Or bachelor's degree in education plus at least 2 years' experience.
	3. Or bachelor's degree plus at least 3 years' experience.
IV.	Bachelor's degree with an overall grade average of at least "very good."
	<u>Researchers and research assistants</u>
V.	Doctor's degree, master's degree, or bachelor's degree with a grade average of at least "very good," [and this applies] only to researchers and research assistants.

Table 3. Salaries and Allowances of Faculty Professors, Lecturers, Teaching Assistants, and Language Instructors (in Saudi riyals)

<u>Job</u>	<u>Initial Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Annual Bonus</u>	<u>Maximum Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Monthly Transportation Allowance</u>	<u>Annual Housing Allowance</u>		<u>Furniture Allowance (disbursed as lump sum)</u>
Teaching assistant	2,700	300	5,400	500	17,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					20,000	married	
Lecturer	3,400	350	6,550	500	18,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					22,000	married	
Language instructor	4,080	350	6,880	500	22,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					25,000	married	
Assistant professor	5,600	400 (5 yrs. maxi- mum)	9,200	600	25,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					30,000	married	
Associate professor	7,250	450 (5 yrs. maxi- mum)	11,300	600	25,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					30,000	married	
Full professor	9,100	500	13,600	600	25,000	unmarried	50 percent of housing allowance
					30,000	married	

Wages of Persons Working in Private Sector Establishments

This section deals with the average wages of those working in private sector establishments, the average wages of members of the Asian work force, and the minimum wages of members of the Egyptian work force.

There are no stipulations in Saudi Labor Law concerning minimum wages. However, after having made a study of the wage levels of foreign workers as well as the price levels and standard of living, the Workers' Bureau has come to consider the following wages to be general average wages--and Egyptian workers should not accept wages lower than these when concluding a contract:

Table 4. Monthly Wages of Workers in the Private Sector

<u>Job</u>	<u>Wages</u>
<u>Health Sector</u>	
Specialist doctor	5,000 riyals
General practitioner	3,000 riyals
Pharmacist	2,500 riyals
Head nurse (with bachelor's degree and full residence)	2,000 riyals
Nurse (with nursing diploma, specialization, and full residence)	1,500 riyals
Nurse (with nursing diploma and full residence)	1,200 riyals
Assistant nurse (1 1/2 years and full residence)	1,000 riyals
Laboratory technician (secondary level diploma and laboratory technician diploma)	1,700 riyals
X-ray technician (secondary level diploma and X-ray technician diploma)	1,700 riyals
<u>Education Sector</u>	
Teacher (with 3-year teacher's diploma after preparatory school)	1,500 riyals
Teacher (with 5-year teacher's diploma after after preparatory school)	1,700 riyals
Teacher (with university diploma)	2,000 riyals
Teacher (with university diploma and 1-year pedagogy diploma)	2,250 riyals
Teacher (with university diploma and 2-year pedagogy diploma)	2,500 riyals

Table 4. Monthly Wages of Workers in the Private Sector (continued)

<u>Job</u>	<u>Wages</u>
<u>Building and Construction Sector</u>	
Engineer (with bachelor's degree in engineering)	3,000 riyals
Draftsman	1,700 riyals
Surveyor	1,700 riyals
Foreman and work supervisor	2,000 riyals
Skilled laborer (blacksmith, carpenter, tinsmith, plumber, painter)	1,500 riyals
Assistant skilled laborer	1,000 riyals plus board
<u>Transportation Sector</u>	
Private chauffeur	1,000 riyals plus board
Microbus driver	1,300 riyals
Bus or truck driver	1,500 riyals
Truck trailer or heavy equipment driver	2,000 riyals
<u>Agricultural Sector</u>	
Agricultural engineer	2,000 riyals
Agricultural supervisor	1,500 riyals
Tractor driver	1,000 riyals plus board
Agricultural worker	750 riyals plus board
<u>Financial and Administrative Jobs</u>	
Accountant	2,500 riyals
Jobs requiring university diploma	2,000 riyals
Jobs requiring diploma above the intermediate level	1,700 riyals
Jobs requiring intermediate level diploma	1,500 riyals

Table 4. Monthly Wages of Workers in the Private Sector (continued)

<u>Job</u>	<u>Wages</u>
<u>Other Skilled and Ordinary Labor Jobs</u>	
Skilled laborer (mechanic, electrician, tinsmith, painter, etc.)	1,500 riyals
Assistant skilled laborer (mechanic, electrician, tinsmith, painter etc.)	1,000 riyals plus board
Ordinary Laborer	700 riyals plus board
Sanitation worker with full residence	700 riyals

Other Benefits

1. Suitable housing or a housing allowance totalling at least 3 months' wages.
2. Expenses paid for the trip made at the beginning of the contract period and the return trip at the end of the contract period and travel expenses paid for the annual leave period.
3. Allowances for transportation from one's place of residence to one's place of work.
4. Health care.
5. In the case of jobs which require that a worker be provided with meals, the worker is entitled to a food allowance of 200 riyals in case his employer is unable to provide him with meals.

Table 5. Salaries of Dermatologists (in Saudi riyals)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
Bachelor's degree in medicine	4,400	200	15	7,000
Bachelor's degree in medicine plus diploma for [study of] minimum of 1 year	4,300	220	15	7,600
Master's degree in medicine or the equivalent after minimum of 2 years study after bachelor degree level	4,600	250	15	8,350
Doctor's degree in medicine or the equivalent after minimum of 3 years study after bachelor degree level	5,500	300	15	10,000

Table 6. Salaries of Engineers (in Saudi riyals)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
Bachelor's degree in engineering	2,900	130	15	4,850
Master's degree in engineering	3,400	155	15	5,650
Doctor's degree in engineering	4,100	300	15	8,600

Table 7. Salaries of Specialists (in Saudi riyals)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
Bachelor's degree	2,100	150	15	4,350
Master's degree	2,900	150	15	5,150
Doctor's degree	3,600	200	15	6,600

Table 8. Salaries for General Education [Teachers] (in Saudi riyals)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
Intermediate level degree plus 2-year pedagogy diploma	1,170	60	15	2,070
Intermediate level degree plus 3-year pedagogy diploma	1,340	60	15	2,240
Intermediate level degree plus 4-year pedagogy diploma	1,510	60	15	2,410
Intermediate level degree plus 5-year pedagogy diploma	1,680	60	15	2,580
Intermediate level degree plus 6-year pedagogy diploma	1,840	60	15	2,740
General secondary level degree	1,340	70	15	2,390
Secondary level degree plus 1-year pedagogy diploma	1,510	70	15	2,560
Secondary level degree plus 2-year pedagogy diploma	1,680	70	15	2,730
Secondary level degree plus 3-year pedagogy diploma	1,840	70	15	2,810
University non- pedagogy degree	1,930	85	15	3,205

Table 8. Salaries for General Education [Teachers] (in Saudi riyals) (contd)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
University non- pedagogy degree plus at least 1-year pedagogy degree	2,260	100	15	3,760
Non-pedagogy master's degree	2,430	100	15	3,930
University pedagogy degree	2,180	100	15	3,680
University pedagogy degree plus at least 1-year pedagogy diploma	2,520	100	15	4,020
Master's degree in pedagogy	2,850	120	15	4,650
Doctor's degree in pedagogy or doctor's degree in other field	4,100	150	15	6,350

Table 9. Salaries for Technical and Vocational Education [Teachers]
(in Saudi riyals)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
<u>Industrial or agri- cultural technical degrees</u>				
Industrial or agricultural intermediate level degree	1,275	80	15	2,475
Intermediate level degree plus 2-year industrial or agri- cultural diploma	1,500	80	15	2,700
Industrial or agricultural secondary level degree or inter- mediate level certificate with 3-year industrial or agricultural diploma	1,800	100	15	3,300
1-year industrial or agricultural diploma after vocational or general secondary level	2,000	100	15	3,500
2-year industrial or agricultural diploma after vocational or general secondary level	2,300	100	15	3,800
3-year industrial or agricultural diploma after vocational or general secondary level	2,650	100	15	4,150

Table 9. Salaries for Technical and Vocational Education [Teachers]
(in Saudi riyals) (contd)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
4-year industrial or agricultural diploma after vocational or general secondary level	2,900	120	15	4,700
Bachelor's degree in engineering	2,900	120	15	4,700
Master's degree in engineering	3,400	150	15	5,650
Doctor's degree in engineering	4,100	300	15	8,600
<u>Business degrees</u>				
1-year business diploma after secondary business school	1,550	80	15	2,750
2-year business diploma after secondary business school	1,750	80	15	2,950
Bachelor's degree in business	2,100	100	15	3,600
Bachelor's degree in business plus at least 1-year pedagogy diploma	2,300	100	15	3,800
Master's degree in business	2,900	120	15	4,700
Doctor's degree in business	4,100	150	15	6,350

Table 10. Salaries for Assistant Technicians and Craftsmen (in Saudi riyals)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
1-year technical or craftsman's diploma after elementary level	900	60	15	1,800
2-year technical or craftsman's diploma after elementary level	1,050	60	15	1,950
3-year technical or craftsman's diploma after elementary level	1,275	60	15	2,175
4-year technical or craftsman's diploma after elementary level	1,500	60	15	2,400
Vocational intermediate level degree	1,275	80	15	2,475
Vocational intermediate level degree plus 1-year technical or craftsman's diploma	1,475	80	15	2,675
Vocational intermediate level degree plus 2-year technical diploma	1,725	80	15	2,925
Vocational intermediate level degree plus 3-year technical or craftsman's diploma	1,995	80	15	3,195
Vocational secondary level degree	1,725	100	15	3,225

Table 10. Salaries for Assistant Technicians and Craftsmen (in Saudi riyals)
(continued)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
Vocational secondary level degree plus at least 1-year technical or craftsman's diploma	1,950	100	15	3,450
Vocational secondary level degree plus at least 2-year technical or craftsman's diploma	2,250	100	15	3,750
Vocational secondary level degree plus at least 3-year technical or craftsman's diploma	2,550	100	15	4,050

Table 11. Salaries for Administrative Jobs (in Saudi riyals)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
General secondary level degree with experience of at least 3 years in the field of translation required	1,600	80	15	2,800
General secondary level degree with at least 1-year foreign language diploma and proficiency in translating Arabic into the foreign language required and vice-versa	1,800	90	15	3,150
General secondary level degree with at least 2-year foreign language diploma and proficiency in translating Arabic into the foreign language required and vice-versa	1,900	100	15	3,400
Intermediate level certificate plus proficiency in typing Arabic	850	60	15	1,750
Intermediate level certificate plus proficiency in typing Arabic and typing on European-language typewriters	1,200	70	15	2,250

Table 11. Salaries for Administrative Jobs (in Saudi riyals) (contd)

<u>Qualifications</u>	<u>Basic Salary</u>	<u>Bonus for Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Years of Experience</u>	<u>Maximum Starting Salary</u>
General secondary level degree plus proficiency in typing Arabic or secondary level business degree with specialization in typing	1,200	70	15	2,250
General or business secondary level degree plus proficiency in typing Arabic and on European-language typewriters	1,400	80	15	2,600
University degree	1,400	60	15	2,300
General secondary level degree	1,120	40	15	1,720

IV. Social Insurance Laws

The laws dealing with social insurance in Saudi Arabia were issued on 6 Ramadan 1389 A.H. The Saudi Social Insurance Code stipulates that it is compulsory for all persons working in Saudi Arabia to be subject to the code's provisions, regardless of a person's nationality, sex, or age and regardless of the period, nature, and form of his contract.

The laws are divided into two sections--those dealing with pension benefits and those dealing with occupational hazards. They are as follows:

1. Pension Benefits

This section deals with retirement pensions, disability pensions, heirs' pensions, lump sum payments to persons who do not qualify for pensions, and grants for funeral expenses.

A. Retirement pensions. An insured person who has reached 60 years of age is paid a retirement pension. The amount of the pension depends on the period of time the person has participated in the pension plan and on what his average salary was during the last 24 months of the period when he was insured [while employed]. The retirement pension payment is equal to 2 percent of the employee's average monthly wage during his last 24 months of employment multiplied by the number of years he participated in the pension plan. An additional payment for dependents is added to the pension, and it totals 10 percent of the pension for the first dependent, 5 percent of the pension for the second dependent, and 5 percent of the pension for the third dependent.

Requirements for disbursement of this pension are the following:

- a. The insured person must have reached the age of 60.
- b. He must cease working at any job which is subject to the insurance plan.
- c. He must have participated for 120 months in the insurance plan, and must have participated in the plan for at least 36 months during the 5 years directly preceding his request for the pension.
- d. A person more than 50 years of age is eligible provided he has participated in the pension plan for at least 60 consecutive months and worked for wages prior to this period for at least 60 continuous months--and he is thereby entitled to add a month of insurance free of charge.

B. Disability pensions. If an insured person is afflicted by a non-occupational disability before reaching retirement age, he is entitled to receive a disability pension which will be paid to him by the General Social Insurance Organization every month for the rest of his life.

The value of the monthly pension is computed the same way that the retirement pension is computed. That is to say, it totals 2 percent of the average monthly wage for the 24-month period preceding the occurrence of the disability multiplied by the number of years that the employee has participated in the insurance plan. It is a condition that the total not be less than 40 percent of the abovementioned average [monthly wage]. If the total turns out to be less than 40 percent, it will be increased to 40 percent, but if the total turns out to be more than 40 percent, then this higher figure will constitute the value of the monthly disability pension. If the disabled person requires the assistance of another person in order to be able to take care of his everyday needs, then he shall receive in addition to his monthly disability pension a total disability premium amounting to 50 percent of the value of his disability pension. Both the pension and the premium are to be paid to the insured person throughout the rest of his life. In case of his death, the members of his family who were his dependents are entitled to receive heirs' pensions.

C. Heirs' pensions. In case of the death of an insured person who met the insurance requirements to be entitled to an occupational disability pension, or in case of the death of a person receiving a disability pension

or retirement pension, the members of his family who were his dependents are entitled to receive the pension which was being paid to their [deceased] provider. The pension which they receive will be the monthly pension without the additional payment for dependents.

D. If an insured person does not meet the eligibility requirements for a pension and has reached the age of 60 and spent at least 6 months working at a job not subject to the insurance plan or he has been affiliated with an occupational disability before the age of 60, such a person is entitled to receive a lump sum payment from the Social Insurance Organization. The payment shall be equal to the total value of the insurance premiums paid in (5 percent of the employee's wages) during the period of time the employee participated in the insurance plan plus a grant of 5 percent of the total of these premiums. Persons in either of these two above-mentioned categories must have been insured for at least 12 months. This applies only to persons who have not fulfilled the necessary requirements to be eligible for a retirement or disability pension.

E. Grants for funeral expenses. In case of the death of an insured person who was employed at the time of his death and who was insured for at least 6 months during the 12 months which preceded his death, or in case of the death of a person receiving a retirement or non-occupational disability pension, a grant of 400 Saudi riyals for funeral expenses shall be paid to the person responsible for arranging the funeral.

F. Beneficiaries outside Saudi Arabia. The General Social Insurance Organization pays entitlements to insured persons and to persons entitled to the insurance payments of these insured persons after [the death of] the latter no matter where they are and no matter if they are residing outside Saudi Arabia.

2. Occupational Hazards

Saudi Arabia will not be putting into practice the regulations dealing with occupational hazards until the completion of [the formation of] the agencies and organizations which will be concerned with providing treatment for job injuries, occupational illnesses, paying out daily compensation to injured persons during the period when they are unable to work, and disbursing monthly disability benefits to persons rendered disabled by injuries.

V. Services Provided by the Workers' [Representation] Bureau in Jiddah

In view of the fact that large numbers of Egyptian citizens have entered Saudi Arabia's labor market, the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Vocational Training has opened up an office in Jiddah. The purpose of the bureau is to study the labor market in Saudi Arabia, to study methods of guaranteeing protection to, and taking care of, the Egyptian work force abroad, and to contribute effectively toward solving the everyday problems of this labor force. The Workers' Representation Bureau undertakes its daily sponsorship of the Egyptian work force in numerous realms, which are the following:

1. Workers' disputes

A. The bureau looks into complaints which are submitted to it by contracting parties involving their employers and attempts to settle such disputes amicably.

B. If the bureau is unable to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute, the dispute is referred to the Saudi Labor Offices, accompanied by a memorandum containing the opinion of the bureau concerning the dispute.

C. The bureau undertakes the preparation of legal memorandums for contracting parties whose cases have been referred to the Initial Committees of the Labor Courts.

D. The bureau continues to look into these disputes until the implementation of the rulings which have been issued concerning them has been carried out.

2. Settlement of the entitlements of deceased persons

The bureau plays an important role in the realm of protecting the rights of legitimate heirs and settling the entitlements of deceased persons, whatever the reasons might be for the death of the deceased. These entitlements include the following: wages, severance pay, what the deceased person is owed by other persons, insurance entitlements from the Saudi Insurance Organization, and compensation due if the death was due to a criminal act.

In this connection, the Workers' Bureau undertakes to represent the legitimate heirs when dealing with the Saudi authorities involved until a settlement of the entitlements of the deceased persons involved is reached. The bureau then undertakes the remittance of these entitlements, in the name of the legitimate heirs, to the closest bank serving the area where the heirs have their place of residence.

In this regard it should be pointed out that the Saudi Cairo Bank has already demonstrated its complete cooperation with the Workers' Bureau when it comes to the remittance of these entitlements. This cooperation has resulted in the following two arrangements:

A. The bank charges no fees for the remittance of these entitlements.

B. The bank immediately cashes checks which involve withdrawing funds from accounts in other banks, and then the bank collects these funds [from the other banks] later on.

3. Job injuries

A. If a contracting party has been injured while on the job and because of his job, the bureau pursues the case with the authorities involved until the contracting party receives his compensation.

B. In the case of a death as a result of a job injury, the bureau, on behalf of the legitimate heirs, undertakes to pursue the case with the appropriate authorities until the appropriate compensation is received and is remitted to them.

4. Supervision of persons being deported

The bureau organizes periodic visits to the centers which shelter persons being deported because of their status of illegal residence in the country, and the purposes of these visits are the following:

A. To confirm the fact that their residence is illegal.

B. To enable them to take along their personal belongings and settle their debts with other persons.

C. To get reservations for them on airplanes and ships and allow them to leave the country in a suitable and dignified manner.

D. To verify the legal residence status of those of them who are [legal] residents and to enable them to put their legal standing in Saudi Arabia in order.

E. To issue return documents to persons who have lost their travel documents, in cooperation with the [Egyptian] Consulate General.

F. To issue embarkation orders to persons who have no funds in order to enable them to leave the country at the expense of the government.

5. Supervision of contractual agreements and regulation of contractual relations between contracting parties

A. The bureau reviews all of the contracts in order to guarantee that the wages are appropriate for the standard of living and the labor market and in order to make sure that there are no terms in the contracts which are unfair to the contracting party. The bureau discusses these matters with the two contracting parties and negotiates with employers in order to increase the wages [of the workers].

B. Passports for governesses are not renewed unless [a copy of] their work contract has been deposited with the bureau and [the bureau grants] its approval of the employer so that contractual relations between the two parties can be regulated.

6. Employment of the Egyptian Labor Force

The bureau looks into all requests by foreigners desiring to obtain an entry visa to come to Egypt for the purpose of hiring Egyptian workers and bringing them [to Saudi Arabia]. This applies to "non-Saudis since Saudis are permitted to enter Egypt without having to obtain a visa in advance." The bureau does this for the following reasons:

A. To ascertain the fact that such a person has received official authorization from the employer to conclude contracts with Egyptian workers.

B. The bureau undertakes the drafting of the necessary acknowledgements of the basic contractual terms as well as a written agreement to the effect that [persons seeking to hire Egyptian workers] will not charge the workers any fees in return for arranging contracts with them. These agreements shall supplement the terms of the contract in cases of contractual agreements involving wages less than these [wages mentioned above].

C. Persons wishing to bring Egyptian workers to Saudi Arabia [are urged by the bureau] to consult the Ministry of Manpower when attempting to meet their requirements rather than resorting to middlemen in Egypt.

7. Persons arriving with forged visas

Since the residence laws in Saudi Arabia require that a person coming to Saudi Arabia to work have--as a basic condition for his being allowed to leave [his own country]--the approval of [his prospective] employers, and since most of those arriving with invalid visas have been persons coming [to work for] fictitious establishments, the bureau undertakes the following:

A. Conducting investigations with the workers in order to find out how they obtained these visas and in order to find out which middlemen, whether in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, [supplied the visas to them]. No matter which country the middlemen are in, the bureau undertakes to pursue the matter with the appropriate authorities in order to help the workers regain the sums of money which they paid [to these middlemen].

B. Contacting the Chamber of Commerce and the Commercial Register [Office] in order to verify the fictitious nature of the establishments and consequently the non-validity of these visas.

C. The drafting of embarkation orders for those of them who have no funds and providing them with passports for travel via the airline company Egypt Air.

D. Obtaining exit visas for them from the Saudi authorities.

E. Providing a contracting party involved with an official statement to the effect that his entry into Saudi Arabia has taken place in accordance with a non-valid visa, and this official statement shall contain the name of the middleman involved so that the contracting party can bring civil and criminal charges against him in Egypt. In this connection we would like to point out the fact that, as a result of the fact that these cases have been vigorously pursued, since 1978 there has been a decrease in the number of cases involving persons coming [to Saudi Arabia] with forged visas.

8. Other matters

A. The bureau aids contracting parties who have lost their travel documents after the [Egyptian] Consulate General issues them papers replacing those which they have lost, and the bureau contacts the local passport authorities in order to verify the fact that they have legitimately come [to Saudi Arabia] to work.

B. The bureau helps workers who have deserted their employers to return to Egypt and contacts the appropriate authorities in order to obtain exit visas for them and in order to enable them to settle accounts with their [former] employers.

C. The bureau makes hospital visits to persons who have been injured on the job.

D. The bureau visits persons who have been arrested by the Saudi security authorities in order to investigate the reasons for their arrest and in order to keep the [Egyptian] Consulate General informed as to the progress of cases involving such contracting parties.

Headquarters of the Workers' Representation Bureau in Jiddah

The Workers' Representation Bureau is located in the Egyptian Interests Section in the Ashrafiyah area of Jiddah. Its telephone number is 6323007.

Other Benefits

1. 45 days annual leave for technicians and 60 days for others, with the leave-time pay disbursed in advance.

2. Disbursement of severance pay to persons who have worked for 2 years at a university, with the pay amounting to half a month's salary for every year worked and a full month's salary for every year for persons who have worked 5 years or longer.

3. A university provides a contracting party and his family up to 4 round-trip travel tickets at the end of every year for travel to and from the country of which the contracting party is a citizen or the country where he resided during the 2 years preceding his contract.

4. If a university does not provide housing to a contracting party, the contracting party shall be paid a housing allowance in accordance with the figures in the salary table.

5. If a university does not provide a contracting party with furnished housing, the contracting party shall be given a lump-sum payment for his entire contractual period--amounting to 50 percent of the housing allowance he is entitled to--as a furniture allowance during the period of his initial contract with [the university]. This lump-sum payment is to constitute his furniture allowance for his entire contractual period.

6. New contracting parties of the category mentioned above who are involved in a contract in Saudi Arabia for the first time shall be paid [an amount of money totalling] 50 percent of their first month's salary as a lump-sum payments to serve as an allowance for transporting their effects [to Saudi Arabia].

7. Persons who have previously worked in Saudi Arabia and have been away from Saudi Arabia for at least 1 year shall be considered among the "new contracting parties" dealt with in Paragraphs 5 and 6 unless they have already received the allowances referred to in these two paragraphs.

8. A university may undertake to pay the actual costs of educating the children of contracting parties if they do not speak Arabic. It can do this for up to 4 children, and the children must be between 6 and 18 years of age. The maximum [years of education provided] shall be 10 years, and the maximum payments shall be 10,000 riyals for the first child, 7,500 riyals for the second child, 5,000 riyals for the third child, and 2,500 riyals for the fourth child.

9. Medical treatment is provided to contracting parties and their families free of charge in the university hospitals.

9468

CSO: 4404/160

HEAVY FIGHTING KEEPS AFGHAN BORDER CLOSED

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 22 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, Wed.--Heavy fighting between anti-communist fighters and Afghan government forces kept the road linking Afghanistan with northern Pakistan closed for the second day running yesterday.

Muslim fighters in Peshawar, 50km (30 miles) east of the border, said the fighting has been raging on the frontier since Sunday, when Mujahidin forces seized the Torkham border post.

Western diplomats in Islamabad confirmed the Mujahidin's weekend capture of the Torkham post, a complex of Customs and security guard buildings.

Some Mujahidin sources said the Muslims holding the post had to give it up yesterday, but others maintained the post remained in Mujahidin hands. Both groups agreed heavy fighting was underway.

One Mujahidin source in Islamabad said Afghan warplanes attacked the Torkham post to try to dislodge the 150 fighters there. He said a dozen wounded fighters were brought to Peshawar.

Western diplomats said a huge convoy of Soviet tanks and trucks was seen leaving Kabul on Dec 12 in the direction of Torkham.

The Muslims, who have their headquarters in Peshawar are fighting to topple the Marxist Government installed in Kabul by the Soviet Union in December 1979.

Western diplomats also said Mujahidin shot down six Soviet helicopters in mid-December near Kabul and eastern Afghanistan.

They said the Muslims downed two helicopters in the Khost area in Paktia Province and the other four fell to resistance rocketfire at an unspecified area in the Logar valley; south of Kabul, on Dec 13.

Nine Soviet armoured vehicles were also destroyed in the Logar valley in a related action.

Twelve Soviets were killed and three Russian armoured vehicles were destroyed on Dec 16 during a clash at Qarabagh, just north of Kabul.

During a clash on Dec 9, three communist party members and 45 Afghan government soldiers were captured and released after surrendering their weapons, the sources added.

They also said a high-ranking Soviet officer and two Russian soldiers were being held hostage in Gulbahar, north-east of Kabul.

The sources said the security situation in Kandahar, Afghanistan's second biggest city, was out of hand from the communist regime's standpoint. They said the city's bazaars open for a short while in the morning and close as the Mujahidin enter the city during the daylight hours. UPI, SPA.

CSO: 4600/282

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

KARMAL LAMENTS ARMY DISCIPLINE PROBLEM--Islamabad, Jan 8 (AFP)--President Babrak Karmal of Afghanistan today expressed his disapproval over the "problem of discipline" in the Afghan army, according to a Radio Kabul broadcast monitored here. In a speech before the country's army commanders and senior party leaders convened to review the internal and external situation, Mr Karmal called for strengthening the armed forces, as well as improved coordination between army, police and security forces. Observers in Islamabad said that according to various sources, the Afghan army has had numerous desertions and defections. They said that a number of senior Afghan army officers have defected to neighboring Pakistan or fled to European countries, leaving the Soviet-equipped army in the hands of less experienced officers. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 9 Jan 84 p 1]

CSO: 4600/281

EXPORT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION SEEN IN FRENCH EXPULSIONS

French Intelligence Report

Paris LIBERATION in French 30 Dec 83 p 2

[Article by Veronique Brocard]

[Text] Three Iranian diplomats were expelled from France on Saturday [24 December]. Five students were expelled yesterday [29 December]. Although the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs have remained silent regarding this affair, evidently the French Government suspected the persons expelled of preparing to carry out armed attacks in France.

The French counterespionage service [DST], in a report prepared early in 1983, formally accused the Iranian Embassy in Paris and Iranian cultural or religious associations in France of providing cover for pro-Khomeini subversive activities.

The five Iranians awaiting expulsion from France normally would have been expected to have been in their seats on an Iran Air flight yesterday at 8:45 pm at Orly Airport. Since 22 December the five students: Mahamoud Kamkar, 27 years old; Mojtaba Norozi, 27; Mohamed Kalentari, 32; Mohamed Dastgheib, 26; and Nasrollah Jafari Najafabadi, 26, have known that they must leave France.

This was decided by the Ministry of the Interior which, in its decision on the matter, concluded that, in view of the intelligence collected on the activities of the Iranians, their continued presence in France was "incompatible" with the security of the state. While waiting for the next regular flight to Iran all five individuals were placed under house arrest at the National Police School in Reims.

Hoping that this decision by the Ministry of the Interior would finally be cancelled, Dr Nouri Alballa, one of their lawyers, yesterday [29 December] at 4:15 pm submitted five applications to the Administrative Tribunal, requesting the cancellation of their orders of expulsion, as well as five applications for postponements in the execution of their orders of expulsion. Dr Alballa stated:

"Although it is true that the Ministry of the Interior has discretionary powers, it must, nevertheless, justify the reasons for its decision." Now, in the view of the defense attorney of the five students, who said he "did not know in detail the kind of study program followed by his clients in France," Gaston Defferre [minister of interior and decentralization] had been very evasive. Dr Alballa stated: "I have not succeeded in obtaining explanations from the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, I don't know what they are really accused of."

Although the Ministry of the Interior and the Secretariat of State for Public Safety have remained very quiet about this affair, limiting themselves to a more than usually brief communique, it appears evident that the essential reason for these expulsions is related to terrorism. In effect, these five Iranian students are suspected of preparing to undertake armed attacks in France. Under these conditions it is difficult to see how the Ministry of the Interior, which is sure of its information, could cancel its decision.

The Ministry of the Interior is observing the same silence as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a few days ago. At that time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in effect refused to publish the names of the three Iranian diplomats expelled last Saturday [24 December]. Reportedly, those expelled included Majid Karchenas (who was named in the report of the DST mentioned above) and Abdoula Baghlani.

For the past several years the Iranian Embassy, its diplomats, and Iranian students have been carefully watched by the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST). In an overall report prepared early in 1983, whose conclusions have never changed, the French counterespionage service put the matter flatly: under the cover of their official missions, these representatives of the Khomeini government are nothing but agitators, activists, and even dangerous terrorists.

Under the heading, "Establishment of a Subversive Infrastructure," the DST explains that "in order to carry out its policies in France, Iran has been engaged in establishing a clandestine organization which is deployed around its embassy in Paris. The Iranian Embassy controls a large network made up either of individuals or of cultural associations whose official, religious activities in fact provide cover for their subversive activities."

Further on the report adds: "Small at first, this network was methodically built up and now covers, if not all of our country, at least all of the areas where significantly large Muslim communities live. Therefore, this organization, set up in this way, can be considered 'operational.'"

According to the DST, it is the Iranian Embassy in Paris which "constitutes the summit of this structure, and its subversive, political activities are extensive." The embassy is reportedly the source of the "dissemination of propaganda supporting the Khomeini government." The DST study states that through "the abuse of the diplomatic pouch, a substantial quantity of books, magazines, and pamphlets is brought into France. This propaganda is printed in Tehran by the

official Ministry of Islamic Propaganda [Ministry of Islamic Guidance]." As it is unable to bring in all it wants through this official and technically limited channel, the embassy also orders printed matter from various "Islamic centers" in Western Europe, particularly in Aix-la-Chapelle [Aachen] and Munich in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Vienna, Austria.

In addition to this distribution of pious brochures, the Iranian diplomats, according to the DST, are engaged in other and more "direct" tasks. In the report it is stated in particular that "on the occasion of clashes which took place on several occasions between Iranian opposition elements and Khomeini supporters, interrogation of certain participants in these events made it possible to identify several officials of the Iranian Embassy, whose essentially 'gangster-type' functions were evident."

According to the DST, a student association called "Iranian Muslim Students in France" plays an important role. With its assistance the Iranian Embassy in Paris reportedly made a list of all Iranian political opposition figures living in exile, at the request of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the embassy could not carry out this task by itself, it was forced to draw on the mass of Iranian students who support the Khomeini government and particularly those who are members of the student association.

This effort does not seem to have been sufficient since, according to the DST study, "many militant Khomeini supporters were sent directly from Iran to France with the 'official cover' of students. These pseudo-students, numbering between 150 and 300, were placed directly under the Iranian Embassy and were closely supervised by diplomatic staff members."

The listing and location of opponents of the Khomeini regime was only one of the aspects of a much broader plan which aimed at the liquidation, pure and simple, of the principal opposition leaders. According to the DST, orders were given "to Iranian diplomatic representatives in Paris to help in every way--reception, housing, cover--the terrorists charged" with liquidating the opposition leaders. The training of these terrorist groups was reportedly entrusted, at the time, to the Ayatollah Heidi Ghaffari, a close associate of Ayatollah Khomeini. The arrival in France of several groups of terrorists had been reported by the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance. According to the DST report, their target at the time seemed to be limited solely to the opponents of the Khomeini regime. Today the field of activity of the pro-Khomeini Iranians has been broadly extended, since it now involves French targets.

Terrorist Networks

Paris LIBERATION in French 30 Dec 83 pp 3, 4

[Article by Eric Landal]

[Text] Even though the bulk of the exiles opposed to the Iranian Islamic regime have settled outside of Paris, the

pro-Khomeini networks are only interested in the "export of the revolution" to France and the pursuit of opposition groups.

Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini has at least two good reasons for interesting itself in France (without any sense of good will). The first reason relates to French foreign policy. In the countries of the Persian Gulf, as well as in Libya, the policy of President Francois Mitterrand aims at blocking Khomeini's objectives. And although, officially, Iran is not an enemy of France, Iran's enemy, Iraq, has received Mirage fighter-bombers from France. The second reason is every bit as important: the bulk of the Iranian opponents of the Islamic revolution are concentrated around Paris.

Watch and punish: in Paris the pro-Khomeini networks borrow the usual channels and cover for this kind of activity: employees of embassies and cultural organizations. Certain Iranians among those expelled yesterday [29 December] belonged to the "Centre Culturel Islamique" [Islamic Cultural Center]. Its principal activists are Jafar Jalali, Jafar Monfared, Abdoula Baghlani, Kazem Helali, and Morteza Dastgheib.

Morteza Dastgheib, who was expelled from France, was in charge of contacts with French-speaking Arab circles. With his strong right arm, A. A. [as published], he had close relationships with Tunisian groups. Certain members of these groups have gone through "training" courses in Iran. Another network is made up of a small number of "hezbollahis" (Partisans of God). This network was controlled by Nasrollah Jafari Najafabadi (who was also expelled from France). At the Iranian Embassy in Paris several diplomats were charged with coordinating the activity of these two networks and of related forms of work. Before he was assigned to Paris, Majid Karchenas (one of the three diplomats expelled) belonged to the Bureau for the Coordination of Security Affairs under the Iranian prime minister. At the Iranian Embassy in Paris he was charged with contacts with the Arabs and Muslims of the Maghreb [Northwestern Africa].

Colonel M. F. [as published] is responsible for training the Embassy intelligence agents, and F. H. [as published], a protege of the Ayatollah Montazeri, the "heir apparent" to Ayatollah Khomeini, occupied himself with watching over the activities of the "Islamic Cultural Center." M. H. [as published], a near relative of Khomeini's, is "the eye of the Imam." Officially, he is the representative of the Iranian radio-television service.

The majority of the diplomats sent to Paris held important positions, either in organizations charged with searching out opposition elements or in the organization charged with spreading the word of the Khomeini revolution throughout the world. Added to these diplomats over the past few months has been a substantial "traffic" in personalities between Tehran and Paris. In particular the Ayatollah Asari Ghomi and Fazel Marandi, a close associate of Ayatollah Montazeri, have passed through Paris.

However, the Khomeini revolution is far from being concerned exclusively with Paris. In Tehran several organizations are concerned with the "export of the

revolution" and hunting down opposition elements. These organizations are often rivals and carry on a factional struggle. Power in Tehran is still far from being monolithic. The principal efforts of these organizations are concerned with the countries of the Persian Gulf and Lebanon. Certain organizations work in cooperation with Syria and Libya. It reportedly appears that the Syrians are more specialized in intelligence matters. In Libya, at the "Al Qobra" camp, certain operations against Libyan and Iranian opposition elements are planned. During this training period the recruits receive salaries ranging from \$1,500 to \$2,500 per month.

Once they have been trained, these militants are provided with cover by Iranian organizations abroad. Kariman Hossein, a member of the personal cabinet of the prime minister of Iran, is charged with finding adequate cover for them. He works in collaboration with the "external security and counterespionage services."

In the northern part of Tehran, on the Avenue Villa du Nord, these intelligence services occupy the same offices as the former SAVAK [intelligence organization] under the shah. It is not only geographic continuity which is maintained in this way. A large proportion of the officials has continued to serve. The organizational chart has not changed, and the objectives of these organizations are the same: watching over and working against opposition groups abroad. As was the case under the shah, moreover, these intelligence services officially come under the prime minister. Today, Hussein Moussawi is their director. He is in charge of the "Bureau for the Coordination of Activities Concerning the Security of the Country." However, in the same way that these intelligence services used to receive their orders directly from the shah, today they are led by Rafsanjani, the president of the Iranian Parliament.

These intelligence services, which have agents in all Iranian embassies, are responsible for several attacks against Iranian citizens: in particular the murder of a former Iranian press attache under the shah in Washington and the attack which took place in Paris against Chapour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister under the shah.

Two organizations are fighting over the privilege of exporting the Khomeini brand of Islam throughout the world. These efforts are made in three particular directions: the countries of the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, and the other Muslim countries. This struggle is between "The Unity of Islamic Movements," which is controlled by the so-called guardians of the revolution, and the "Section of Islamic Liberation Movements." The latter organization is controlled by Sayed Mehdi Hachemi, a close associate of Ayatollah Montazeri. Sayed Mehdi Hachemi was sentenced to life imprisonment under the shah for having strangled a mullah in Isfahan who was opposed to Khomeini.

The unification of these two organizations in a super-ministry is under consideration. Meanwhile, they carry on a no holds barred kind of competition. They receive help from those in favor of Muslim integration, mostly Shiites, and non-Iranians. They have networks (more or less clandestine) in the Philippines,

in Indonesia, and in the Maghreb. These organizations are especially active in Afghanistan and Lebanon. However, they also have bureaus in Pakistan and in Austria.

In Beirut the "charif" unit is apparently the one which organized the attacks by suicide trucks against the American Embassy and the American and French military headquarters. This unit is directed by Hadi Charif, a "guardian of the revolution," who is also linked to the clandestine Iraqi integrationist organization, Al Dawa. Furthermore, Hadi Charif seems to work in close coordination with a dissident branch of Shiites, the Amal, in Beirut, which is directed by Hossein Moussaoui and Mustafa Deyrani.

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, about 1,000 Iranian "Pasdars" (guardians of the revolution) were assigned in Syria and in Baalbek. They went to reinforce the first elements who were sent to Lebanon, beginning in 1980, by Mohamed Montazeri, the son of Ayatollah Montazeri, better known under the name of "Ayatollah Ringo."

In Iran itself the Islamic liberation movements have two training camps. The first of these is called "Tchemram," after the name of the former minister of defense and principal founder of the Amal Shiite militia, who died in 1980 on the Iraq-Iran front.

The second and principal camp is south of the holy city of Qom. This former SAVAK center is directed by the Hodjatoleslam Najafabadi. It has substantial financial resources and about 2,000 personnel. It is at this camp that volunteers from the different Muslim integrationist currents come to be initiated into the latest techniques of terrorism--involving suicide or not: booby-trapped trucks and automobiles, kamikaze aircraft packed with explosives, etc. It was after photographs had been taken by a spy satellite that the Americans decided to install anti-aircraft defenses around the White House.

Reasons for Export of Revolution

Paris LIBERATION in French 30 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Eric Landal]

[Text] Faced with internal difficulties and a certain loss of popular enthusiasm, the most radical wing of the Iranian clergy has decided to make a great leap forward and to intensify terrorist actions abroad.

Shiite activist plots in Bahrein, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar; attacks against the Americans and French in Beirut; a series of explosions in Kuwait; Islamic networks in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Pakistan. We have lost count of the "terrorist" actions with which Iran is directly or indirectly associated. "You only lend money to the rich," the saying goes, and it is true that numerous actions have been coordinated or encouraged in Iran by the "Section of Islamic Liberation Movements of the Guardians of the Revolution."

Since he came to power, Ayatollah Khomeini has not hidden his intention to "export the revolution." Khomeini, the "guide" of the revolution, has always said: "The road to Jerusalem goes through Kerbala." One could not state more clearly that "Zionism" will only crumble after an Islamic revolution in all of the Muslim countries.

For Khomeini there is therefore a fundamental need to "export the revolution" made in Iran with all the more use made of its supporters today, since the Islamic revolution is going through real difficulties. How it drags on! Each day the Iran-Iraq war looks more and more like a war of attrition which has not attained its military objectives and is wearing out the country in economic and human terms. The latest Iranian offensive, "Law IV," reportedly caused loss of 40,000 Iranian dead.

The lassitude toward an unending war, serious economic difficulties, major dissensions among the Iranian leaders, and a particularly violent campaign of repression of dissidents have unquestionably "broken" the popular enthusiasm of the first years of the Iranian revolution. The formidable support for the revolution which was evident for a very long time now seems at least partly gone. And it is no longer a time when the mullahs can count on the enthusiasm of the masses to escape from the difficulties which affect the country. Today the "extremists" of the Tehran regime seem to have decided resolutely to make a great leap forward. This has been done because the mullahs, from now on unable to undertake a major mobilization of the people, seem to have decided to try to resolve their internal difficulties by proving that Iran remains "strong and solid because it has succeeded in making the earth shake."

The surface to air missiles installed in Washington to protect the White House, the security measures taken in all of the Western countries, and the booby-trapped trucks in Beirut clearly reflect action in support of the propaganda broadcast every day by the Khomeini regime. Every young Iranian Shiite may thus feel that he is invulnerable because he makes "all the Satans" of the earth, large or small, quake in their boots!

The "terrorist" actions carried out abroad, in Europe, in Lebanon, or in the Persian Gulf furthermore play an important role in the internal rivalries of the Iranian regime. Everything is happening, in effect, as if the most radical wing of leaders of the Islamic revolution were engaged in "activist" incidents on the international scene in order to continue to maintain themselves against the "pragmatists" of the regime, who presently hold the upper hand in Tehran. This pragmatic wing, faithful to the "line of the Imam," should give way to the religious figures favorable to a rapprochement with the West, since the outlawing of the leaders of the Tudeh (communist) party. These religious figures, who are basically anti-Soviet, are pressing for the normalization of relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf, are urging the further development of relations with Turkey, are presently in a strong position in Tehran, and are imposing their views.

In this context the most radical wing of the Muslim clergy has nothing left to do than to engage in "activism" abroad, if it wishes to continue to keep at

least some power. And that is all the more the case since, on the eve of parliamentary elections in Iran, the most conservative mullahs have been able to stabilize their position of power. In view of this, the "extremists" who are faithful to the "line of the Imam," which they proved by the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran and who control the "guardians of the revolution," have decided to respond by a process of auctioning off the revolution. Hence the attacks in Lebanon, in Kuwait, and the attempts to destabilize several countries in the Persian Gulf. Those who follow "the line of the Imam" say in substance: "If the United States is our enemy, why go and fight it on the sands of Iraq and not 100 kilometers farther South in the Arab countries allied to America in the Persian Gulf?"

Faced with this logic, Khomeini does not appear to have made a decision. First, because he has always kept a balance between the different groups in the Muslim clergy. However, he has also avoided a decision because his personal logic leads him to favor the well-known "export of the revolution." In his book, "Esperance Trahie" [Hope Betrayed], Abol Hassan Banisadr, the former president of Iran, reports one of the things which Khomeini taught Hossein, his grandson. There could not be a more revealing comment on the view which "The Guide of the Iranian Revolution" takes of the "export of the revolution." He says: "If the Iranians obtain what they need, they will no longer fight for the victory of Islam in the world. We must create repeated crises, strengthen the idea of death and martyrdom. It is not important if Iran should disappear in the struggle. The important thing is to drown the whole world with crises. This is what 'exporting the revolution' means. If we do not create a new crisis every day, the people will return to their former habits. It is in the flames of crisis that those who are called on to export the revolution will lose their unhealthy desire for comfort and will acquire the maturity necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. That is why the Imam does not remain quiet. Once the noise stops, he says something that starts the crisis going again. He thinks that without a crisis Islam cannot be practiced."

5170

CSO: 3519/160

BRIEFS

DIPLOMAT DETAINED IN BEIRUT--Beirut, Jan 8 (REUTERS)--The Iranian embassy said today the Lebanese army had detained a diplomat from the mission at a checkpoint in central Beirut on Friday. An embassy statement delivered to REUTERS by hand said the army took attache Assghar Poushi to an unknown place of detention and "until today there has been no sign of life from him." The Lebanese army spokesman said he knew nothing about the incident. The Beirut government broke relations with Iran on November 24 and asked all Iranian diplomats to leave within a week. But Beirut Airport closed before the deadline ran out. Soon after the airport reopened on December 16, the Iranian diplomats told the Lebanese Foreign Ministry by phone they could not leave because gunmen had detained them in the southern suburb of the city. They said they were in Ghobeire, an area controlled by Shi'ite Muslims sympathetic to Iran. The embassy statement said Poushi was arrested close to the embassy, two km (one mile) from Ghobeire. It demanded his immediate release and accused the foreign ministry of doing nothing to have him freed. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 9 Jan 84 p 1]

CSO: 4600/279

ISLAMIC RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN CHALLENGES USSR

Karachi JANG in Urdu 10 Dec 83 p 3

[Editorial: "Listen, Russia"]

[Text] A sizable segment of world opinion has once again criticized the presence of Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan and demanded their immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Two weeks after the UN General Assembly passed this resolution, another resolution, presented by Pakistan, was passed unanimously by the political committee of the Islamic countries' foreign ministers conference. This resolution demands that Russia withdraw all of its armed forces from Afghanistan immediately and unconditionally and clear the way for the peaceful return of the nearly 4 million Afghan refugees now in camps in Pakistan and Iran. It is further demanded in the resolution that Afghanistan's Islamic and nonaligned status be restored and that Afghans be given the freedom to choose their own future and decide what sort of social system they want. The resolution expressed appreciation for UN efforts to find a political solution to the problem and wishes it success. Now this resolution will be presented at the general meeting of the foreign ministers conference, where it is expected to be passed unanimously. Three countries on the political committee--Syria, Libya and South Yemen--abstained from voting, but despite their known stand on the matter they did not vote against the resolution. These countries had opposed the resolution. These countries had opposed the resolution when it was presented in the United Nations by Pakistan and 44 other countries. If we look at the resolution passed by the political committee of the Islamic conference of foreign ministers, we find that it is different in tone and substance from the one passed by the UN General Assembly. The words of the new resolution are stronger and contain an analysis of how the Afghans should have the right to self-determination regarding their future and their internal social system. Along with this comes the demand for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan. This makes it clear that although Soviet policy in Afghanistan is criticized the world over, and 116 countries of the world voted for the UN resolution, the agitation and reaction in the Islamic world is nevertheless greater than in any country outside the world of Islam. The reason is clear. The victim of Soviet aggression is a Muslim country and a part of the world of Islam. Russia, to compete with its rival superpower, needs the friendship and good will of other countries, including the world of Islam. Russia, which claims to be the friend of the

backward people of the Third World, should take note of the reaction of the world of Islam against its policy in Afghanistan. The intensity of the feelings of the Muslims on this matter can be judged from the fact that even those Arab countries that are supposed to be closest to Russia could not oppose a resolution against it and had to take a noncommittal attitude toward it, even though they had opposed a much milder resolution only 2 weeks earlier.

The Soviet Union is certainly a great power and can ignore any negative reaction to its policies, but in so doing it hurts its own image. It will destroy whatever good feelings some Islamic countries might still have for it. Under these circumstances, it is advisable for Russia to review its policies in Afghanistan. This will be in its own interests and will help improve its relations with the world of Islam. It should also help achieve success for the United Nations, which is deadlocked on this issue. This deadlock stems from the fact that Russia has not given a firm timetable for its withdrawal from Afghanistan. This is causing problems for Russia as well as for others. Sagacity and diplomacy demand that the matter be solved in a generous and far-sighted manner, so that the Soviet forces will be able to leave Afghanistan according to a definite schedule. The resolution is a challenge to Soviet diplomacy. Let's see if it reacts to the implications of this challenge or sticks to its policy intransigence.

12476

CSO: 4656/57

COUNTRY ADVISED NOT TO ANGER 'SUPERPOWER NEXT DOOR'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 24 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Khalid Akhtar: "How Not To Provoke a Superpower"]

[Text] Pro-Soviet ties appear to be at a crossroads. From here the two countries may move still close to each other or they could fall apart. The next year will find the two States making some hard decisions about their future relationship.

Whatever Mr V.I. Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, said in his interview with the Editor of an Urdu national daily recently made one thing crystal clear that the Afghan issue was now taxing the otherwise "inexhaustible" Soviet patience. Mr Smirnov spelt out his country's options clearly and firmly and in a tone betraying bitterness.

It was for the first time that the Kremlin has conveyed us the message that there is either 'friendship' or 'No friendship' at all. It seems that Moscow has reached the conclusion that any other relationship with Pakistan will not help it to come out of the Afghan 'quagmire.'

There has been consensus among political observers that the Kremlin would like nothing better than to have a pro-Soviet Pakistan near its borders. And it made no secret of this desire when Mr Smirnov said that his country would like to have a treaty of peace and friendship with Pakistan.

Keeping in view their long time objectives the Soviets did everything possible to make Ghulam Ishaq's visit to their country a 'productive' one. The Pakistan Finance Minister on his return home described his talks in Moscow as highly satisfactory. At a time of economic difficulties the Soviet offer to help Pakistan complete some of its major projects like Kalabagh Dam and Chashma Nuclear Project should be a great relief. And as is so often the case the Soviets have made a timely move.

But going pro-Soviet would not be all that easy choice for Pakistan. Our religious moorings, our close ties with China and the United States and above all our commitment to Non-Alignment all go against having special relationship with Moscow. And even if we make a clean sweep of our past any treaty with the Soviet Union will not solve our security problem. It is inconceivable that any relationship with Moscow will provide us protection against Indian hegemonism just as despite treaty arrangement America has not helped us against Delhi's ambitions.

Whatever may be our relationship with Moscow, India will remain Soviet Union's senior partner and a 'favourite chum.' Super-power policy is guided by the same instinct--siding with the power which promises greater gains and add greater weight to its policies. When put on this scale the pendulum has inevitably swung in India's favour. This explains the nightmares suffered so often by us in the domain of foreign affairs.

The Afghan crisis has placed us at a critical juncture. A pro-Soviet role, as already pointed out, is no answer to our problems. But our tragedy is that we are being viewed to play an anti-Soviet role. And this misunderstanding could cost us dearly. Mr Smirnov's warning of Soviet action against us in case there is no headway in resolving the Afghan crisis has confronted us with a challenge of far greater dimension than anything of the kind we have faced before. There is a widespread speculation that in any such eventuality the Soviet Union would try to fuel the nationalities issue' on this side of the Durrand Line, particularly in Baluchistan.

The Afghan issue may have revived the U.S. interest in us and the region. But it will hardly be a wise policy to welcome revival of friendship with the U.S. at the cost of Soviet enmity. Ironically, Pakistan, threatened most by the Afghan situation, has been blamed for the stalemate over the issue. Only on last Tuesday as a result of Afghan plane bombing of a military post (captured recently by the Mujahideen) near the Khyber Pass traffic was suspended between the two countries. The operation was conducted dangerously close to the Pakistan territory.

We cannot afford to ignore the Soviet warning. In most such cases the Kremlin means business when it says so. And unfortunately our internal situation makes us vulnerable to the type of intervention that the Soviet Union envisages. Political cleavages within the country have widened and political frustration has mounted. The process of reconciliation between the politicians and the government is now at a dead end. But the sides have found it impossible to thrash out an acceptable power-sharing formula. This will keep the temperature at the political barometer within the country at a dangerous level.

There was a time when the Afghan crisis had enough plus points for us to offset the threat that it poses to us. It had helped us to win the West's political and material support when the present regime had needed it most. We became a Frontline State--a status which while ensuring certain gains for us also confronted us with serious challenge to our integrity and security. For a time our gains remained greater than the threat. But this process was to reverse as the time went by and the inevitable seems to have happened. While we still continue to get all the considerations from our allies as being a Frontline State Mr Smirnov's statement has reminded us of the dangers that lay ahead.

It is said that Mr Andropov was among those very few in the Soviet Politburo who had opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. His emergence to power after the death of Brezhnev kindled hopes that the Red Army would be withdrawn from Afghanistan. And the indirect UN talks did for a moment look like resolving the crisis. But then suddenly the process came to a standstill. Some have

blamed the U.S. for this deadlock. In this list fall people like Selig Harrison, who says the United States does not want the Soviet Union out of the Afghan 'quagmire.' The indirect U.S. talks are likely to resume soon. But Moscow sees no progress possible in this forum. It has called for direct parleys between Afghanistan and Pakistan--a proposition not acceptable to the latter and its Western allies.

So long as the Afghan crisis remains an East-West issue there will be little hope of its early solution. Can we delink this crisis from East-West rivalry? Much will depend on our ability to bring down this issue to the regional level. It may be a source of consolation for the U.S. to see the 'Big Bear' bleed in Afghanistan. But we cannot afford an angry Superpower groaning in pain next door. Mr Smirnov's tone is a clear indication that the Soviet Union has been hurt. This is a dangerous state of mind to be in and we had better be watchful of Soviet moves in days to come.

CSO: 4600/286

ZIA CALLS FOR REINFORCING ISLAMIZATION PROCESS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by Sikander Hayat]

[Text] Islamabad, Jan 4--President Ziaul Haq today sought closer cooperation of the Ulema in reinforcing the process of Islamisation for its deeper impact particularly in areas such as social reform, sectarian harmony and eradication of poverty. He was speaking at the inaugural session of the two day Ulema conference, which opened here today.

He said with Islamisation in the country now in full swing there had been brought about a positive change, and not a ordinary one, and promised that till his government lasted this process would receive top priority. About 170 Ulema representing various Fiqh are attending this conference.

The President defended the gradual and evolutionary nature of the Islamisation process in the country because of the deep rooted evils which had set in our society but said that even then a lot of ground had been covered. He listed various steps ranging from imposition of the Hudood laws to the Zakat and Ushr since his government took over in 1977.

He said he had to encounter difficulties and delays on account of social resistance, in the evolution of Islamic system, particularly from the lawyers. He said the Islamic Law of Evidence was not ready and would be placed before the Cabinet shortly.

Gen Zia said he had turned down the suggestion that he should talk less of Islam because it was being "overprojected." The projection of Islam, he asserted, would continue because without it "we cannot overcome our weaknesses." He wondered why no strong objection was raised in the past when both Pakistan and its ideology were being undermined.

The President expected that the conference would be able to help him find out the reasons why despite all possible efforts the impact of Islamisation was not so strong. He said the crime was even now on the increase and so was the drug addiction.

He also expected the Ulema to come out with their suggestions on the possibility of evolving voluntary social groups at grass root level, which should take on the responsibility of injecting social reforms.

President Zia said the sectarian harmony was yet another area where the Ulema must suggest ways and means to promote the unity among the Muslim community irrespective of adherence of its members to various creeds and Fiqh. He said it was deplorable that mosques were being used to brand others as 'Kafirs.' He suggested that from coming Friday each Imam should explain at least one 'Ayat' and Hadith'. Fixing of uniform prayer times should also be explored, he added.

Another area in which he sought the advice of Ulema was the utilization of Zakat and Ushr money. He said, the Ulema might like to convene an Ijmah of the Ulema to allow the use of Zakat money on other heads in addition to the already prescribed.

APP Adds: Addressing the convention Alhaj Mohammad Abbas Khan Abbasi, Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, said the followup work on the 15 point declaration adopted by the last Ulema convention had been completed. He referred to the points one by one and the steps taken by the government in this regard.

The minister said that the review of all laws to bring them in conformity with the Islamic injunctions would be completed by June 30 this year.

He said that the first Ulema convention had recommended that a committee be constituted to monitor the progress toward Islamisation in the country. Though such a committee was not established the President had been meeting Ulema from time to time and on various occasions to consult them on the on-going Islamisation process, he said.

The minister also announced the creation of four committees to prepare recommendations of the convention.

CSO: 4600/288

NOORANI CLAIMS ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE HELD EVEN IN '85

Karachi JANG in Urdu 15 Dec 83 pp 1, 12

[Correspondent's dispatch: "Maulana Noorani: 'The Government Has Failed To Crush the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy; Elections Will Not Be Held Even in 1985'"]

[Text] London, 14 Dec--Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, leader of the defunct Jamiatul Ulema-e Pakistan and head of the World Islamic Mission, charged that some members of the present military government of Pakistan are not sincere about holding general elections in Pakistan and contrary to the wishes of the people, want to maintain their unconstitutional government. Maulana Noorani talked with this correspondent before departing for Paris and Mauritius. Noorani arrived in London after laying the cornerstone of a mosque to be built in Amsterdam. He said that the present authorities are in fact gambling with the country's destiny. He condemned the present government in strong language and said that it has not kept a single one of the promises it made to the people and that the authorities even failed to carry out their promise to announce their election program by the end of November. Maulana Noorani stated that when he and his friends met Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq on 10 October, the latter assured him that at the maximum he would spend a month and a half meeting with politicians eliciting their views about giving final shape to the elections program. But 2 months have passed and still there is no sign of an election announcement. Maulana Noorani said that to preserve the integrity and unity of the country, it is necessary to hold general elections immediately under the provisions of the 1973 constitution. He claimed that the government had tried with all its power to crush the MRD but had failed to do so. Its campaign continues in all four provinces; processions are being held and people are submitting to arrest. The full use of power has affected the campaign to a certain extent but this is a transitional stage and such phases do occur in campaigns against autocracies. The campaign will continue until it achieves its objectives. Maulana Noorani said that irregularities are rampant under the present government and that it is a great shame that all these things are being done in the name of Islam. He said that the present government has gravely harmed Islam, and the fact is that General Zia does not want to relinquish power. Maulana Noorani expressed doubt that elections would be held even in 1985. He said that if elections were held on a nonparty basis, Jamiatul Ulema-e Pakistan would not participate in them. He charged that the United States was supporting the present government of Pakistan in pursuit of its own interests.

JUP OFFICIAL VOICES OPPOSITION TO NONPARTY ELECTIONS

Karachi JANG in Urdu 14 Dec 83 Magazine p 4

[Interview with Shah Farid-ul Haq, deputy secretary general of the Defunct Jamiatul Ulema-e Pakistan by Mukhtar Aqil: "Elections on Any Other Than Party Basis Are Unimaginable"; place and date of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] What is the position of the defunct Jamiatul Ulema-e Pakistan [JUP] regarding nonparty elections?

[Answer] Our party holds the unequivocal position that elections on any basis other than a party basis are inconceivable. Political parties are the backbone of a democratic system. There is no democratic country in the world today where the business of government is carried on without parties. In view of this fact, in raising the issue of nonparty elections in Pakistan a telling blow is in fact being inflicted on democracy. One cannot understand why the government is raising this issue after 6 and 1/2 years. It seems to indicate clearly that the government is not sincere about democracy and wishes to prolong its power by having its own particular people elected indirectly.

[Question] Can democracy and parties be accommodated within Islam?

[Answer] Every government that comes into power in this country uses Islam as a means of protecting itself but does not consider it necessary to promulgate Islam in a proper way; nor is any justification offered for regarding Islam as being opposed to democracy. If Islam and Pakistan are viewed from the perspective of history, one would find that this country came into existence as a result of party politics. If, as the propaganda spread by the well-wishers of the government maintains, this phenomenon was un-Islamic, then a religious verdict would have to be announced declaring the existence of the Muslim League and all of its efforts and strivings for the establishment of Pakistan un-Islamic. The country that came into existence as a result of these un-Islamic efforts would also be un-Islamic. But I do not believe that any patriotic Muslim and Pakistani would consider this action of Quaid-e Azam and the Muslim League un-Islamic.

[Question] Would party elections prove successful under the present disorganized condition of the political parties?

[Answer] If the parties are disorganized, then the responsibility for that also rests on the government. The fact is that the parties that exist in the country--I mean those parties that are noteworthy and have taken part in national elections--appear to be united on the grounds that elections should be held on a party basis. In view of this, why does the government want to take responsibility for the parties not being organized? We think that this is just a lame excuse for not holding proper elections.

[Question] The success of municipal elections conducted on a nonparty basis shows that provincial and national elections also can be held on a nonparty basis. What is your opinion in this regard?

[Answer] As far as the municipal elections are concerned, what happened in that instance cannot be applied to national elections. Even so, the number of people who participated in the municipal elections was a slap in the face of democracy. In a city the size of Karachi, only 15 to 20 percent of the voters cast their ballots. This shows that people do not participate in nonparty elections with the kind of spirit and enthusiasm that they should display. If the same course is followed in national and provincial elections, the logical outcome would be that a representative government in the true sense of the word would not come to office, and dissension, mutual resentment, provincialism, factionalism, linguistic prejudice, nepotism and similar hard-to-cure maladies will spread throughout the country. It would not be possible to repair the damage to the country.

[Question] Why do you think the government is trying to avoid elections on a party basis?

[Answer] The fear may be lurking at the back of the government's mind that if elections are held on a party basis, people will be elected who will ask for an accounting and take retaliatory measures. If the government is obsessed by this fear, I think that the problem will not be solved even if elections are held on a nonparty basis, because individuals who may take harsh action and shake the country to its foundations may gain the upper hand in the elections. I think the government should set aside all fear and fulfill honestly the promise that it made to the people 6 and 1/2 years ago because the survival of the country and the nation depend on it. As far as the defunct JUP is concerned, it was decided at the meeting of the Central Council held in Lahore on 9 December that nonparty elections should be opposed on all levels. Every effort should be made to have elections held on a party basis and power handed over to the elected representatives of the people. We have begun our efforts to achieve this aim and will continue the struggle until the objective is attained. In this connection, efforts are also under way to obtain the cooperation of other parties and to bring the people together so that they also will resist the holding of elections on a nonparty basis, and the country will be able to see the dawn of true democracy.

MRD COULD NOT GATHER STRENGTH IN KARACHI

Lahore CHATAN in Urdu 7-14 Nov 83 p 27, 28

[Article by Sayyed Ibn-e Hasan: "Why Couldn't the MRD Gain the Support of the Populace in a City Like Karachi?"]

[Text] The MRD movement was unable to gather any strength in Karachi, and this may be the first time in the history of Pakistan that this city has not supported such a movement. Karachi is famous as the city of opposition, and it has never been the friend of any government, so no one could understand why the people of Karachi were so indifferent to the MRD movement this time.

One reason is that the people of Karachi had been forced to hate Mr. Bhutto by the deprivations to which Karachi had been subject since the beginning of the People's Party government. Leaving all that aside however, an important reason hidden in the depths of this indifference is that while Karachi has always been in the forefront of movements for democracy, whatever ruler has come into power has made the people of Karachi the target of his oppression. There are no jobs for the people of Karachi. There is a dearth of positions for those who are successful in the competitive exams. The colleges and universities of Karachi have the same number of grants now as they did 20 years ago. The students who take first place in the various departments of the university can't find any jobs. Nowadays M.B.B.S. doctors are working for only 1200 rupees a month.

Those unfortunate engineers who have graduated from the Engineering University are doing "house jobs" instead of regular employment. It is the fate of this city to thirst after a drop of water, and it is its destiny to be deprived of electricity. Despite the population pressure from the entire country having been moved here, there are no facilities available. These conditions have now forced the people of Karachi to consider the cause of their backwardness to be that political attitude which always breaks out as a flood of protest. All of these troubles have been dumped into its lap because it is known as the city of protest. This new way of thinking among the people of Karachi has started in the last three years, and now every citizen says that when governments change, the faces change, the system doesn't change. What is the use of making a sacrifice; one should mind one's own business. The main leaders of the MRD live in Karachi itself, but the MRD movement is gasping on its death bed here. Another reason for this is that even those people in Karachi who are sympathetic to the Peoples Party, and their numbers can be counted in at least the hundreds of thousands, have complaints with

the leadership of the MRD. For example, Khwaja Khairuddin is a prominent leader of the MRD and continually harasses the government, but last year he accepted a 20,000,000 rupee contract from the government for his construction committee. The wedding party for the gentleman's son was held in the Holiday Inn. The bill came to 117,000 rupees, which Mrs. Bhutto paid as a gift out of her own funds. These matters are openly discussed by Peoples Party workers, and our journalist friend Ahmad Hassan has already hinted at them in editorials in Jang.

Miraj Khan advocates violent revolution, but acts like a sentimental socialist, so his leadership is worthless. The Tehrik-i Istiqlal's existence is limited to writing on the walls of Rock Court and the Jamiat-ul Ulema-i Islam's Fazalur Rahman group is not very active in Karachi, so the MRD movement has deflated like a balloon. However, if conditions remain the same and these deprivations continue, the citizens of Karachi will not remain spectators on the sidelines for long, and the history of past movements gives ample warning of what the results will be if they should join in the game.

9914

CSO: 4656/48

LEADER CLAIMS MRD MOVEMENT 'EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Nusrat Javeed]

[Text] Islamabad, Jan 4--Chaudhry Aitzaz Ahsan, a leader of the defunct Tehrik-i-Istiqlal has claimed that their movement had been "extremely successful" and "we have compelled the regime to adhere to its announcement of holding elections before March 85."

Talking to THE MUSLIM on Monday, he said the regime was not sincere in implementing even its August 12 plan. It hurriedly presented a "Dhancha" to frustrate the movement called on August 14, he added.

He also belied the rumours that his party was planning to leave the nine-party opposition alliance. He said ever since the formation of the defunct MRD, the Tehrik was one of its most active and committed components. The Tehrik leader had been under detention for years and "in spite of consistent efforts on the part of the regime, he had refused even to negotiate with them."

He said his party's leaders and workers were most active not only during the movement launched by the MRD but were also in the forefront of the lawyers' struggle to restore the Constitution of 1973. The National Working Committee of the Tehrik, he reminded, had fully endorsed the MRD programme in its meetings of Sept 82 and July 83. Thus, he concluded, "we are irreversibly committed to the objectives of the movement and till the realisation of its goals, there is no possibility of our abandoning it."

He also refuted the impression that recent statement and letter of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Abid Zubairi appearing in the Press were an expression of the frustration now prevailing among the ranks of the MRD for not achieving its objectives. He said: "To begin with it is wrong to assume that the MRD has miserably failed under mounting pressure of the government."

He disagreed that the movement remained confined to certain districts of Sind and claimed that it was a countrywide movement. "However," he said, "in some parts of Sind it became violent due to the ruthless reactions of the administration which was somewhat tolerant in other provinces. This, he alleged, was a conscious attempt on the part of the regime to switch the movement to separatism.

He said the movement was equally successful in the Punjab. "In fact," he claimed, "Lahore became centre of the peoples' opposition to the regime where not only the MRD workers but, women, lawyers, labourers and students brought out processions and organised big rallies." He said the MRD could continue the courting of arrests in the Punjab for an indefinite period.

He forcefully asserted that the movement was not over. "On Dec 23, it ended just one of its phases." He said through courting of arrests, the MRD wanted to put peaceful and moral pressure upon the regime. "Now, however," he said "We have realised moral pressures mean nothing to the regime. We have to change our tactics." He expressed his confidence that soon the next phase of the movement would begin with more intensity.

He claimed that Jatoi's statement had been misinterpreted and did not reflect any softening of the MRD's position vis-a-vis the regime. He questioned the credentials of Abid Zubairi's letter and said, "the letter we received during the meeting of MRD's Central Committee was typed and it did not have any date. We are sure that Zubairi does not enjoy the facility of a typewriter in jail."

He also disagreed with the impression that his party leaders and workers may contest elections even if they were to be on nonparty basis. He repeated that the MRD and his party had clearly said mere holding of elections was not the issue, "They are to be held as per the provisions of the Constitution of '73." He said Article 17 of this unanimously adopted Constitution clearly states that the elections are to be held on party basis.

He said his party would also oppose the move of denying the right of contesting elections to a particular party of a family. He said: "Certain elements who are eager to help the desperate regime are dishing out such suggestions."

CSO: 4600/288

PAGARA COMMENTS ON MRD, MUSLIM LEAGUE OBJECTIVES

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 5 Jan 84 p 8

[Text] Syed Ali Mardan Shah the Pir Sahib of Pagara has said that Pakistan Muslim League was ready to contest elections on nonparty basis. He advised those who were advocating holding of referendum on the issue that they should watch for the results of such an election and those who choose to boycott it would automatically be casting their weight in favour of an election on party basis.

The Pakistan Muslim League President was talking to newsmen in Lahore on Wednesday at Makhdoom House. He said that PMI requires some time for reorganisation after the political process was restored but repeated that his party was ready to go for nonparty elections under protest.

He denied having met the President during his recent four day stay at Islamabad. He said that he had no knowledge about the second round of talks but added that the PMI was ready for 20 rounds. Commenting on reports about massing of Indian troops on Pakistan borders, the Pir Sahib remarked: "India want to hold its elections under the umbrella of such propaganda. I have doubts about the credibility of such reports." He advised pressmen not to spread unnecessary harassment by publication of such news reports.

Replying to a question about a political lull following the failure of the so-called MRD movement the Pir asked: "Where was the MRD movement. It was only in the minds of newspaper men who had given undue publicity to the agitation of violence. Regarding Mr Hanif Ramey's demand for giving more powers to the Provinces through amendments in the 1973 Constitution the PMI President said that he was surprised and thought as Mr Ramey was demanding a confederation. The Pir Sahib of Pagara thought that the constitution was given by the people and should be amended by an elected assembly.

Asked whether the PMI and Jamaat-Islami were on the right side of the present Government the Pir Sahib observed that he could not say anything about the J. I. but as far as the PMI was concerned they were very much on the left side of the present Government. However to be in the opposition did not mean that one should indulge in abusing the Government and its functionaries or spend your time in stoning and burning the private and public properties.

The PMI, President said that the people of Pakistan were committed to the holding of accountability and he would ask the Government to finish this job as early as possible. He said that the cases of politicians should be sent to the Tribunals which should be constituted for the purpose. He however added that the job left by the present Government would be accomplished by the future elected assembly which would complete the accountability process. He said that accountability was also an Islamic process to clean up the public life from undesirable elements.

The Pir disclosed that during his last meeting with the President, he had recommended for the release of Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Miss Benazir Bhutto. He said that he had asked the President to haul them up again if they committed any breach of law. Regarding the celebration of late Mr Bhutto's birthday, the Pir remarked: "I did not celebrate or participate in Bhutto's birthday functions when he was alive and very much in power. Hence, it was immaterial for him if the birthday of the former Prime Minister was being celebrated by some of his followers or relatives."

CSO: 4600/288

WORKING OF OMBUDSMAN'S OFFICE REVIEWED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 5 Jan 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Ombudsman in Action"]

[Text] A survey of the cases dealt with by the Wafaqi Mohtasib during the last four months points up some interesting facts about the working of various government departments. When the office was set up it was predicted that it will be deluged with complaints and that is what happened. Aggrieved citizens rushed to the Mohtasib for justice and in most cases the problems were satisfactorily solved. The complaints would have been several times more in number but the Wafaqi Mohtasib does not deal with matters under the provincial jurisdiction. The new institution has been able to provide justice not only to individuals, but in many instances collective problems have also been taken care of. Not unexpectedly a large number of complaints have related to pension cases, insurance claims and provident fund payments which are inordinately delayed. The approaches made to the Ombudsman reflect acute public dissatisfaction with the working of departments like telephones and WAPDA. Complaints against these two organisations mostly relate to wrong and inflated billing. It is educative that a large number of cases brought to the notice of the Wafaqi Mohtasib have been about matters involving financial transactions between the individual and the Exchequer. The complaints invariably have been against departments unduly withholding payments and disbursements from the individual. The Nationalised Banks too have had their share of problems and grievances which related to lack of attention to wrong accounting claims and manipulation of current and savings accounts. The extent of administrative high-handedness can be gauged from the fact that many complainants sought the help of the Wafaqi Mohtasib to get the vacation of their houses under the occupation of government departments.

The Federal Ombudsman is a very useful institution in a society where the helpless citizen has no remedy against excesses by the administration whose powers have enormously increased with time. The individual wronged by a department has nowhere to go; wherever he turns he runs into a stonewall of indifference and apathy. The institution of the Ombudsman provides him a channel through which he can bring his problems to the notice of a higher authority and get them solved. Already, the institution has had a salutary effect on the working of various government departments which know that they cannot now get away with their transgressions and are therefore more careful in their dealings with the public. It will indeed have a beneficial effect if the Wafaqi Mohtasib

publishes a monthly report on the cases dealt with by it, also naming the organisations against which complaints were lodged. This will keep them alert and they will take steps to stream line their internal working to avoid adverse publicity in the press. To give a long-term effect to its actions, the Wafaqi Mohtasib in the light of its findings should also suggest improvements and reforms in the working of various government departments. If a particular procedure or form is a source of trouble, and gives rise to public complaints, it is better to replace it by a new one facilitating quicker disposal of cases. In this role, the Wafaqi Mohtasib can act as an agent of radical restructuring of the existing administrative set-up to make it more responsible and responsive to the public's needs.

CSO: 4600/288

MAULANA SHAH AHMED NOORANI, DELEGATION TOUR SIND

Karachi JANG in Urdu 23 Nov 83 p 1, 10

[Article by Nadir Shah Ali: "Pakistan Will Become a Cradle for Islam, the System of the Prophet, and Peace and Justice, Says Maulana Noorani"]

[Text] Karachi, 23 November. The delegation of the Sind Union Board left Hala and arrived in Karachi today, having completed their three day tour of various areas in the interior of Sind. During this fact-finding trip the delegation, led by Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, leader of the defunct Jamaat-i Ulema-i Pakistan, toured those areas which had been severely affected by the recent movement. The leader and members of the delegation toured New Jatoi, Nau Shaharofiroz, Dadu, Khairpur Nathan Shah, Moru, Mehr, Qazi Ahmad, Nawabshah, Lakhat, Panil Khan Chandev Mathiyani, Miyani, Hala, and various other small towns in the countryside, and collected statistics. The delegation was told of the oppression which had occurred in connection with the movement. Some people even began to weep during these recitals. The leader of the delegation, Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, learned the details of the destruction of life and property in the above mentioned areas during this tour. He met with the workers and political leaders of the area, with students, peasants, and people from various other walks of life, and assured them that the present struggle would prove successful and, God willing, would make Pakistan a cradle of Islam, the system of the Prophet, peace, justice and brotherhood. This delegation, composed of politicians and others, included Professor Shah Faridul Haq, Mahmudul Haq Usmani, Haroon Ahmed, Sabir Ali Jami, Akhtar Rizvi, Zafar Masud, Aziz Khan, Nazir Riyaz and others, in addition to Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani. Earlier, when the delegation reached Hala from Nawabshah the previous evening, they were greeted with enthusiastic slogans from hundreds of students. The acting president of the Peoples Party of Sind, Makhdum Amin Fahim, welcomed the delegation at his home. Maulana Noorani and Amin Fahim discussed in detail the current political situation, the pace of the movement at present, the results obtained, and the future joint actions to be taken. Makhdum Amin Fahim told the delegation that he was not only personally grateful for their mission but was also certain that the movement which the government was declaring unsuccessful would be made successful through the combined efforts of all the enlightened classes of the country and of the political workers in the urban areas. He emphasized to Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani that he should now use his considerable influence for the restoration of democracy and civil rights and for the holding of fair elections because not only did the people of Sind have full faith in him, but the eyes of the entire country were focused on him. Maulana Noorani said that this movement

would become more intense and more powerful. The leader of the delegation said that they were trying to prevent the government from holding non-party elections because the government wants to use these kinds of elections to put together a group of unscrupulous sycophants who will continually laud it, as do the members of the present Federal Advisory Council. He said the delegation should emphasize to the members of the Federal Advisory Council that they should promptly resign or else the nation would not be lenient in judging them. The delegation also visited the tomb of Shah Abdul Latif, presented a floral tribute, and talked with the people who had come there for the death anniversary of the saint.

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CSO: 4656/48

STUDIES CONFIRM GOLD DEPOSITS IN CHITRAL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Jan 84 p 8

[Article by Murtaza Malik]

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Jan. 4: Some latest studies have confirmed the existence of gold in good quantities in different parts of Chitral and the spadework is now under way to mark the richer areas and determine the possibility of its commercial exploitation.

Asked to comment on these reports the country's renowned geologist Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan Taher Kheli who has remained actively associated with the in-depth geological studies in the terrain told The Muslim that the existence of gold was undoubtedly there in Chitral - and with little effort and investment it could be exploited to no small an advantage. He recalled that the primary gold mineralisation had been reported in a document prepared by a firm in U.K. and passed on to him some-time back. The firm had received some samples of antimony through a mining concern and the geochemical tests had revealed 35 to 70 PPM of gold besides the other elements. This was later further confirmed by a couple of other authorities who reported an average of 77 PPM of gold in a number of samples.

Dr. Taher Kheli who is now the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Peshawar said that he himself had examined three hydrothermal quartz samples from Chitral and these too had revealed gold mineralisation. In this connection he particularly mentioned the Luthko area in the valley going to Garm Chashma.

He said that the auriferous alluvial deposits in the region had been worked in the search of gold through gold washing in the traditional primitive manner carried through in three stages but the recoveries through this old method had not been satisfactory and a scientific approach could yield much better results. He said that plenty of alluvial reserve is available in the accessible sites not only in Chitral but also in Gilgit, Hunza and in the Indus River bed. Most of these sites are accessible by fair weather and metalled Roads.

He suggested that where the concentration of the valuable minerals including gold was relatively high should be located for dredging purposes. For weaning minerals from the alluvials he suggested that mining operation, mineral concentration and mineral separation should be carried out one after the other.

CSO: 4600/288

OFFICIAL SAYS REFUGEES NOT PLANNING PERMANENT SETTLEMENT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Jan 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Saeed Qureshi]

[Text] Islamabad, Jan. 2. Brig Said Azhar, the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, has dispelled the view that the Afghan refugees were contemplating permanent settlement in Pakistan. In the light of his personal contacts and meetings with the refugees, he could say that they had no desire to stay in Pakistan for good.

Brig Azhar clarified that barring the establishment of a camp in Mianwali with the capacity of 61,000 individuals, the Pakistan Government had no intention of dispersing the refugees in other parts of Punjab and Sind. In Quetta however, he said, 300,000 refugees were staying.

In an interview Brig Azhar said the Afghan refugees are allowed to take up jobs in the private sector for generating income in addition to what they are getting in cash maintenance allowance. The Pakistan Government has tried to absorb the educated and technically qualified within the camps, to the extent it was possible."

Brig Said Azhar said the Pakistan Government was also providing roofing material to those refugees who wanted to shift from tents to mud houses.

Although the practice has taken root on its own, yet the Pakistan Government could not oppose such a choice which saved them from the rigours of extreme weather conditions. "The refugees have already been in tents for four years and who knows how long they have to lead the life of a refugee."

Talking about the facilities being given to the three million refugees he said the stipulated international aid was 200 million dollars for the current year which will be supplemented by an equal component cash aid from Pakistan. "But for certain practical administrative difficulties, the cash disbursement of allowance could not be continued on a regular monthly basis."

Brig. Azhar maintained that the Afghan refugees staying in about 350 camps all along the border were mostly the families of those Mujahideen who were fighting against the Soviet and Afghan forces within Afghanistan.

When asked whether these Mujahideen regularly visited their families in the camps, and whether they carried their weapons with them, Brig. Azhar said he was not sure about this adding that he was sure about one thing that the camps were not being used as the training camps as alleged in certain quarters.

The Commissioner did not object to the relief work being done by certain defunct political parties and said that any organisation, group or party whether national or international were welcome to do relief work in the camps.

To a question whether the aid given by the WHO and UNHCR were in fact reaching the refugees the Chief Commissioner said, these international agencies had a monitoring system of their own. If there had been any malpractice they would not have increased the assistance with the increasing influx of the refugees.

Of a host of the facilities which the government was providing to the refugees the latest addition was the award of 200 stipends to Afghan students for professional training in home as well as foreign institutions.

Brig Azhar also repudiated the impression that feuds between the refugees and locals were escalating. The question of the land on which the refugees have pegged their tents is contentious. As such the demand of the land owners for compensation was natural.

Dissociating himself from the political aspect of the problem, Brig Azhar said he had never met any of the Afghan leaders. He denied any pressure being exerted on the Pakistan Government by these leaders for handing over to them the control of aid distribution in the camps.

When his attention was drawn to the allegations that the commodity ration being given to the refugees was more than their needs, and that they were trading in the surplus stuff, the Chief Commissioner was of the view that the ratio quantity was fixed according to the international standards which could not be curtailed. "There is no harm if the refugees got some thing of basic necessity in exchange for the food stuff," he added.

CSO: 4600/286

CII RECOMMENDS DEATH FOR BLASPHEMY

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 5 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] The Council of Islamic Ideology has made recommendations to the Government of Pakistan that contempt of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and apostasy be made an offence punishable with death.

This was disclosed by Mr Ismail Qureshy, Convener of the World Association of Muslim Jurists of Pakistan, on Wednesday in Lahore.

He had moved a resolution against a book "Heavenly Communism" written and published by Mushtaq Raj an advocate of the Lahore High Court, in which he had shown disrespect to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and demanded that the book should be confiscated and legislation undertaken on this issue. The punishment of death was demanded for offence of contempt of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).

A resolution was also passed by the Lahore High Court Bar Association demanding that a provision should be made in the Pakistan Penal Code whereby the punishment prescribed by Islam should be provided for the offence of the contempt of the Holy Prophet.

The Government took immediate steps in this regard. The book was proscribed, the author was arrested and the matter referred to the Islamic Ideology Council which after due deliberations made recommendations that death penalty should be awarded to the person who committed contempt of the Holy Prophet as ordained in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

The same penalty has also been recommended by the Islamic Ideology Council for the apostasy.

There is no provision in the present Penal Code of Pakistan whereby a contempt-er of the Holy Prophet and apostasy can be dealt with under the law. There are two sections i.e. 295A and 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code which only grants punishment for contempt of the religion and Ummahatul Momeneen Khulfa-i-Rashideen and Ahl-e-Bait.

CSO: 4600/288

BRIEFS

GOVERNOR ON REFUGEES PURCHASING PROPERTY--Lahore, Jan 2--The Governor of Punjab Lt Gen Ghulam Jilani Khan has taken a very serious view that Afghan refugees are purchasing property in the province and were also getting national identity cards and Pakistani passport. He said the officers who would violate government policy would be taken to task. During the general discussion on the third day of provincial council of the Punjab, he directed the commissioners and deputy commissioners and other concerned officers to keep strict watch and ensure that no Afghan refugee would purchase property in the Province. [Excerpt] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Jan 84 p 1]

CONCERN OVER EDITOR'S REARREST--Hyderabad, Jan. 2--About 55 prominent Sindi writers, scholars and poets have expressed great concern over the rearrest of the editor, SOHNI, a Sindi weekly magazine, Tariq Ashraf, and confining him in jail with habitual criminals. In a press release today they have demanded the immediate release of Tariq Ashraf. It may be recalled that Tariq Ashraf had printed a book of Rasool Bux Paleejo "Subhu Thenda" in 1974 from his press and the city Police, Hyderabad, had then registered a case charging him with the printing of an objectionable book of Paleejo. The second addition of the same book was printed by another press during martial law regime but no action was taken against that printer. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Jan 84 p 6]

LEADERS COMPLAIN OF MALTREATMENT--Hyderabad, Jan 2--All MRD leaders, except Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Mumtaz Bhutto and Khawaja Khairuddin have been shifted from "B" class to "C" class and "B" class facilities have been withdrawn. Some former federal as well as provincial ministers have been given "C" class. The MRD have sent letters to their family members to send them "katcha" ration as they would cook their meals themselves. They have also made allegations of torture. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Jan 84 p 6]

JASARAT EDITOR RESIGNS--Karachi, Jan. 1--Mr Mohammad Salahuddin has relinquished the charge of editor daily JASARAT on personal reasons from today January one. A press release issued by the JASARAT management said that all the employees of the establishment have wished him a better and secured future. Meanwhile Mr Kashish Siddiqi has been appointed Acting Editor of the daily. APP [Text] [Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 2 Jan 84 p 1]

NDP CLARIFIES POSITION--Lahore, 4: The Acting Secretary General of defunct National Democratic Party, Sohail Akhtar Malik has contradicted the news appearing in a section of Press that NDP was dissociating itself from MRD. In a statement he said NDP was firm on the four point programme of MRD and was founder of the alliance. He said "Our past indicated that we had never compromised on principles." Further, the party did not lag behind in the struggle for the restoration of democracy in the country. He said the task assigned by MRD for saving the country was unparalleled in history. Sohail Malik said NDP was very much within the fold of MRD and added that no individual, except the Central Working Committee of the party, was competent to make such policy decisions. He reiterated that the struggle launched by MRD for the restoration of democracy, lifting of martial law, restoration of 1973 constitution would continue till realisation of the objectives. [Text]
[Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Jan 84 p 8]

WORKERS RETURNING HOME--January 4--Pakistani workers returning home outnumber those who are going abroad. Experts say that against every 100 Pakistani workers go to the UAE, on the average 125 Pakistanis return. This trend is noticeable for two years. Previously the number of those who secured jobs abroad was more than the ones who returned home on the expiry of their contracts. This is due to a number of factors like reduction in oil prices, completion of on-going projects and cuts on new development projects in the host countries. The Pakistani workers have high priority in the countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. For Iraq and Libya, the Pakistani workers have not to go through the Overseas Employment Corporation only. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 5 Jan 84 p 1]

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